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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis is a qualitative study of a group of leaders from the 
Westminster Parliament, the Financial Services Authority and three UK 
high street banks following the 2008 financial crisis and has been 
undertaken to further our understanding of interorganisational trust. 
The study is ethnographically informed, but makes significant use of 
focus group and interview data. It also uses data collected from Treasury 
Select Committee meetings and other publications relating to the policy 
debate following the publication of the draft Independent Commission on 
Banking Report in April 2011.  
There is currently a gap in our knowledge about how interpersonal 
trust relates to trust between organisations. There has been a good deal 
of empirical work on interpersonal trust between individuals and within 
organisations; on the other hand, our understanding of interorganisational 
trust tends to be more theoretical, lacking the same breath of empirical 
work that has been undertaken on interpersonal trust. 
 This thesis attempts to better understand interorganisational trust-
building by using what we know from the trust literature. It then proposes 
a practice-based approach to studying trust-building to address the 
challenge we face in conceptualising trust coherently at micro and macro 
levels together, moving our understanding beyond thinking about trust as 
a construct or as existing at a level. 
The thesis firstly identifies three practices that help us better understand 
how trust-building takes place in the complexity of the interorganisational 
system. The first of these practices is storytelling, the second is curating 
space, the third is managing knowledge flows.  
The thesis secondly proposes that understanding individual and 
organisational actors as occupying a liminal state, existing in a state of 
being both individual and organisational actors. This allows us to begin to 
consider trust-building as both a micro and macro concern at once and 
provides fresh insight into trust-building. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AS A TRUST 
CRISIS 
 
 
‘Anyone who says we're in a 
recession, or heading into one, 
especially the worst one since the 
Great Depression, is making up his 
own private definition of recession.’  
 
 
Donald Luskin, Former CIO, Barclays Global Investors 
(The Washington Post, September 14 2008) 
 
On the 15 September 2008, or "Black Monday” as it became known, Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for Chapter Eleven Bankruptcy Protection with bank debt 
of 613 billion dollars and 155 billion dollars in bond debt. Lehman Brothers’ 
bankruptcy filing represented the equivalent value of the sum-total of the ten largest 
bankruptcy filings that had ever previously been filed. This ‘investment bank, 
operating essentially as a hedge fund’ (Mario Draghi, Notes from the Meeting of the 
Governing Council, European Central Bank 20 November 2012) was, as 
commentators quickly began to agree, ‘too big to fail’1 (McKinney, 1984).  
Lehman Brother’s default was however ‘just the leading edge of a financial 
hurricane’ (‘Into the Storm’, The Economist 23 October 2008) as trust in the global 
financial system quickly disappeared. On the trading day proceeding news of 
Lehman’s default, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 500 points, the FTSE Index 
fell by six percent and the Nikkei 225 index fell by eleven percent. The following 
month, the Belgian Bank, Fortis, the twentieth largest business in the world by 
revenue in 2007 was bailed out and nationalised by the Belgian Government. 
 In the UK, a lack of liquidity led to Bradford and Bingley Building Society 
being nationalised and resold, Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) becoming partly 
nationalised with the Government taking a forty-three percent stake in the business 
and the Royal Bank of Scotland effectively nationalised with a Government bailout 
representing an estimated eventual liability of eight hundred and fifty billion pounds 
                                                 
1 This was a term first coined in remarks made regarding the Deposit Insurance Corporation by U.S. 
Congressman McKinney in a 1984 Congressional hearing, but quickly became a maxim in 
commentators’ references to large financial institutions following the 2008 financial crisis.   
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(‘Bank Bailout Hits £850 Billion’ Reuters, 4 December 2009). Although other UK 
banks were not forced to nationalise, it became apparent, as the cost of credit 
increased and use of the wholesale markets came under intense scrutiny, that the 
UK banks may not have the sufficient liquidity to ensure they had sufficient resilience 
should the crisis deepen and, without exception, they all raised further capital by 
new share issues to preserve their capital ratios. 
The crisis was essentially the collapse of a complex set of interconnecting 
relationships across national boundaries, between multiple actors in the retail and 
wholesale functions of the banks, which was caused by a single catalyst: ‘the high-
profile disorderly failure of Lehman Brothers’ (Swedberg, 2010: 42). The 
catastrophic, roughly simultaneous, collapse of the interconnecting relationships 
based on a failure of the interorganisational system is fundamentally what 
differentiates the 2008 crisis from any previous crisis.  
This thesis is a study of trust-building amongst British politicians, regulators 
and the UK banks following the breakdown of interorganisational trust in the system. 
The study recognises the European and American contexts, it also acknowledges 
the other financial services sector organisations contributing to the escalation of the 
crisis as well as the ongoing public scrutiny on the stakeholders in the study, but the 
primary focus of the thesis is on the attempts to build trust that take place between 
the British regulators, the British legislators and the UK high street banks.   
 
A breakdown in interorganisational trust in the financial system 
 
The 2008 crisis was not the first time there has been significant disruption to the 
routine business of the banking system. Indeed, Martin Wolf, an ICB Commissioner 
commented that the 2008 crisis should be considered ‘an inevitable part of the 
modern business cycle’ (‘The Origins of the Financial Crisis’ The Financial Times, 8 
December 2008). Most commentators agree that Martin Wolf is correct in his 
assertion that financial crises should be considered as ‘an inevitable part of the 
modern business cycle’. However, I argue that the financial crisis represented a 
breakdown in trust in the system that went beyond the individuals and organisations 
operating in the global financial system.  
Financial crises are generally observed at the level of the organisation where 
there is an expectation of periodic failure (Harper, Randall & Rouncefield, 2012). 
Wider contagion is therefore considered to be ‘unpredictable, but unlikely’ (Kaufman, 
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1994:34) and when it happens it can normally be contained. If an organisation is a 
risk, counterparties simply removed their exposure to that organisation. The system 
within which the organisations operated remained unaffected, provided the 
perceived risk was isolated to a specific organisation. This type of interorganisational 
trust breakdown has increasingly been considered ‘business as usual’ (Caplin & 
Leahy, 1994: 81) between financial organisations operating in the global financial 
system and there are manifold cases that highlight that trust breakdown between 
organisations does not necessarily impact trust in the overall financial system; it is 
simply viewed as a ‘breakdown of cooperation between organisations’ (Spagnolo, 
1999: 23).  
Bradford and Bingley’s mis-selling of precipice and with-profit bonds in 2005 
(Laffey & Gandy, 2009), the Clearstream failings which began in 2004 (Robert & 
Backes, 2005) and the example that the Securities and Futures Authority (SFA) 
made of Natwest who hid losses by over-valuing options in 2000 (Bowe & Jobome, 
2000) are examples of organisational-level trust violations that impacted multiple 
organisations prior to the 2008 crisis. Similar breeches of trust throughout the 1990s 
such as the Baring Bank derivatives trading scandal in 1995 (Jones & George, 
1998), the Credit Lyonnais case in 1991 and the Salomon Brothers Treasury bond 
auction scandal provide evidence that over the past twenty-five years organisational-
level failure has not necessarily constituted grounds for a wider financial crisis and 
failure of trust in strategically important financial organisations can be isolated to the 
organisation in question. 
In some scenarios, organisational failures focus on the individual as the 
cause of organisational failure and the breakdown in trust has therefore focused on 
an individual such as the Chief Executive. Bob Diamond is a notable example in the 
case of the LIBOR scandal in 2012. However, work on the cases of Charles Ponzi 
in 1920 (Greenspan, Belongie, Goodman, Perona, Rakshit, & Anderson, 1994) and 
Ivar Kreuger in 1932 (Flesher & Flesher, 1986) remind us that scapegoating an 
individual (or small group of individuals) is not a new, or post-2008-crisis 
phenomenon. Even as far back as the sixteenth century the failure of Ambrosius and 
Hanns, one of the most prominent German merchant-banking houses, was blamed 
on the Höchstetter brothers (Safley, 2009).  
Most financial crises prior to 2008 crisis have taken place at the level of the 
organisation. Often this is not entirely clear when the blame is placed on external 
conditions faced by the organisation. For example, the Northern Rock (Goldsmith-
Pinkham & Yorulmazer, 2010: 55) case demonstrated that trust – or at least 
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confidence - is important to protect against the unpredictable effects of integration 
of ‘modern banking and capital market developments’ but ultimately this example 
was the result of an organisational-level failure (Tobias & Hyun Song Shin, 2009). 
The Banco Ambrosiano and the Vatican Bank scandal in 1982, The Butcher 
Brothers and the United American Bank in 1983 are further examples of 
organisationally specific crises that were brought about by external factors that were 
located at the organisational level, which leads one to conclude that blaming 
exogenous factors for failures located at the level of the organisation has taken place 
for at least thirty years and is therefore not isolated to Twenty-First Century 
examples – organisational trust breakdown is therefore not a new phenomenon.   
There are instances where the breakdown of trust between individual 
organisations does spread to a wider group of organisations; for instance, in the 
case of Enron in 2001 due to the size and the number of stakeholders and more 
recently the criminal settlements against Barclays Bank in June 2012 for fixing their 
LIBOR rate and the ‘implications for the US derivatives market’ (Blanco & Wehrheim, 
2016: 49). This ‘spill over of shocks’ (Böwer & Guillemineau, 2006) from one firm to 
another is described in the financial services literature as ‘bank contagion’ (See 
Kaufman, 1994 for a review of theory and evidence).  
The key point to note in all the cases mentioned so far however is that the 
crisis has been linked either directly with the actions of individual(s) or 
organisation(s) as the perpetrator. Despite the widespread contagion in some of 
these cases the exposure to risk and the ensuing breakdown of trust in the 
organisations in these cases can be rationalised by the financial community as 
‘specific to individuals or organisations and their circumstances’ (Reason, 2016: 31). 
External stakeholders were able to isolate themselves from the organisation in 
question to ensure they were not vulnerable.  
Therefore, provided the failure is located at the level of the organisation and 
not the interorganisational system itself, the breakdown of trust and any ensuing 
bank contagion in the financial services sector will likely only have a peripheral 
impact on trust placed by stakeholders in the wider architecture of the system. 
Fundamentally interorganisational trust breakdown (even following a severe period 
of wider contagion) does not necessarily lead to a breakdown of trust in the system 
if the root cause is situated at the level of the interorganisational system, but as the 
2008 financial crisis demonstrated, a breakdown of trust in the interorganisational 
system will bring about a level of contagion amongst strategically important financial 
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organisations in a way that cannot be isolated to the level of the individual or the 
organisation.   
It should also finally be acknowledged that although the Dotcom bubble had 
a similar effect to the 2008 crisis since the effects of the collapse of the Dotcom crisis 
were global in nature and the crisis impacted other sectors, it could be rationalised 
as an organisation-level problem. It is now considered to be based on the revelation 
that the legitimacy of venture capitalists’ confidence in technological advancements 
was largely unsubstantiated, rather than a interorganisational problem relating to the 
structural architecture of the financial services sector itself. The legacy of the 
Dotcom crisis has therefore been rationalised as part of this boom and bust cycle 
which creates winners (such as Amazon and eBay for example) and losers (such as 
Cisco and LastMinute.com for example). The Dotcom crisis was more severe in its 
effects than the financial crises preceding it because of the speed with which the 
crisis spread due to the globalisation of the financial sector and advances in 
technology. However, the fact that those invested in the crisis could identify a cause 
within the system that could be isolated at the level of the organisation (i.e. 
moderating the rapid investment in new internet-based technologies) meant there 
was a clear way to address the crisis for those involved in the leadership of the 
financial services sector as well as those regulating and legislating the sector at the 
time. 
The fundamental factor that makes the 2008 crisis different to all the 
preceding crises, including the Dotcom bubble, and why it is of such empirical 
interest is because it was the trust in the overall architecture of the financial system 
that broke down. The combination of a globalised marketplace, readily networked 
actors and the lack of trust in structural aspects of the financial services sector meant 
that we saw an unprecedented ‘black swan’ (Taleb 2007: 2) event in the 2008 crisis. 
Lehman Brothers’ insolvency was therefore incidental to those involved in the future 
of the global financial system since it was a symptom rather than the cause. It was 
quickly recognised domestically in the UK, in Europe and in the United States that 
the failure was not because of any specific individual, organisation or activity within 
the system as with the examples previously cited, but that the banking system itself 
had been allowed to develop in such a way that it was now ‘no longer fit for purpose’ 
(‘Wounds from the 2008 financial crisis are still bleeding’ The Financial Times, 6 May 
2009). This presented a much greater challenge to those with an interest in the long-
term future of the banking system and those organisations that provided its structure 
and operated within its boundaries.  
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Therefore, the 2008 crisis can be understood as new type of financial crisis, 
where the breakdown of trust in the interorganisational system brought about the 
breakdown of the trust in and between strategically important financial organisations. 
Firstly, the inter-connectedness of the organisations and individuals in the system, 
secondly, the speed at which information was shared and thirdly the structural nature 
of the breakdown of trust differentiate it from the Dotcom bubble and all previous 
financial crises. Although the crisis has commonalities with many of the crises that 
have come before it, the combination of these three factors mark the 2008 crisis out 
as fundamentally different– and the breakdown in interorganisational trust more 
pervasive than any other financial crisis. There was a breakdown in confidence – or 
more specifically in trust in the interorganisational system itself that had implications 
for all the organisations within it. 
The system broke down not because Lehman Brothers had collapsed (Plenty 
of organisations had been bailed out previously) but because it revealed what many 
involved in the strategic future of the banks had suspected - that the level of trust 
that third party organisations allowed participants to place in the system was not 
warranted (Wolf, 2009). Although, as has previously been observed, the 2008 crisis 
is still considered by many as ‘an inevitable part of the modern business cycle’ (Wolf, 
2008: 12). What made this crisis different is that this complex set of relationships 
broke down not because Lehman Brothers had collapsed but because Lehman 
Brothers’ collapse was a catalyst that revealed that the level of trust placed in the 
fundamental building block of the system had failed. Essentially the malleability of 
the architectural structure of a global market-based economy to insulate 
organisations from mass contagion and instant failure was removed and therefore it 
was not possible to locate any single fault point for the crisis. 
The idea that ‘the cause of the crisis was because of a breakdown in trust 
across a range of parties’ (Roth, 2009: 325) seems to have been agreed upon in 
much of the media and academic commentary. Economists (Colander, Goldberg, 
Haas & Juselius, 2009), Psychologists (Ariely, Kamenica & Prelec, 2012) and even 
Historians (Sylla & Ögren, 2010) have touched on the issue of trust breakdown 
amongst the banks (Lapavitsas, 2009). The relevance of the crisis to scholars from 
a range of disciplines, and the fact that some of those scholars have begun to make 
links between the financial crisis and the lack of trust (i.e. Roth, 2009; Erkens, Hung 
& Matos 2012 & Earle, 2009), makes it a particularly appealing, but conceptually 
complicated case for trust scholars (Gillespie & Hurley, 2013). 
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Furthermore, the 2008 crisis is of particular interest to a study of 
interorganisational trust because of the complexities of interactions between multiple 
stakeholders operating in specific locations that evolved and changed over time and 
presents an empirical opportunity to explore interorganisational trust-building. The 
global financial crisis of 2008 was the result of a loss of trust in the financial system, 
which was affected and caused by a multitude of individual, organisational and 
institutional actors and prompts us to ask the question: 
 
“How do individual, organisational and institutional actors work to 
build trust following a financial collapse?”  
 
In addressing this question, I will take a practice perspective on trust-building 
that addresses two theoretical questions that have been problematic in the trust 
literature. First, I suggest that practice theory can be applied to interorganisational 
trust-building to help us make sense of the complexities of interorganisational trust 
repair, an area of research that remains largely unaddressed. I suggest specifically 
that storytelling, curating space and managing and mediating knowledge flows are 
useful practices to make sense of the complexities of interorganisational trust-
building following a breakdown in trust such as we have seen in the financial crisis. 
Secondly, taking a practice approach I address the challenge of addressing the 
dichotomy of levels of analysis that the current debate remains polarised around 
between primarily psychological theories of interpersonal trust (Kong, Dirks & Ferrin, 
2014; Weibel, Den Hartog & Gillespie, 2015) and nomological structural theories of 
institutional trust (Kroeger, 2016; Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011). In the hinterland of 
this debate is some nascent interest developing amongst scholars (Vanneste, 2016; 
Villena, Choi & Revilla, 2016) around how organisations build interorganisational 
trust. I address this gap by suggesting that studying trust-building from a practice 
perspective allows us to go beyond considering trust as either a macro or micro 
concern and therefore cannot be considered as phenomena that exists at particular 
unit of analysis or in specific way, since individuals and organisations are socially 
embedded in a complex web of interactions that constitute the social reality in which 
they exist.    
The theoretical interest in the 2008 financial crisis therefore stems from a 
desire to better conceptualise trust building between multiple organisations within a 
system and to develop new approaches capable of accommodating micro and 
macro interpretations of trust-building (Bachmann, Gillespie, & Priem, 2015; 
Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011) in the messiness of the interorganisational environment 
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where there are individual, organisational and institutional actors all working to 
influence the trust-building process.  
 
Structure of the thesis  
 
Chapter two reviews the trust literature and identifies five aspects of trust that 
are significant in the trust literature, but are also relevant to the empirical study 
undertaken in this thesis. The chapter also identifies two challenges for trust 
research. Firstly, the lack of alignment between micro and macro interpretations of 
trust, which continues to remain a challenge for trust scholars. As this thesis is in 
print there is a call for papers for a special issue on multi-level trust in the Journal of 
Trust Research. Secondly, the chapter recognises that our current research 
methods are fundamentally ill-equipped to address the complexities of 
interorganisational trust-building. In this chapter I propose a practice theory 
approach to trust-building that allows us to (1) address the complexities of trust-
building in an interorganisational environment and (2) allows us to reconcile the 
micro and macro conceptualisations of trust in new ways that we have not yet 
previously been able to consider.  
Chapter three presents the methods that were undertaken in the study and 
provides some further context regarding the data gathering and the data analysis. 
The fieldwork focused on the policy debate between senior bankers, the FSA and 
politicians with an interest in the legislation in the period between the publication of 
the draft Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) Report in April 2011 and draft 
publication of the draft Banking Reform Bill in October 2012.  
I worked in Parliament during this period and undertook this Ph.D. research 
part-time. Therefore, the study relied heavily on ethnography, but also made 
extensive use of interview and focus group data together with data collected from 
the Treasury Select Committee (TSC) hearings and other material published by the 
three stakeholder groups during this period. Using these different data sets allowed 
me to study the discussion about the policy recommendations put forward in the 
draft ICB report from a variety of perspectives and an opportunity to explore the 
participants views and behaviours in a range of public and private fora.  
 Chapter four briefly outlines the salient information about the organisations that 
are relevant to the study. These include the three high street banks, the TSC and 
the Financial Services Authority.  
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 Chapter five describes the data collected about the interactions of the three 
stakeholder groups that was of particular interest to trust-building: first, the bankers’ 
interactions with the TSC and then with the other two stakeholder groups in the focus 
groups. The chapter then examines the ways that the actors curate and are 
influenced by the spaces they inhabit exploring the ways the TSC and the focus 
groups served to facilitate attempts at trust-building.  
    Chapter six focuses specifically on the bankers’ collective interactions with one 
another, their engagement with the European regulatory and American legislatory 
environments and their focus on the City of London. It also considers how the spaces 
the banks occupy help to facilitate their attempts at trust-building. 
Chapter seven makes two contributions to our knowledge of trust-building. It 
firstly offers three practices that contribute to interorganisational trust-building. 
These practices are storytelling, curating space, and managing and mediating 
knowledge flows. The thesis then addresses the challenge of reconciling micro and 
macro conceptualisations of trust by suggesting that we consider the individual and 
organisational actors in a perpetual state of liminality – never quite fully one nor the 
other.      
Chapter eight suggests three practical applications. First, clarifying the 
relationship between the leaders and their organisations. Second, considering how 
spaces might be used more prominently in the trust-building process and third, how 
we might reframe the role of the regulator. Chapter eight also provides some 
suggestions of further avenues for research. 
Chapter nine provides a brief conclusion of the thesis and summaries the 
contributions that the thesis makes to our understanding of trust-building  
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CHAPTER TWO: TOWARDS A PRACTICE 
PERSPECTIVE ON TRUST 
 
‘Not so different after all?’ Considering interorganisational trust-building 
 
The past twenty years or of trust research in organisation and management 
studies has steeled our understanding of trust as primarily a psychological concern 
(Bigley & Pearce, 1998; Mayer & Gavin, 2005). Overall, the dominant approach to 
trust research in organisation studies combines an the context specific, ‘fuzzy logic’ 
of trust (Bachmann 1999: 1032) with a sense that trust can be quantified either as 
the attitude or state of mind of an individual (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer, 
1998) or as an organizing principle (McEvily, Perrone & Zaheer, 2003).  
If the ambition of trust researchers is to become the reflexive awareness of 
what trust looks like in today’s society, then the study of practices is a central analytic 
task in developing an understanding of trust for scholars and practitioners. With this 
goal in mind, the purpose of this thesis is not to devalue previous work on trust but 
to contribute a different way to think about trust in and between individuals and 
organisations, which reconnects the trust research agenda in organisation studies 
with research on trust in the broader social sciences, which has, relatively-speaking, 
received little attention from trust scholars in management and organisation studies 
of late. (I will refer periodically to Sztompka’s (1999) book, since it provides an 
excellent point of departure into a discussion of trust from a practice perspective, but 
it would be remiss not to refer to Luhmann (1982), Barber (1983) and Giddens (1994) 
as making a significant contribution to the view of trust that I describe). This thesis 
is merely a signpost for thinking about trust differently; as Möllering (2001: 343) 
suggests ‘it should be interesting to analyse how the new framing challenges or 
conﬁrms previous ﬁndings’.  
Since practice theory is a broad church of many faiths I do not claim to offer 
an authoritative exegesis of practice theory in this thesis, but simply to reflect on 
some of the central tenants of practice theory to explore what they might bring to our 
understanding of trust. As trust scholars, we are in a fortunate position insofar as the 
practice path is already well worn by other organisation scholars; the discussion in 
management and organisation studies of the “practice turn” over the past decade 
now feels distinctly well-rehearsed (See Whittington, 2006 and Schatzki et al., 2000), 
having been explored in numerous special issues (For example, Organization, 2007; 
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Human Relations, 2007; Organization Studies, 2009) and a raft of international 
symposia.  
To orientate the reader to the task ahead I point in particular to the 
burgeoning literature on strategy-as-practice since my discussion of trust will take a 
similar approach to try to reorientate our thinking about trust research as part of a 
‘broader concern to humanize management and organization research’ (Whittngton, 
2006) focusing on the thick description of social life and contributing more generally 
to the turn ‘towards soft social sciences’ (Stompka, 1999 3; see also Pettigrew et al., 
2002 and Korkman, Storbacka & Harald, 2010). I also borrow from other pockets of 
practice-based research – in areas such as organizational learning (Gherardi, 2009), 
technology (Orlikowski, 2007) and from the nascent literature on marketing-as-
practice (In particular the special issue in the Scandinavian Journal of Management, 
2011). In this respect, I offer my practice-based approach as a ‘collage, 
heteroglossia or even carvinvalesque approach’ (Nicolini, 2012: 34) to trust 
research.  
However, in researching this thesis I have come to recognise the significance 
of thinking about trust from a practice perspective, which links trust research to deep 
traditions of theoretical work in other disciplines whilst contemporaneously helping 
to address some of the ontological and methodological questions that have 
challenged trust scholars in organisation and management studies over the past 
twenty years or so. My discussion therefore serves a dual purpose: first, as an 
experiment to explore how a practice theory perspective might help us, as 
organisation scholars, reflect from a different perspective on trust. Second, in doing 
so I examine to what extent we might consider my account yet another ‘re-turn to 
practice’ (Fredericks, Miettinen and Yanow, 2005) reflecting back on what we know 
about trust research in management and organisation studies, given the rich 
European heritage of broader social scholarship from Luhmann to Giddens and 
Sztompka that has grappled with the concept of trust in the social sciences more 
broadly from, what might in all but name be considered a trust-as-practice 
perspective. The originality of the conceptual framework I develop in this chapter 
therefore stems in part from this re-turn to ways of thinking about trust by standing 
‘on the shoulders of giants’ (Sztompka, 1999: 2). One might suggest, in line with 
Mueller Carter and Whittle’s (2015) account in the recent Organisation Studies 
special issue on trust, that I am merely bringing these perspectives firmly to the fore 
of management and organisation studies, in order to explore them within the 
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management and organisation studies literature. And, therefore in this respect my 
conceptualisation is a novel one.  
This chapter continues as follows. The next section outlines the distinctive 
emphases of the practice perspective for trust research. In doing so I identify trust-
as-practice’s family resemblance to strategy-as-practice. Second, reflecting on the 
recent Organisation Studies special issue on trust I explore some of the current and 
persistent challenges facing trust scholars and proceed to discuss in further detail 
five aspects of trust that help us to consider the cognitive, normative and regulative 
aspects of trust. Finally, I turn our attention to back the “nuts and bolts” of trust-as-
practice: considering what how we might consider a practice theory approach to an 
empirical study of trust and in doing so, I reflect further on the distinctive approach 
to trust research that a practice theory allows.  
  
Trust, strategy-as-practice and the practice turn in Social Sciences  
 
 
Whittington (2006) and Jarzabkowski, Balogun, and Seidl (2007) foreground 
their discussion of strategy-as-practice with three classifications that provide some 
initial bearings to my approach to this study. Broadly, these are (1) the social, where 
shared routines of behaviour, including traditions, norms and procedures exist and 
are reproduced (practices), (2) what actually happens in practice through the activity 
and actions of individuals in bodily interaction with the environment (praxis) and (3) 
the people themselves that perform the praxis (practitioners). I address each in turn 
and discuss how each one foregrounds our understanding of trust from a practice 
perspective. 
First, a practice theory approach to trust prompts us to consider that trust is 
always socially accomplished. From a practice perspective, it makes no sense to 
talk of trust as something that can be assigned to an individual or an organisation 
since trust does not exist discrete from the relationships from which it is created. 
Trustee and trustor are always orientated towards one another within fields of 
practice as they work to earn, or learn to, trust not as atomistic individuals, but 
essentially part of the social. From this perspective, we would never encounter trust 
in isolation and to think of a specific instance of trust one must foreground it by 
bracketing its relationships. As Stzompka (1999: 66) reminds us ‘intuitively we feel 
that trust must be vested in people’. Trust from a practice perspective is thus 
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accomplished as the mutual outworking of social interaction between multiple actors 
rather than belonging to, or bestowed on, an individual. 
This perspective is a departure from the more positivist assumptions 
underpinning much of the most influential trust research in organisation studies. 
Traditionally, trust researchers have tended to treat trust as a property of an 
individual or organisation (See for example, respectively, Lewicki, Tomlinson & 
Gillespie, 2006 or Gillespie & Dietz, 2009), and existing in a reified sense (This trend 
continues in the trust research published in leading management journals of late; 
see Fulmer & Gelfrand, 2014’s article in Journal of Management for instance). Whilst 
placing the individual or organisation as the locus of trust might at first be appealing, 
from a practice perspective it diminishes the socially accomplished, mutually 
constituted nature of trust. I would agree with Szompka (1999: 12), it somehow does 
not seem to make sense to dislocate trust from its social context. 
Second, practice theory places the act of trusting central to a discussion of 
trust and considering trust-as-practice moves our thinking firmly beyond the 
‘snapshot view’ of trust (Lewicki, Tomlinson & Gillespie, 2006: 1342); trust is 
therefore always ‘in the action’ (Nicolini, 2012: 67). Trusting in social life is 
consequently an ongoing production and thus ‘emerges through people’s recurrent 
actions’ (Feldman & Orlikowski 2011; 1240). This should be an intuitive leap for trust 
scholars since trust is usually followed by a verb. Trust is developed (Vanneste, 
Puranam & Kretschmer, 2014), broken (Tomlinson and Mayer, 2009), repaired 
(Gillespie and Dietz, 2009) and enhanced (Kramer & Lewicki, 2010).  
A practice perspective however moves us away from the use of the past 
participle and suggests on each occasion that trust would be recursively shaped 
through the ongoing iterations of praxis of the trusting parties.  For trust research, 
this means that instead of considering trust at a specific moment in time, often 
retrospectively, or as having developed on a continuum from, for example, from 
weak to strong trust (Levin & Cross, 2004) or, say, from calculus to identification-
based trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996) we consider actors as playing a role in 
continually monitoring and assessing situations, employing different trusting praxis 
in the ‘here and now’ (Nicolini, 2012: 91). This view of trust means that praxis will 
impact the state of trust between parties ad infinitum as practices continually shape 
the trusting relationships.  
Third, the distinction between practices and what happens ‘in practice’ 
(Nicolini, 2012) points to the actors and provides a plumb line for a people-centred-
view, which is interested in authentic explanations about the trustee and the trustor 
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as well as the characteristics of their trusting relationship. Actors are seen ‘not as 
simple automata, but as artful interpreters of practices’ (Nicolini, 2012: 103). 
However, despite actors’ ability to decipher and make sense of practices often the 
reality of trusting in practice is rather pragmatic. Therefore, to coin a phrase from 
Whittington (2006: 614) ‘from a practice theory perspective, people count’ both in 
terms of their idiosyncrasies and their aggregate behaviour.  
This acknowledgement of individual agency, whilst also holding in check the 
very real impact of social norms brought about by activities is an important distinction 
for trust researchers. For trust scholars, this addresses two challenges that have 
plagued community of trust scholars: (1) how can we draw comparisons between 
studies of trust (See Dietz and Den Hartog, 2006) and (2) how do we consider the 
micro and the macro aspects of trust without leaving either as the “poor relation” 
(Bachmann, 2001).  
 
Current, perennial and enduring themes in trust research  
 
 
In the editorial of a 2015 Organization Studies special issue on trust crises, 
Bachmann, Gillespie and Priem (2015: 1124) confirm the ongoing challenge of 
reconciling micro and macro conceptualisations of trust, commenting that ‘new 
methods will likely be required to examine trust crises such as the financial crisis’. 
The special issue made a significant empirical contribution to the nascent literature 
on organisational trust. The issue included four empirical papers that addressed 
organisational trust, an area of research which has typically been the purview of 
theoretical work on institutional trust. Prior to the special issue, in top management 
and organisation studies journals, there were only a handful of other studies on 
organisational trust-building that considered both the interpersonal and the 
organisational. These studies focused on trust-building either between two 
organisations (Pfarrer et al., 2008 and Dirks, 2009) or in the case of Gillespie and 
Dietz (2009) trust repair of a single organisation with external stakeholders being the 
trustors.  
The special issue included four further studies of trust in organisations 
(Spicer & Okhmatovskiy, 2015; Stevens, Macduffe & Helper, 2015; Eberl, Geiger & 
Aslander, 2015 and Mueller, Carter & Whittle, 2015). However, to date, despite the 
insight that these studies brought to the fore, the dominant discussion between those 
who study organisational and inter-personal trust is that it is not possible to study 
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the two using similar measures (This discussion goes back to Creed & Miles, 1996 
through Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, (1998) to Blomqvist & Stahle, (2000) and is 
continued in Lewicki et al., (2006) and more recently brought to light in the special 
issue’s editorial (Bachmann et al., 2015). Similarly, the focus in recent symposia and 
scholarly articles has remained that organisational trust is conceptually discrete from 
interpersonal trust; debates will refer to external (as organisational) or internal (as 
interpersonal or intra-organisational) as ways to differentiate the two for instance 
(Kim, Dirks, Cooper & Ferrin, 2006) or for example, micro and macro (Sitkin, 1995) 
or interpersonal and institutional (Lewicki et al., 2006). The recent special issue on 
multilevel trust research in the Journal for Trust Research appears to continue this 
line of thinking where levels are disaggregated and studied independently.  
From this nascent literature on inter-organisational trust in management and 
organisation studies, the comments in the editorial in the Organization Studies 
special issue and, where relevant, the wider corpus of trust literature I refer to five 
aspects of trust that I will discuss briefly to further orientate our discussion on trust 
in order to conceptualise it as a phenomena that should be studied without the 
constraints of levels of analysis.  
 
1. Ability    
 
Muller et al.’s (2015) study of trust in the Organization Studies special issue is of 
particular note both because of its empirical focus and because of its 
conceptualisation of trust. However, like other articles in the special issue the focus 
remains on levels of trust – for instance in their study of trust repair of the big four 
accountancy firms following the financial crisis - they remind us that ‘it is possible to 
distinguish four bases of trust: one can trust individuals, organisations, institutions 
and systems’ (Ibid.: 1324). However, as Mueller and colleagues explore the concept 
of trust transference, I refer to Sztompka’s (1999: 33) assertion that ‘we ultimately 
trust human actions’ and suggest that the human aspect of transference remains 
true, and that, although Mueller et al.’s assertion is a new idea to management and 
organisation studies it is not a new idea to trust research in the social sciences more 
broadly. Sztompka (1999) made the same argument as Mueller et al. (2015) when 
he comments that when we trust the actions of an individual or a group we often 
begin to trust the institution they represent. In this sense, Mueller et al.’s (2015: 
1330) assertion that ‘trust “travels” or can be transferred’ also builds upon Mayer et 
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al.’s (1995) description of ability-based trust in a particular domain by referring to 
Sztompka’s theory of trust transference.  
  A trustee’s ability to deliver an agreed output has been established as 
instrumental in building (Laeequddin, Sahay & Sahay, 2012), maintaining 
(Nickerson, Gubler & Dirks, 2013) and repairing trust (Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). 
Barber (1983:14) highlights the importance of specific skills, noting the trustee’s 
‘expectation of technically competent role performance’ to establish trust. Mayer et 
al. (1995: 717) acknowledge both domain specificity and the importance of specific 
skills describing ability-based trust as reliant on ‘that group of skills, competencies, 
and characteristics that enable a party to have influence within some specific 
domain’ suggesting that ability-based trust is reliant on ‘skills, competencies and 
characteristics’ to influence a specific domain. Mayer et al.’s (1995) definition of trust 
as the ability trustee to deliver a task in a domain specific environment continues to 
be cited systematically by researchers as fundamental to successful trust-building 
(For example, see Robert, Denis & Hung, 2009; Schaubroeck, Lam & Peng, 2011; 
Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Lewicki et al., 2006). 
These studies confirm what we know about trust transference and suggest 
that trust-building is often reliant on actions that present a degree of transference. 
This contributes to subsequent work which builds on Mayer et al’s (1995) paper and 
we see in more recent studies that the domain-specific ability of the trustee has been 
successfully proven in a range of domains. Therefore domain specific ability-based 
trust as defined Mayer et al., (1995) is a firmly established aspect of trust-building in 
the interpersonal trust literature. However, the important contribution Mueller et al., 
(2015) make in their assessment of trust transference is that although we can study 
the development of the trustee/trustor relationship through the abilities shown by the 
trustee in one domain, it will not translate to another domain, particularly in a 
professional services environment such as the accountancy (See also Schwieren & 
Sutter, 2008; Bhattacherjee, 2002 and Hoegl, 2014).  
Therefore, we know that the ability of the actor, whether an organisation or 
an individual, does not exist in a hermetically sealed environment. The ability of the 
actor in different domains will be influenced by the external environment in which 
trust is being built. As Earle (2009: 81) highlights, tasks are ‘reliant on the 
environment surrounding the individual’, which allows them to achieve the necessary 
outcomes and build trust influenced by external influences beyond the scope of a 
dyadic relationship. We see the same argument rehearsed by Mueller et al. (2015).  
Therefore, to focus simply on the actors’ ability and not acknowledge external 
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influences affecting the trustee/trustor relationship, (particulary the institutions) 
means we will not have a full picture of the complexities of interorganisational trust-
building.  
Ability as an aspect of trust-building therefore provides useful insight into 
understanding the importance of the domain specific ability of an actor as 
contributing to the trust-building process, but to describe an individual or an 
organisation as able to deliver a task or have influence in a specific domain and to 
expect this to consistently be the case even if the domain specificity of their 
competence is acknowledged does not acknowledge the external environment and 
the influences of other actors that are constantly evolving and shaping the 
environment in which the ability-based trust is being built. There will be 
immeasurable external variables that influence the trustee’s ability that are beyond 
the scope of the interpersonal or dyadic organisational trusting relationship. 
The role of other actors to facilitate the delivery of a task or produce an output 
is an underexplored aspect of the trust-building literature (Möllering, 2002) and is a 
theme that is developed both by Mueller et al., 2015 and Bachmann et al., 2015 – 
this is described in terms of trust transference, but is similar to the domain-specificity 
ability-based trust as defined by Mayer et al., (1995) (i.e. the set skills, 
competencies, and characteristics that the trustee must do a specific task and the 
ensuing relationship with the trustor those skills develop or maintain). For Mueller et 
al. (2015), just as for Mayer et al., (1995) the focus is on the dyadic relationship 
between organisations and they pay less attention to the role that other actors play 
in assisting the ability of the actor to ‘deliver on an agreement’ (Mayer et al., 1995: 
724). There will likely always be other actors that affect the actor’s ability to deliver 
on an agreement, positively or negatively regardless of the domain studied – 
whether at the organisational or individual level.     
Since ability based trust is agreed to be domain specific (See Levin & Cross, 
2004 for a useful review) and likely to be reliant on external factors and other 
individuals one might pose the question that, if the trustee has the right ‘aptitude, 
intelligence, knowledge or skills’ (Schoorman, Mayer & Davis, 2007) to deliver a task 
in one domain might it be possible for the trustee, as an intelligent actor interacting 
with others and their surroundings, to develop new abilities shaped and supported 
by the external environment and other actors when circumstances require such a 
shift?  
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2. Knowledge and knowing  
 
Knowledge and knowing is a second theme that has both dominated the trust 
literature, and a theme also developed in the recent Organization Studies special 
issue through the discussion of trust transference. Mueller et al., (2015: 1328) 
describe expert systems as ‘principle ways that knowledge is codified beyond the 
interpersonal and shared across teams and between organisations in order to 
provide a basis for trust’. This idea is not a new one. Almost forty years ago, Rotter 
(1980: 55) defined knowledge-based trust as ‘a generalized expectancy held by an 
individual that the word, promise, or statement of another individual can be relied 
on’, a definition that still regularly cited in the trust literature. Knowledge-based trust 
is differentiated from ability-based trust since it relies on information gathered about 
the trustee rather than their actions per se (Lin, 2011). Interpersonal knowledge-
based trust requires repeated instances of the trustor gaining information about the 
trustee that will allow the trustor to ‘predict the actions of the other even in their 
unpredictability’ (Lewicki et al., 2006) which go beyond simply the abilities or actions 
of the trustee. Knowledge-based trust can therefore be understood as a ‘complex 
compilation of judgements by the trustor based on information gathered about the 
trustee’ (Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006: 1032) as they interact over time. 
To be able to predict the unpredictability of the other – as we see in Mueller 
et al.’s (2015) empirical study – requires an ongoing relationship (See also Sitkin & 
Roth from 1993). Both studies imply a degree of interdependence between the 
trustee and trustor ‘where agreements develop obligations which may or may not 
include genuinely expressed, communicated and exchanged promises of the 
parties’ (ibid. 34) as the trustee and trustor gain a deeper knowledge of the 
motivations of the other and the trustor can begin to predict the behaviour of the 
trustee based on aggregation of information gathered (Robert, Denis & Hung, 2009). 
These obligations based on knowledge gathering have typically been difficult to 
measure or quantify as they are subjective and exist as the result of the actors’ own 
abilities and methods of gathering information (Hardwig, 1991). 
Knowledge-based trust-building between two individuals within an 
organisation is achieved in two ways: through arrangements based on explicit rules 
of behaviour that are codified by the trustor who is normally the manager (Das & 
Teng, 1998) or as implicit routines and practices that develop between the two 
parties where the relationship may be as equals (Long & Sitkin, 2006). Implicit rules 
are of interest to our study of interorganisational trust-building since the routines and 
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practices of an organisation that shape behaviour over time can come to imply formal 
rules ‘especially when they acquire stability over a longer period and attain 
legitimacy through common acknowledgement’ (Bachmann & Lane, 2011: 11).  
At the organisational level knowledge-based trust is based on gathering 
information about ‘organisation’s structural arrangements represented by rules of 
behaviour to which individual and collective action is oriented’ (Bachmann & Lane: 
2011: 22), implying that knowledge can be gained about how ‘organisations create 
social order by providing patterns of behaviour used by actors to lend meaning and 
legitimacy to their behaviour’ (Shamir & Lapidot: 466) and that interpersonal trust 
between individuals is also reliant on the social order created through the ‘implicit 
and explicit routines and behaviours provided by the structure of the organisation’ 
(Currall & Inkpen, 2002: 480).  
Organisational-level studies tend to offer responses focused on trust-building 
from the perspective of a single organisations, such as the organisational level trust 
repair (OLTR) model (See, Gillespie & Dietz, 2009, Dietz & Gillespie, 2012 and 
Gillespie and Owen, 2013). Interpersonal studies offer solutions that places the 
organisation as an outer context rather than an active background that influences 
the interpersonal trust relationship (McAllister, 1995). However, the organisational 
actor and the individual actor refer to one another. An organisation’s trustworthiness 
is defined by the individuals within the organisation (Lewicki, McAllister & Bies, 1998) 
and individuals, as actors within organisations are perceived through the lens of the 
organisation they represent (Six & Sorge, 2008). These observations demonstrate 
that knowledge-based trust requires an approach that explores the trustworthiness 
of the actor by gathering knowledge of an actor in a range of ‘social situations’ (Jones 
& George, 1998), or by acknowledging ‘joint activity embedded in social interaction’ 
(Lawler, 2001).  
Knowledge-based trust is established through a relationship spanning 
different situations and activities that deliver successful outcomes for both parties 
on a consistent basis (Mayer et al., 1995; Lewicki et al., 1998; Schoorman et al., 
2007). Knowledge-based trust distinguishes “trustworthiness assessments” and 
“trust decisions” in joint activities. “Trustworthiness assessments” tend to focus on 
the overall strategic relationship of the two parties (Chen, Sapirito & Belkin 2011) 
based on a range of knowledge gathered about the trustee and suggests that 
assessing the trustworthiness of one’s partner through knowledge of their 
motivations is a way to ensure long term successful partnership transactions which 
does not require the assessment of a recurring pattern of separate activities in order 
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to establish  that the partner is able to deliver on an agreement in a specific domain, 
therefore minimizing the number of “trust decisions” a trustor will make (Sabel, 
1998).  
Therefore, knowledge-based trust is viewed as more subjective than ability-
based trust since it is qualified by the degree to which the actor ‘perceives that its 
relationship…is based upon mutual trust and thus is willing to accept short-term 
dislocation because they are confident that such dislocation will balance out in the 
long-run’ (Anderson et al. 1987: 87). As a result, knowledge-based trust is more 
diffuse in the precise expectations of specific outcomes, making trustworthiness 
assessments and derives trust from knowledge gathered that ‘bring about 
successful agreed strategic outcomes’ (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992: 488) based on 
knowledge that allows the trusting party to anticipate the predicated actions of the 
trust partner.  
Acknowledging the tendency for knowledge-based trust to rely heavily on 
diffuse outcomes presents a challenge for interorganisational trust-building since it 
presents a lack of transparency in the knowledge that is shared. Interpersonal trust-
building studies suggest that transparency is key to developing knowledge-based 
trust (Nayar, 2009) and to be sure that the knowledge gathered is accurate and 
representative of the individual (Abrams, Cross, Lesser & Levin, 2003). The same 
has been proven in studies of trust-building at the level of the organisation (Lidberg 
& Robie, 2012). Transparency (or lack thereof) has implications for a study of 
interorganisational trust-building since it will be difficult to identify the motives of all 
the actors involved in an interorganisational trust-building scenario.  
The issue of transparency when dealing with knowledge-based trust 
between multiple organisations is a key theme in the recent Organization Studies 
special issue. In response, I return to the challenge Luhmann (1979: 8) sets out: 
multiple actors ‘unencumbered by distance time, commodity or familiarity’ will 
unlikely present a transparent environment for knowledge-based trust-building. We, 
frankly, do not have a suitable way to capture information when it is so diffuse using 
the methods currently available. Furthermore, we know that external influences 
heavily influence the way knowledge is understood and codifiedAs Möllering (2002: 
786) notes, ‘even when generalised factors such as reputation are drawn upon, 
trustworthiness is ultimately “in the eye of the beholder”” and therefore knowledge-
based trust in an interorganisational environment will remain opaque and difficult to 
fathom for the researcher.  
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3. Identification and alignment of values  
 
The trustors’ psychological alignment with the trustee is therefore the third 
aspect of trust-building that I consider (See DeConinck, 2011 for a discussion of 
alignment and trust). According to Dietz and Gillespie’s (2012: 1032) organisational-
level study of trust, ‘if between equitable partners the trustors’ judgement of the 
trustee is positive and values are aligned this will increase the willingness of the 
trustor to take a risk in dealings with the trustee and ultimately to place trust in them’. 
Identity-based trust is 'socially oriented trust' (Zuppa, Olbina & Issa, 2016: 91) and 
‘rests on shared values or close personal ties’ (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005: 81) 
between individuals representing the organisations highlighting again the role of the 
individual and the organisation in shaping and forming perceptions of trust. Between 
individuals, this might be demonstrated through acts such as gift-exchange (Baviera, 
English & Guillén, 2016) or between organisations through face time (See Kroeger, 
2012). Interpersonal and organisational identification-based trust goes beyond the 
actions of the individuals or the knowledge that the trustor can gain about the trustee. 
Identification based trust therefore is highly idiosyncratic (Ho, Kuo & Lin, 2012), 
relying on the past experiences of the trustor, or for instance expectations that are 
rooted in diffuse and uncodified structures in the external environment that shape 
and give reason for the trustor to trust the trustee. 
Values are therefore an important aspect of identification-based trust. Unlike 
ability or knowledge-based trust, identification-based trust involves a cognitive ‘leap 
of faith’ (Möllering, 2001: 934) that the trustor takes which goes beyond basing their 
trust simply on an assessment of the abilities or knowledge about the trustee, but on 
the perception of shared values. A trustee might demonstrate ability to undertake a 
task to engender trust in the trustor or knowledge may be gained about the trustee 
that might enable the trustor to place trust in the trustee. However, identification-
based trust requires an alignment of values that goes beyond simply the abilities of 
the trustee regardless of their competence in a specific domain (Gillespie & Mann, 
2004) and the trustor might trust the trustee despite accepting that the actions and 
knowledge gathered do not necessarily provide an obvious reason for the trustor to 
trust the trustee.  
The ‘leap of faith’ (Möllering, 2001: 934) that the trustor must take means 
that trust based on identification with the trustee is a decision normally instigated by 
the trustor (Möllering, 2001, 2006), indicating once again that trust-building is not 
always in the hands of the trustee but in the ‘eye of the beholder’ (Möllering, 2002: 
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786) and identification based trust places the trustor in a position of alignment with 
the trustee.  
The trustor’s position of alignment with the trustee helps distinguish the 
process of identification-based trust from ability and knowledge-based trust. Since 
Identification-based trust appears to demonstrate alignment between the trusting 
parties it is often contrasted to ‘skepticism, impartiality, exigency [and] opportunism’ 
(Stevens, MacDuffe & Helper, 2015: 1). McAllister’s (1995) study of 194 managers 
and professionals proved this at the inter-personal level. The study concluded that 
interpersonal cooperation within organisations is often based on identification, and 
that the role of alignment in identification-based trust plays a ‘crucial role in the 
creation and maintenance of trusting relations in the face of uncertainty about 
trustworthiness’ (Ibid.: 334).  
Rempel, Holmes and Zanna (1985) focused their study at more intimate 
level. Instead of investigating the interactions between colleagues, they interviewed 
forty-two Canadian couples. Rempel and colleagues concluded that trust was 
“closely tied to feelings of identification and the attribution of intrinsic motivation to 
both self and partner” (Rempel et al., 1985: 101) [my emphasis added]. Therefore, 
identification-based trust is something – even between married couples – that 
requires the attribution of certain qualities the trustor determines for themselves 
about the ability and motivations of the trustee, but the ‘leap of faith’ is not a rational 
construction of the former. Rather identification-based trust for the individual trustor 
‘is a state of mind’ (Das and Teng, 2001: 254) of the trustor. 
 Having said this, the trust must to some degree be warranted by the trustees’ 
actions (Bhattacharya & Devinney, 1998) and this will likely involve a period of 
identification with their values and their motivations, which are demonstrated to an 
extent by the actions of the trustee (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996) and knowledge about 
the trustee which may lead to a decision on the part of the trustor to align themselves 
with the trustees situation, but the precise reason for the trustor’s decision to place 
identification-based trust in the trustee remains elusive. The literature simply 
acknowledges that at some point identification-based trust may develop (Mayer et 
al., 1995). 
However, the description of identification-based trust in the interpersonal 
literature is useful in a study of interorganisational trust as it indicates that where 
identification-based trusting is taking place there is a commitment to the individual 
or the organisation rather than simply the function they perform (Buchan & Croson, 
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2004). The individual becomes the focus of the trustees’ trust rather than the 
expected outputs. This presents an insight that may be observable in the behaviours 
or actions of the trustor and trustee: for instance, trustors will likely be more tolerant 
of trustees’ mistakes (Costa, 2003) and therefore one would expect to see less 
adversarial behaviour between individuals (Crisp & Jarvenpaa, 2013) because the 
basis of the trust is on the relationship between the trustee and trustor, not simply 
the delivery of an agreed output by the trustee.  
What is not clear in an interorganisational environment is how values might 
be collectively considered and shared. Identification-based trust in an 
interorganisational environment is likely to demonstrate that the organisations will 
depend on the other and behave in a manner acceptable to all parties without the 
need for formal legal arrangements but what might be acceptable to one party may 
well be unacceptable to other parties, however what may be a consideration is the 
practical resource-saving value of collective alignment and a form of collective 
identification-based trust as actors realise that the resources (i.e. time and money) 
that are saved outweigh the risk of closely monitoring the multiple relationships 
through knowledge gathering or measuring the specific outputs (Sitkin, Burt & 
Camerer, 1998).    
 
4. Control and benevolence 
 
Forth, in line with Bachmann (2015), we consider control as an aspect of 
trust-building. For Mueller et al., (2015) impersonal structures resonate closely with 
the systems they critique. At the interpersonal level this is relatively straightforward. 
According to Wiebel (2002: 6) ‘formal control may strengthen the intentions of the 
trustee to act in the interests of the trustor and thereby contribute, in conjunction with 
trust, to organizational effectiveness’. On the other hand, formal control is 
considered in much of the interpersonal literature to be ‘at odds with a trusting 
environment’ (Das & Teng, 1998:  501). However, I am inclined to take the view of 
Möllering (2002) that in the most part, it depends what social theory one applies and 
the context in which the trust-building is studied (See also Reed, 2001). However, 
what is of note here – and something that is not really touched on in any great detail 
in the Organization Studies special issue on trust is that the interpersonal trust 
literature describes control and trust as situated solely in the micro environment 
relating to the actions of the trustee/trustor relationship and pays little attention to 
the way in which control or trust is created in the macro environment through the 
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ongoing individual behaviours and actions (See Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011 for a 
helpful discussion of distinctive role of institutional trust). Control is therefore often 
described by psychologists as ‘deterrence-based trust’ Rousseau et al, (1998: 393), 
‘that emphasises utilitarian considerations that enable one party to believe that 
another will be trustworthy, because the costly sanctions in place for breach of trust 
exceeds any potential benefits from opportunistic behaviour’ (Ibid. 394) 
Since the terms are described as micro concepts that influence the 
behaviours and actions and routines of the individuals that are to be either controlled 
or trusted, the trust literature has tended to consider trust and control as dichotomic 
(De Man & Roijakkers, 2009). Control is also described in pockets of the 
interpersonal trust literature as the antithesis of trust (Reed, 2001). Whether the two 
terms are considered as contrary or as two subsets, the literature has established 
that control does not to ‘equate to trust’ (Skinner & Spira, 2003: 42) but in doing so 
these studies have acknowledged that control is an aspect of trust that contributes 
in some way either to trust-building or to the decline of trust (Paxton, 2005). 
However, although the literature acknowledges the interplay between the two 
concepts, it does this at the expense of largely ignoring the agency individuals have 
to shape and interpret trust at the micro level either as control or trust themselves 
but rather it is considered a mechanism (Bachmann et al., 2015) that controls their 
behaviour rather than an emerging consensus co-created through behaviours and 
actions.  
When exploring the relationship of trust and control at the interpersonal level, 
some trust scholars have conceptualised trust and control as a duality (Möllering, 
2002) rather than a dualism, which is helpful as we begin to think about the 
complexities of organisational trust-building and the agency of the individual in this 
process. Möllering (2005: 912) states that trust and control should be considered as 
a ‘trust/control duality instead of a dualism’. This addresses to an extent the fact that 
human agency plays an important role in determining and interpreting and shaping 
the institutions, organisations and the macro environment that contributes to the 
ways that trust and control are enacted, but does not address the fact that control in 
one instance might represent a form of trust to one individual whereas it might at the 
same time be interpreted as control by another; or how, as interorganisational trust 
is built, we might be able to unravel the “how” and the “when”; can trust create 
control, can control create trust, or can there be an absence of either or the presence 
of both at the same time? These questions remain unaddressed in the trust 
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literature, but are important considerations in a study of interorganisational trust-
building.   
Thinking about trust and control as benevolence may be a way to address 
this challenge in an interorganisational trust-building situation. Benevolence is an 
aspect of trust that is underdeveloped in the trust literature but appears to relate both 
to trust and control. We know from the interpersonal trust literature that benevolence 
must ‘consider the trustee’s overall intentions’ (Sitkin and Roth, 1993: 368) towards 
the trustor. We know from the interpersonal trust-building literature that between two 
trusting parties ‘the effect of perceived benevolence on trust will increase over time 
as the relationship between the parties develops’ (Mayer et al., 1995: 722). 
Benevolence as an aspect of interpersonal trust-building ‘implies a greater good’ 
(Wray‐Lake & Syvertsen, 2011: 14), ‘the belief of goodwill’ (Dong & Li, 2017: 1240) 
and a ‘public-spiritedness’ (Kong, 2014: 388), which all suggest that benevolence 
may not simply relate to the orientation of the trustee towards a single trusting party 
as it has been studied in the interpersonal literature but may be considered to 
understand multiple simultaneous trusting and controlling relationships. Since both 
complete control or complete trust in a global system where financial organisations 
operate is unlikely to be possible, it may be more helpful to think about the 
trust/control duality Möllering (2002) describes and interpret his trust/control and 
consider the problem as one of benevolence, where there is a general well-
meaningness towards all parties involved that moderates rather than controls to 
facilitate the trust-building process.     
If we consider this to be the case, benevolence observed in individuals as 
described by Mayer et al. (1995) should be considered simply the by-product of 
cultural values that form normative behaviour and therefore benevolence should be 
considered as the outworking of institutional arrangements. Bachmann and Inkpen 
(2011: 54) observe from an organisational perspective that ‘an organisation 
establishes behavioural norms that exchange parties usually will orient their 
behaviour to, especially if they have limited knowledge about each other and long-
winded face-to-face trust-building is not a desirable option’ suggesting that 
normative influences may be responsible for benevolent behaviour between 
individuals attempting to build trust. 
There is empirical evidence that suggests this might be the case. Sako and 
Helper (1998) noted in their study of office workers that the level of interpersonal 
trust is higher in Japan than in the United States observing that structural factors 
facilitating trust and those attenuating opportunism differ in the US and Japan. The 
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study leads one to conclude that the Japanese system ensured that the 
organisations and individuals acted with more benevolence simply because there 
was less scope for opportunism because of the external context, not because there 
was any specific difference in the benevolence of the individual participants. The 
study also noted that the participants were the ‘engine of change’ (Ibid. :812). This 
suggests again that benevolence may simply be the by-product of cultural or 
organisational norms that are created over time by individual actions (Guiso, 
Sapienza & Zingales, 2015) but also that benevolence is also the result of 
benevolent structures producing routines and behaviours that govern social 
interactions in ways that allow individuals to operate effectively. 
 Although the focus of these experiments on interpersonal trust-building 
(Mayer & Davis, 1999) and dyadic organisational-level trust-building (Gillespie & 
Dietz, 2009; Sako & Helper, 1998) are not specifically focused on benevolence as a 
form of trust, their descriptions of the complicating role of control mechanisms in the 
development of trust suggests that benevolence may be an aspect of trust-building 
in an interorganisational environment that can be influenced by individual agency 
but also exists as part of the background of the macro environment in which the 
actors operate and may be a useful way to theorise about the relationship between 
trust and control in an interorganisational environment. 
 
5. Calculus-based trust, regulations and boundary setting   
 
 
Finally, we turn our discussion to calculus-based trust. The structure of most 
interactions between individuals and organisations today therefore include the 
possibility for joint benefit or loss – risk of losing something individually (Susan & 
Holmes, 1991) or collectively (Langfred, 2004). Individuals may have ‘considerable 
uncertainty about each other’s intentions and likely actions, and whether the 
interaction will be positive’ (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels & Murnighan 2002: 497). 
Organisations will therefore attempt to employ calculus-based trust that often 
involves bargain agreements (Lorenz, 1999) or economic trade-offs (Lyons & Mehta, 
1997). Weighing relationships, creating boundaries (McEvily & Tortoriello,  2011) 
through calculative assessments of the trustee is an important aspect of how a 
trustor protects their own interests as they embark on the process of establishing 
the basis on which they can begin to trust any potential trustee (Buchan & Croson, 
2004). ‘An individual may be said to have trust in the occurrence of an event if he 
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expects its occurrence and his expectation leads to behaviour which he perceives 
to have greater negative motivational consequences if the expectation is not 
confirmed than positive motivational consequences if it is confirmed’ (Deutsch, 1958: 
265).  
The interpersonal and organisational-level trust literature has established 
that this process often takes place in the early stage of any trusting relationship. As 
a result, calculus-based trust, whether at the interpersonal or organisational level, is 
considered a ‘weaker form of trust’ (Blau, 1968), ‘often one-time’ (Ba & Pavlou, 2002: 
255) and tends to relate in particular to ‘early trust-related experiences’ (Kramer, 
1999). It is the initial calculation made by the trustor, which focuses on the possible 
risks (and benefits) of being vulnerable to the trustor (Rousseau et al., 1998) based 
on factual knowledge gained about the trustee often from third parties combined with 
their own calculation of the risk to themselves of placing trust in the trustee. 
Therefore, attempts to build calculus-based trust focus on the possible gains or 
repercussions for the trustor in placing trust in the trustee in the early stages of the 
relationship and is an important basis for initially developing a trusting relationship 
between the trustee and the trustor. 
At the level of the organisation, regulatory and legal provision provided by 
external bodies become important tools for organisations to build trust. Bachmann 
and Inkpen (2011: 91) highlight ‘the existence of regulatory controls and reliable 
contract law can actually be very conducive to developing trust  between two 
organisations, as relationships firmly based on legal rules can significantly lower the 
inherent risk of trust’ and that the ‘law – or at least regulatory provision – can be an 
effective risk reducing mechanism for organisations because it aligns organisations’ 
expectations and behaviours long before any serious disagreement arises’ (Ibid: 22). 
In this regard, in an interorganisational environment calculus-based trust may have 
a good deal in common with control mechanisms (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996), legal 
provision for the trusting parties (Bachmann, 2001) and as a ‘tit-for-tat series of 
economic exchanges’ (Walker, 1992: 182).  
However, since the number of variables and the number of actors involved 
in any attempt to build trust increases exponentially at the level of the system where 
organisations exist, it seems unlikely that organisations operating in a system where 
benevolence rather than control might be the only aspect of trust they can begin to 
build they are likely to focus on ways in which they can maintain calculus-based trust 
to preserve their own interests as the relationships progress. This assumption is a 
significant shift from the assumption of the interpersonal trust literature that there will 
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be less need for calculus based trust as the relationship progresses. One might 
expect there to be an ongoing use of calculus based trust.   
Since calculus-based trust implies a certain level of distrust (as it relies on 
legalistic control mechanisms) one might expect to see individuals and organisations 
shift their mode of calculus based trust as they feel more inclined to trust the other 
organisations in an interorganisational trust-building scenario to more nuanced 
practices to demonstrate they are prepared to move from legal mechanisms. This 
might involve managing information flows more subtly, through actions and words 
that have tacit or implied meaning as to the consequences if the boundaries are not 
adhered to through anecdotes to suggest possible meaning. The idea of shifting 
modes of calculus-based trust to more nuanced practices is not explored in the 
interpersonal or organisation-level trust literature, but might shed some light on the 
development of calculus based trust in an interorganisational environment and may 
mean we might reconsider the assumption that calculus-based trust is simply a 
catalyst for trust-building at the start of a trust-building relationship.  
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Table (1): Summary of relevant literature and observations  
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Addressing the challenge of levels and constructs  
 
Bachmann et al. (2015: 4) suggest that ‘new methods will likely be required 
examine trust crises such as the financial crisis’.  Although the five aspects of trust 
explored here provide useful insight into interpersonal and organisational trust, and a 
series of lenses through which to consider interorganisational trust-building, the 
current way that we think of trust in terms of discrete constructs, antecedents or 
underlying mechanisms limit the way we can explore the complexities of trust-building 
between multiple stakeholders.  
For example, defining ability-based trust in the interorganisational 
environment of the financial crisis becomes wrought with questions about how one 
might measure ability. Abilities may rely on relationships; abilities will likely exist in 
domains that are constantly shifting. Similarly, questions of calculus decisions made 
at what moment or how to use control to build trust when there is no ultimate authority 
become fluid and intangible. One might consider ability based trust as based on 
knowledge in one instance, or that ability-based trust might be reliant on the control 
an individual or organisation has in a specific situation in another instance for 
example. Identification-based trust between individuals might equally for example rely 
on forms of control enacted by the organisation for individuals to build identification. 
Questions of who trusts, whether it is the individual trusting the organisation, the 
organisation placing trust in its own staff or trust in the interorganisational system 
allowing organisations to make trust decisions about one another, complicate our 
ability to describe trust as a form, or ascribe trustworthiness to an individual or 
organisational actor.  
The point here firstly is that the focus of studies that isolate trust to a particular 
construct of level or analysis will unlikely reflect the complexities of the social reality 
in which interorganisational trust-building between multiple stakeholders is taking 
place. Using the insights from the trust literature outlined in the previous pages we 
need consider new research methods that can acknowledge the complexities of 
interorganisational trust in cases such as the financial crisis where there are multiple 
individual, organisational and institutional actors operating to build trust in different 
ways. As Bachmann et al., (2006: 6) point out in the Handbook of Trust Research:  
 
Trust should move beyond single snapshots of interpersonal, inter group or inter-
organisational trust. Such approaches do not do justice to the intricacies of trust 
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or the degree to which it changes over time. Therefore, we call for a new era of 
trust research that shifts attention towards multilevel analysis of trust.  
 
We see that to date the primary focus of trust research continues however to 
be focused on delineating levels of analysis and has further dislocated our 
understanding of interpersonal and organisation trust as discrete concepts (See 
Bachmann et al., 2015) and we still continue to find ourselves focused on levels of 
analysis in ways that do not allow us to fully consider the complexity of a 
interorganisational environment where there are multiple stakeholders attempting to 
build trust following the breakdown trust in the interorganisational system as we have 
seen in the financial crisis. 
 However, trust scholars insist that the division between micro and macro 
conceptualisations of trust only serves to add more confusion to our understanding of 
the concept of trust (Fulmer & Gelfrand, 2012; Gillespie, Hurley, Dietz & Bachmann, 
2012) and that key to a better understanding of how we better conceptualise trust is 
to ‘reconcile the micro and the macro’ (Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006: 435). Therefore, I 
suggest that to address this problem we need to consider the concept of trust beyond 
simply a micro or macro concern and instead of formalising trust through mechanisms 
that exist at levels of analysis, I suggest we consider how we can go beyond thinking 
of trust in terms of levels, or precise mechanisms, but in ways that allow us to think 
about interorganisational trust in order to address the question of:  
 
“how do individual, organisational and institutional actors 
work to build trust following a financial collapse?” 
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Conclusions: towards a practice perspective on trust  
 
In this chapter, I suggest that interorganisational trust should be studied 
neither in terms of micro or macro phenomena, nor just as singular concepts, since 
trust between multiple organisations will involve a complex web of interactions 
between individuals representing the organisations that are attempting to build trust, 
which current research methods currently struggle to address.  Therefore, rather than 
viewing trust as a thing that exists as a fixed construct based on specific constructs 
or levels of trust, one might conceive that interorganisational trust-building and the 
various aspects of trust described in this chapter will be both created and shaped by 
human behaviour and determined by the actions or beliefs of the trustee or trustor 
and will represent ‘embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity organised 
around shared understanding’ (Schatzki 2001: 2).  
Considering trust from a practice perspective aims to study relationships 
situated and socially accomplished through the actions and interactions of multiple 
actors. Such a perspective builds on Weick’s (1979) distinction that social life is better 
understood using gerunds and verbs instead of static, reified concepts. Central to 
such an approach is the notion that social life ‘is an ongoing production and thus 
emerges through people’s recurrent actions’ as it focuses on dynamics, relations and 
enactment (Feldman & Orlikowski 2011: 1240).   
In conclusion, a practice theory approach to building and maintaining trust 
offers four unique angles to trust research. First, a practice ontology rejects dualisms, 
such as micro-macro, subject – object, theory-action, body-mind. In trust research this 
is an important reorientation of thinking and addresses the challenge that we currently 
face in the trust literature between micro and macro conceptualisations of trust (Dietz 
and Den Hartog,  2006; Bachmann et al., 2015) where levels of analysis are 
considered as discrete (Fulmer & Gelfrand, 2012), described as different categories 
(Schoorman et al., 2007) or as dualistic (Lewicki et al., 2006) and provides new 
opportunities to consider trust beyond levels of analysis. ‘Individual and collective 
social agency is therefore constituted through assembling, aligning and stabilising 
patterns of relationships so that any form of social order is in fact the outcome of 
observable instances of ordering’ (Nicolini, 2009: 1394) rather than existing at a level 
of analysis or as a static, reified concept. From this follows that the aim of studying 
interorganisational trust in this way is concerned with ‘tracing the associations 
between human agency and the structures it creates and studying the effects that the 
resulting arrangements make in the world’ (Nicolini, 2012: 32). This provides an 
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opportunity to revaluate our approach to studying trust-building that does not build up 
levels of analysis (See Bachmann et al., 2015) but rather considers the micro and 
macro in a state of mutual constitution (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011).  
Second, a practice approach focuses on the centrality of everyday actions as 
consequential. Activity, performance and work create and perpetuate all aspects of 
social life (Nicolini, 2012) as ongoing, routinized and recurrent accomplishments. 
Conceptualising interorganisational trust as both a process curated by the individual 
and a process that shapes the individual acknowledges that the individual is at once 
an agent able to shape the environment of their organisation and the 
interorganisational system they exist within, as well as an actor bound up in the 
routines, practices and cultures of their organisation and the interorganisational 
system. Therefore, the everyday actions in the word and the deed can be understood 
to provide insight into the various practices that take place as a whole range of 
different individuals and organisations interact to rebuild trust in the UK banking sector 
whilst also rebuilding trust amongst themselves and in their own organisations. It is 
only once we appreciate the set of practices involves ongoing, routinized and 
recurrent accomplishments that we can ask what sort of ability individuals have to 
build interorganisational trust. Thus, rather than considering concepts like control, 
knowledge or ability as existing in a reified sense, a practice perspective on these 
characteristics or concepts that have been linked to trust, would consider how 
knowledgeability (or control etc) is accomplished and perpetuated (or altered) in 
everyday actions. Using this approach makes trust public and visible, manifest in what 
people do, rather than an idea or belief internal to an individual. 
Third, the practices of building trust become the central unit of analysis. 
Practice as a unit of analysis takes account of bodies, people, histories, knowledge, 
rules, objects, goals that work together to enact practice. In relation to trust, this 
suggests that the perceptions, reasons and goals established in and through a 
practice wherein trust is being built can be just as important as the bodily movements 
or actions that are performed. It also highlights that knowledge – for example 
regarding someone’s ability or competence – is not the property of an individual but 
is formed through practical understanding, ways of proceeding as well as the material 
environment and that actors are ‘capable of shifting from one form of trust to another’ 
(Nicolini, 2009: 1396), using a particular form of trust sooner than expected or 
‘negotiating their strategies of trust as circumstances change’ (Ibid.). The role of space 
is therefore an important consideration, since the physicality of the space, the material 
objects that the actors interact with, the histories and shared knowledge of a space 
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will influence the possibilities and propensity for trust-building. This suggests that the 
perceptions, reasons and goals established in and through a practice wherein trust is 
being built can be just as important as the bodily movements or actions that are 
performed. It also highlights that knowledge – for example regarding someone’s ability 
or competence – is not the property of an individual but is formed through practical 
understanding, ways of proceeding as well as the material environment they interact 
with.   
Fourth, practice theory posits that activities are not accomplished by discreet 
entities, such as individuals, knowledge and objects. Therefore, the analytic task, 
again, is to identify ‘concerted scenes of action’ (Nicolini, 2009: 1394). 
Interorganisational trust-building considered in this way is constantly evolving and 
shaped by the actions and reactions of the trusting parties using practices and 
routines adopted over time that best align their individual and organisational needs 
with their needs in the present. This ontology begins to make sense of the challenges 
of interorganisational trust-building where trust-building is taking place between 
multiple individual actors, at multiple levels and between organisations with agendas 
that are both at once competing and aligned, and shaped by the encounters and 
beliefs that have both created and have been formed by the structures within which 
the organisations operate.  This confirms a view that interorganisational trust is neither 
micro nor macro, nor interpersonal or organisational, but as the result of the dynamic 
relationship of mutual constitution co-created in relationships (Feldman & Orlikowski, 
2011). Thinking about interorganisational trust in this way will provide an opportunity 
to explore the five aspects of trust discussed in this chapter for instance without 
limiting them to either a level or orientation to the trusting parties but acknowledging 
trust is a collaborative process that exists as a result of a relationship not because of 
the construct. 
Thus, practices such as building trust, are mutually constituted by the multiple 
entities and actors enacting them, rather than cognitive reasoning. Individuals 
become orientated to one another, as well as rules, histories etc, through an ongoing 
process of adjusting (Barnes, 2001) as they work to earn or learn trust. How an 
individual might respond to another, monitoring or adjusting their actions to 
accomplish a goal, suggests that an examination of trust as practice needs to account 
for collective level activities, and interdependent social agents. 
Each of the aspects of trust discussed in this chapter might therefore exist for 
a moment, change with time, develop into something new depending on the actor’s 
own motivations and interpretation of their own actions and those around them. 
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Acknowledgement of the individual’s role as an actor that has the ability to both to 
‘enact trust and influence structures’ (Meyerson, Weick & Kramer, 1996) whilst also 
recognising they remain ‘suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun’ 
(Geertz, 1973: 44) presents an opportunity to address the challenge of studying the 
complexities of the interorganisational trust-building described in the previous chapter 
and an understanding about how the aspects of trust discussed in this chapter might 
be used to provide further insight into interorganisational trust-building not as 
constructs to provide positivistic evidence, or to test for the presence or absence of a 
type of trust, but as heuristics for understanding the complexities of the social reality 
of the interorganisational environment in which trust-building is being attempted.  
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
COLLECTION 
 
This chapter firstly provides information about the context in which the data was 
collected. It then describes the rationale behind the choice of participants and how 
main sources of data were collected. The chapter then describes the theoretical 
approach to the analysis of the data. 
 
Context of the data gathering 
 
The study was undertaken whilst I worked in Parliament in a role that brought 
me into regular contact with the participants in the study before the study began. My 
role as Chief of Staff in the organisation where I worked required me to facilitate 
dialogue between politicians and business leaders in a manner that provided 
information sharing between politicians and business leaders in ways that were non-
party political and worked with all parliamentarians and businesses of any sector or 
size. The work that was undertaken was governed by a cross-party representation of 
seventeen senior parliamentarians and was accountable to the Leaders of the House 
of Commons and the House of Lords.  
The organisation was established in 1977 by a committee of Parliamentarians 
to facilitate dialogue between politicians and businesses and operated within the 
Parliamentary estate. There was significant external and internal scrutiny over our 
work to ensure that these aims were met and that the organisation was not used as a 
vehicle for lobbying. Weekly internal office meetings focused on ensuring that we were 
effectively moderating discussions and debates in order to ensure that the ethos of 
the organisation remained non-political, impartial and accessible to all Members of 
Parliament and all businesses. Since the organisation was mandated as an impartial 
facilitator of the interactions between politicians and business leaders, this 
organisation and the role I played in it placed me in a position where I was regularly 
required to observe the interactions between the participants in such a way that I was 
an impartial observer of the discussions between stakeholders with the responsibility 
of ensuring that neutrality was maintained. I was therefore in a position of facilitating 
discussion without directly having an interest in the outcome other than ensuring that 
it was of educational value and represented, as best could be managed, the views 
and interests of all parties involved. The organisation focused on eight industries, one 
of which was the financial services sector.   
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The impact of the financial crisis was a significant influence on our work and 
as a result I was placed into regular contact with senior staff from a range of financial 
institutions prior to the data gathering phase of the project. These individuals were 
usually at “C” level or on the board of the organisation working to address the 
challenges of the financial crisis. Interactions that took place beyond the scope of the 
study that brought me into contact with the participants involved delegations to 
Brussels, facilitating visits for individual parliamentarians, or groups of 
parliamentarians to the offices of an organisation as well as providing space for 
dialogue between groups on policy issues relevant to financial crisis. I was therefore 
inevitably influenced by my own role prior to beginning the study, which was a 
consideration in the data gathering, which is discussed in further detail later in this 
chapter but also a reason for choosing to study the financial crisis. However, the 
organisation that I worked for had operated for thirty-seven years as a moderator in 
this way and the focus of the organisation on sectors beyond the scope of the financial 
services sector placed me in a position where I was known to the participants as an 
“insider” who had no stake in the discussion. I would often describe myself as “the 
butler” to colleagues – reflecting my role of ensuring that the interactions took place 
in ways that were appropriate but without the status or any personal interests in the 
outcome of the discussion other than to ensure that that the discussion was balanced 
and allowed representation of different views to be considered by politicians and 
industry leaders. The role I played in my official capacity therefore was a consideration 
both in terms of my own bias, but it also allowed me privileged access to the 
participants. Furthermore, the relationship of my own work to their organisations 
meant that they were prepared to share information with me that I otherwise might not 
have been able to gather as an “outsider” attempting to understand the interactions 
of the participants.     
 
Choice of participants 
 
The participants were selected from three separate stakeholder groups who were 
placed together to address a crisis and who had different motivations for restoring 
trust in the financial system. The banking participants were taken primarily from the 
UK high street banks, the regulators from the FSA (and in cases where relevant from 
the Bank of England (BoE)) and the politicians from both Houses of Parliament. Six 
of the politicians were members of the TSC at the time of the study.   
The seniority of the participants was a significant factor in the choice of 
participants. If we are to examine how individual actions and behaviours can influence 
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trust in an individual’s organisation and to consider interorganisational trust-building 
existing beyond levels of analysis, then it is important that the individuals in the study 
had the legitimacy to represent their organisations. The banking participants included 
individuals with the following titles for example: UK CEO, Deputy CEO, Chief of Staff, 
Non-Executive Board Member, Group Head of Compliance and Group Director of 
Corporate Affairs. The politicians were all either involved in the TSC or more widely 
in the finance services debate about the ICB Report that was taking place in the 
Houses of Parliament at that time either through positions in Government or 
membership of relevant All Party Parliamentary Groups. Engagement with the ICB 
policy debate was the rationale for the selection of the Parliamentary participants. The 
seniority of roles was also applied to the rationale in asking members from the 
regulatory community to take part in the project. There was an attempt to ensure that 
cross-party representation, differing regulatory views and different types of high street 
banks were represented in the selection of participants to allow for a range of views 
to be considered. 
 
Description of the data collection  
 
The main sources of information gathered in the fieldwork were (1) thirty 
interviews, (2) six focus groups, (3) the meetings and the minutes of the TSC between 
April 2011 and August 2012 and (4) the public literature published by the 
organisations (reports, responses to consultations and advertising campaigns, for 
example) as well as (5) ethnographic field notes taken between April 2011 and August 
2012. The ethnographic element of the study, given my role in the organisation, was 
important in interpreting the other sets of data. 
Since context is a key component to understanding trust (Chen, Saparito & 
Belkin, 2011), data gathering was structured in such a way to allow a range of 
perspectives from private to public. Furthermore, since the creation of trust is highly 
context specific (Tillmar, 2002) the study aimed to engage in an ‘exercise of reflexivity 
that interprets [its] own interpretations’ (Alvesson & Skoldeberg, 2000: 96) exploring 
a range of data on multiple levels in a diverse range of contexts. The study therefore 
combined semi-structured interviews, focus groups, literature reviews and 
ethnographically-inspired methods (Garsten 1999) aimed to provide a diversity of 
perspectives that could be collectively addressed and understood as I began to 
explore interorganisational trust-building from a practice perspective. 
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The purpose of the five types of data collected was to attempt to capture 
private, semi-private, passively public and actively public statements from the 
participants and their organisations to explore the responses in a range of settings in 
order to take an holistic approach that would allow for comparison between data 
sources and for information from one data source to inform analysis of another data 
source. Table two provides further information on the data collected and the rationale 
for each type. The following five sections briefly outline the different data sources 
collected and describe the method for each in more detail. Figure one shows how the 
data sources were considered to relate to one another, acknowledging the data 
gathered related to different public and private contexts. 
 
Table (2): Explanation of data sources 
 
Source Nature of source Reason for analysis  
Private 
interviews 
  
 
Thirty unattributed interviews 
which were held in private and 
anonymised  
 
To capture private sentiment from 
individuals in the group  
Round table 
focus groups 
 
Six Chatham House-style 
meetings with up to twenty of 
the participants attending 
 
To analyse semi-public discussion 
between regulators, legislators 
and leaders in the sector 
Treasury Select 
Committee 
(TSC) minutes 
 
Minutes of fifty-five meetings 
between April 2011 and 
August 2012 
  
To analyse a public dialogue 
between the Treasury Committee 
and the leaders of the banks 
Official reports 
and other 
public domain 
literature 
 
115 other public sources 
including speeches, 
interviews, press releases 
corporate documents and 
news stories and advertising 
campaigns 
 
To analyse literature referring to 
the banks and the crisis 
specifically purposed for a public 
environment 
Ethnographic 
field notes 
 
Field notes taken during the 
duration of the study in a 
journal. (Separate notebooks 
were used for each focus 
group and interview, which 
included ethnographic data) 
 
To reflect on the information 
gathered in the other four data 
sources and to consider 
underlying aspects of the 
discussions between the 
stakeholders that may not be 
apparent in the spoken or written 
material shared by the participants  
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Figure (1): Diagram of data sources 
 
 
 
1. Interview data  
Interviews were conducted at locations requested by the interviewee. There 
were five different locations that interviews took place. Interviews with regulatory 
colleagues were conducted at their place of work, interviews with parliamentary 
participants took place ether at the dispatch box in Portcullis House or in the 
participant’s office. Interviews with the banking participants took place in their offices 
or, on two occasions, in hotel lobbies. Interview data was gathered through semi-
structured interviews with thirty of the individuals who attended the round table focus 
groups. In total, there were five individuals involved in the regulation of the financial 
services sector, ten individuals who were involved in in the creation or development 
of legislation, six individuals from the three UK-based high street banks studied and 
nine individuals who worked in the financial services sector, but were not directly 
employed by one of the three banks that were observed in the study. Requests to 
record the interviews were made on each occasion and anonymity was agreed with 
the participant prior to the interview. Six of the thirty interviews were taped and 
transcribed. The remaining twenty-four relied on notetaking whilst conducting the 
interview. Interviews lasted between twenty minutes and one hour, but the length of 
the interview was governed by the interviewee. For example, one interview was cut 
short because of a division bell in the House of Commons which meant that the 
participant had to leave the interview and vote. Despite the relationship I had 
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established with the participants through the role in my organisation, the seniority of 
the participants meant that there were challenges in gathering a homogenous set of 
thirty interviews. However, the study did not require homogeneity in the interviews, 
but rather an insight into the participants own particular views and their worlds. On 
occasion a shorter interview meant that the participant would focus on a particular 
topic, which demonstrated the significance of the topic to the interviewee in sharing 
certain information in a private setting. It became apparent from the interviews that 
trust was an important topic and therefore I began to consider how trust-building was 
being enacted by the participants in the study.   
With this goal in mind and in order to ensure that certain themes could be 
examined, the individual interviews were structured and where it was appropriate the 
order of the questions was rearranged or the focus of the interview was shifted to 
explore in more detail specific points made by participants. This was also to explore 
emergent themes as they arose (See Spradley, 1979). The interviews also formed 
the basis for some of the focus group discussion topics and the opportunity was taken 
where possible in the interviews to explore topics for the focus groups to discuss and 
for the participants to reflect on topics discussed in the focus groups.  
2. Focus group data 
The second type of data collected comprised of transcripts from six semi-structured 
focus groups held between April and September 2011 and January to May 2012. Each 
focus group was comprised of approximately twenty people. There were 
representatives from the TSC, FSA and each of the three high street banks present 
at each one of the focus groups. The group was also comprised of other leaders in 
the sector, interested politicians and civil servants. The number of participants and 
the breakdown of the representation from each of the stakeholder groups is shown in 
the table ten below.  
Each focus group lasted for one hour and was transcribed. There were 
participants present at the focus groups who were not interviewed, however, all but 
six of those interviewed attended at least one focus group session. Participants were 
told that the meeting was held ‘in the spirit of the Chatham House Rule’. It was 
explained to the participants that this meant that although they would not be quoted 
directly, their unattributed comments may be quoted in the study. This variation on 
the Chatham House Rule (where the place but not the individual would be attributed) 
was highlighted at the start of each focus group to convey to the participants that the 
focus groups were not anonymous like the interviews but did provide a degree of 
anonymity since their identity would not be shared.  
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Table (3): Representation of stakeholders in focus groups 
 
Participants 
present  
Focus 
group 1 
Focus 
group 2 
Focus 
group 3 
Focus 
group 4 
Focus 
group 5 
Focus 
group 
6 
Banking 7 12 6 9 12 9 
Parliamentary 11 7 8 5 6 6 
Regulatory 3 3 2 4 5 2 
Total  21 22 16 18 23 17 
  
Participants were assured all data would be kept securely and that specific 
details that might directly identify participants in the focus groups, or indeed the any 
of specific dates of the focus groups would not be revealed to any outside party. This 
ensured a semi-private environment where information that was particularly sensitive 
could be shared in a controlled way but it did not provide the full anonymity that the 
interviews provided since the participants were amongst colleagues from their own 
organisation and other organisations.  
To test whether the semi-private environment intended in the focus groups 
was reflected in the experiences of the participants, several of the participants were 
asked in the second tranche of private interviews whether they felt comfortable 
sharing information and views in the focus groups. The participants questioned 
confirmed that the fact there were three stakeholder groups around the table made 
the focus groups conducive to sharing information and their views, suggesting that 
the participants felt that the focus groups were a space where sensitive, but not 
business-critical information could be shared. 
The focus groups took place in rooms booked on the Parliamentary Estate 
either in Portcullis House or within the Palace of Westminster. Due to the nature of 
the group, convening the meetings was determined largely by the participants’ 
schedules. Therefore, there was again a lack of homogeneity in the focus groups in 
terms of time, participation and the environment in which the focus group discussion 
took place. Two of the focus groups were held at 6:30pm in Dining Room B in the 
Palace of Westminster and participants were provided dinner afterwards at 7:30pm. 
Two of the focus groups were held in meeting room Q in Portcullis House at 8:30am 
and tea, coffee and biscuits were provided for the one hour discussion, and two of the 
focus groups were held in Dining Room B in the Palace of Westminster at 8:30am 
where a continental breakfast was provided at the table for the one hour discussion. 
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Therefore, although the timings, participants and the locations differed to an extent, 
the length of the discussion and the focus of the discussions on the ICB report 
remained consistent. The differing contexts provided challenges to the data gathering 
process, but also provided opportunity to explore the ways that the participants 
interacted in the material spaces when they met at different times.   
  
3. Treasury Select Committee data  
The third type of data collected were the minutes of all open-session TSC 
meetings that were relevant to the policy discussion. In total, there were fifty-five 
relevant hearings between April 2011 and August 2012 that were used as data for the 
analysis of which fifteen were directly observed by sitting in the room and taking notes. 
The remaining forty were reviewed through the transcripts provided subsequent to the 
meeting. The nature of TSC meetings are such that often, unless there is a particularly 
newsworthy item, the meetings provide publicly accessible information that in the 
most part members of the public do not choose to access. This meant that, despite 
being a public forum, some topics were discussed very openly in TSC meetings if they 
were considered not to be too controversial. It became clear as the study developed 
that although the TSC meetings were in principle not necessarily of significant public 
interest they had the potential to become the focal point of media attention almost 
inadvertently and therefore were considered a passively public environment in which 
the participants engaged.   
 
4. Official reports & other public domain literature  
Longitudinal documentary analysis was conducted to track shifting discourses 
by the leadership in banks, more general regulation of banking practices and any 
lessons learnt since 2008. The research relied on the diversity of available sources to 
support the analysis of the data from the interviews and the focus group meetings. 
Therefore, three types of sources were used: Firstly, articles from the printed and 
broadcast media, specifically relating to organisations involved in the study. Relevant 
data was gathered from the BBC Television Archive and the Sky News Library as well 
as news reports from The Financial Times, The Economist and ReutersBest archives. 
These materials were analysed in the period between the gathering of the first tranche 
of interview and focus group data and the gathering of the second tranche of focus 
group and interview data to provide a “qualitative barometer” about the perceptions of 
the organisations studied to understand the wider environment and the impact this 
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might have on the participants’ responses. Secondly, materials produced by the TSC, 
the FSA and the UK high street banks such as advertising campaigns and reports 
were reviewed to provide a further strand of qualitative material about how the banks, 
TSC and FSA wished to be perceived. Thirdly, documents produced by political 
groups, some Parliamentary debates recorded in Hansard,2 position and lobby papers 
written by think tanks and research papers produced by Committee Clerks and the 
House of Commons Library were analysed to understand what aspects of the debate 
politicians and regulators publicly discussed. Reading these documents also served 
to support the ethnographic element of the data gathering in providing context to the 
study to interpret the data that was gathered in the focus groups and the interviews to 
help reflect on my own situation within the study and because I had a relatively limited 
understanding of the financial services and the relevant policy discussions that were 
taking place prior to the study.  
 
5. Ethnographic data  
It became clear in the development of the study that prior to the financial crisis 
the participants observed in the study had spent very little time together. This was an 
observation that was of interest and prompted the decision to examine in further detail 
the interactions between the participants beyond the scope of the interviews and the 
focus groups. Although this project is not solely ethnographic, in the spirit of trust 
scholars such as Lardeau (2012) who use ethnographic methods extensively, my 
approach to the data collection relied heavily on my own relationship with the 
participants and my own position in the study.   
Some relationships between participants were already established 
(particularly those between the parliamentary participants) but aside from these 
relationships, the majority of the interactions were between participants who did not 
previously know one another prior to the publication of the ICB report and the project 
therefore observed a temporary community of three stakeholder groups resolved to 
tackle the issue of reforming the British domestic financial infrastructure.  
The approach to the design of this project therefore uses the period between 
the publication of the ICB report and the publication of the Banking Reform Bill 2012 
as a boundary to the study. This was an eighteen-month period between April 2011 
and August 2012. It was therefore considered that that gathering ethnographic data 
to support the other types of data gathered would be an integral element of the data 
                                                 
2  
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gathering process to contextualise the data gathered from the four other main 
sources. Where possible I attempted to use my position to interpret the data to gain a 
deeper understanding of the interactions.  
The ethnographic data gathered gave me an opportunity to observe 
interactions between the groups beyond the TSC meetings, focus groups and 
interviews. This allowed for an opportunity to observe instances outside the scope of 
the focus groups, TSC meetings and the interviews that otherwise may have not been 
observed. Crucially the ethnographic element of the project served to provide deeper 
understanding of some of the interactions and comments made in the focus groups 
and the interviews.     
Kidder (2005) states, the fundamental goal of an ethnography is to gain an 
insider’s perspective through understanding behaviour. To gain this insiders 
perspective (and therefore gather data which will allow the researcher to uncover new 
insight) researchers will take on a role in an organization or group. To do this, work 
was undertaken alongside the participants, which allowed the opportunity to be an 
active and trusted observer. The role I undertook in Parliament in this period provided 
an opportunity to gain an insiders perspective, to understand the nuances of the 
organisations that were involved in the study and to play the role of “butler” to their 
conversations. I was therefore able to observe conversations that took place, that 
otherwise I may not have observed. The value of the role I undertook at the time of 
the study was an important part of interpreting the information shared by the 
participants in the interviews, focus groups and the public information they shared as 
it gave a vantage point from which to observe and question the information being 
shared and to interrogate the data with knowledge not only with the information 
gathered but with insight into the reasons why the information may have been shared 
or not shared. However, as Henry and Fields (1984) suggest gaining an insider’s 
perspective can also cause problems whilst gathering data because it is extremely 
difficult to preserve the natural situation whilst trying to gather data and this was a 
challenge faced throughout this study as I managed the responsibilities of my work.  
Comparable examples which have taken a similar approach are Fletcher 
(2010) who became a white-water rafting instructor, Henry (1978) who became a 
driver, and Fields (1984) who lived with drug dealers in California. These studies 
methodologies were helpful in the design of the research project, although my role in 
Parliament preceded the genesis of the project therefore I had become an insider 
without having to ‘take on a role to gain an insider’s perspective’ (Ibid. :84). Although, 
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as Fletcher (2010) and Fields (1984), I was observing the discussions without detailed 
previous knowledge of the subject matter.  
 
Data coding and analysis 
The data analysis was a reflexive process – a ‘hermeneutic spiral’ (Landa, 2002: 2) 
that was informed (1) by the literature review, (2) by my role within my own 
organisation and (3) the decision to gather interview and focus group data in two 
tranches. The following section describes the process of analysing the data. 
Examining the interactions of the participants over an eighteen-month period was an 
important consideration in the data analysis and allowed for further reflection on 
practices that were identified and how they could contribute to what we know about 
interorganisational trust. The analysis of the data can broadly be described as 
developing through three stages that moved from the raw data to more concrete 
empirical themes, and then to more general abstract concepts. As the study 
developed, it became apparent that to capture the richness of the trusting practices 
that were taking place, the ethnographic aspect of the project had become 
increasingly important.  
 
Figure (2): Gantt chart detailing data gathering and analysis 
 
 
 
Stage one. As I began the data collection a literature review of trust research 
was undertaken to inform the coding of the first tranche of interviews. The literature 
review examined manuscripts cited in four previous reviews of the trust literature: 
Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer, (1998), Mayer et al. (1995), Bachmann and Inkpen 
(2011) and Gillespie and Dietz (2009). In total, the four reviews cited 183 separate 
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studies on trust (See appendix I). The analysis of the literature cited in the four 
literature reviews was supplemented with an article search. The article search was 
conducted using Google Scholar and Mendeley Network using the key phrases ‘trust’, 
‘trust building’ and ‘trust repair’. A further 85 articles were found that presented 
relevant definitions of trust (See appendix II).  
When reviewing these combined 268 articles, I tried to ensure that the subject 
of the study, the empirical context and the methodological approach did not bias the 
consideration of its relevance; rather my focus was on the conclusions or observations 
that each study made about the nature of trust in order to establish some broad 
themes relating to trust to inform the first cycle coding of the data collected during the 
first tranche of data gathering. This was an initial attempt in the time allocated to this 
research project to take stock of the current and perennial trends in trust research 
within the fields of management and organisation studies and consequently orientate 
the data analysis to themes that were relevant to the trust research in my field. Further 
explanation as to how the first order coding was developed and made “real” from 
themes in the trust literature are included in appendix III. 
Stage two. Having completed the coding of the first tranche of interviews and 
focus groups and now having had some experience in the field (a deliberate shift of 
emphasis from my day job, which I will discuss later in this chapter), I realised (1) that 
some of the themes were less relevant to the study and that (2) some of the themes 
could be absorbed into one another. As the study progressed towards a second 
tranche of data gathering, I identified twelve of the thirty themes that were both 
relevant to the study and prominent in the trust literature (Details can be seen in 
appendix IV). Having now gathered two tranches of data I then chose to investigate 
in more detail some of the conversation topics that appeared prominently in the 
interviews, focus groups and select committee data. I began to consider other codes 
such as “European legislation” and “The City of London”, which appeared to strongly 
resonate with and substantiate the discussions I was observing and reflected the 
“practical” subjects that the participants appeared to see as important and I 
considered these codes in the context of the other categories I had observed. This 
provided a secondary lens through which I could consider the twelve trust themes that 
I had established and was useful to begin to shape the presentation of my data. For 
example, it helped me decide to present vignettes and stories alongside the data 
gathered from Select Committee hearings, interview and focus groups, given the 
challenges to empirical work on trust set out in chapter two.  
Stage three. Having reflected further on the practice literature, I returned once 
again to the coding and data analysis. I realised that the themes in my data were 
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highly fluid (and often interchangeable). At this point I began to consider if the themes 
may require further consolidation and development in order to capture the richness of 
the practices that were taking place. This led me to do two things. First, I established 
three prominent patterns emerging around space, stories and knowledge 
management, which I develop later in the thesis as trust practices. Second, I was 
prompted to return to the literature review and consider once again the twelve themes 
that I had developed. At this stage, I also became aware of the content of the 
Organization Studies special issue on trust crises (Volume 36, Issue 9, September 
2015) and I reflected on the articles in the special issue as I returned to the themes 
from the literature review. From the initial thirty (then twelve) themes, there now 
appeared to be five aspects of trust that were of interest to the development of our 
understanding of trust from a practice perspective. These five aspects of trust, 
discussed in the previous chapter were of particular interest to the study were selected 
because (1) they had been shown to be significant to the broad conceptualisation of 
trust shown in the trust literature in the literature review that was undertaken, (2) that 
they were aligned with the themes described in by Bachmann et al. (2015) in their 
editorial of the Organization Studies Special Issue (See appendix V) and (3) they 
provided a good methodological fit with the data and showed expository promise in 
developing an initial understanding of practices that contribute to interorganisational 
trust.   
 
Challenges (and other observations) regarding the research method 
 
I will briefly discuss four aspects of the data gathering and analysis that I 
believe warrant particular comment. First was the challenge of gathering reliable data. 
Gathering reliable data from the individuals in this study was difficult since the 
information that I gathered was of strategic importance to the individuals and the 
organisations involved. Therefore, to assess possibly misleading responses from the 
participants there was an eighteen month long ethnographic study, which took place 
concurrently whilst the data was gathered from the four contexts studied. Given the 
context-specific nature of trust research, the ethnographic element allowed the study 
to capture further context and provide a more holistic interpretation of the interviews, 
focus groups and the public materials examined in the study and “read between the 
lines” in interpreting the responses of the participants in the interviews, focus groups 
and the Select Committee meetings.  
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Given the nature of the data collected and the seniority of the participants, 
there was no feasible option to undertake a pilot study. This would have been 
beneficial in so far as it would have helped me to explore some of my initial thinking 
about trust in the interorganisational environment, which I had developed from the 
literature. However, this was not possible because of the time that the participants 
could commit. However, given the benefits of the ethnographic approach outlined 
below, it was in some ways rather helpful to explore the data “in the action” as it were.  
Second, identifying, acknowledging (and best avoiding) researcher bias was 
a persistent challenge, particularly given my day job. It became apparent as the study 
progressed that the practice perspective and the methodology became increasingly 
important in this respect as it was an approach that allowed for (And in fact 
encouraged!) a self-reflexive approach to the project – I realised that I began to 
recognise the project as it developed as ‘something constructed in context; not an 
experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning’ 
(Geertz 1973: 82) and therefore the analysis in the following chapters took a view of 
trusting relationships that led me to view each actor as ‘an animal suspended in webs 
of significance he himself has spun’ (Geertz 1973: 81). This approach helped me to 
acknowledge and consider first-hand some of the challenges with regard to context 
specifity and comparisons of empirical studies, which were considered in chapter two. 
It also meant that, as I moved through the various phases of data analysis and 
fieldwork, the ethnographic aspect of the project allowed a form of thematic analysis 
to develop where interesting areas were explored beyond the scope of the interviews, 
focus group and Select Committee transcripts. For example, section four of chapter 
five is heavily reliant on a single experience that, as a result of the data gathering and 
analysis, I felt represented a broader theme in the data about the use of space to 
control. 
Third, I stand with numerous other scholars before me who acknowledge that 
there are significant challenges to creating an ethnographic study which is empirically 
robust (Parker, 2007; Hammersley, 1992). Combining ethnography with other data 
collection provided an interesting way to explore the data and the emerging themes 
from different perspectives. My view on completion of the project remains firmly 
aligned with the many contemporary ethnographers who present the method as the 
best way to get reliable data in a given situation. I note, that Maher and Dixon (1999: 
492) comment that their study of drug addiction presents a ‘more accurate 
representation of a street-level drug-using population than could have been achieved 
through survey research’. In my study, ethnographic field notes were taken throughout 
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the eighteen-month period of data collection to help interpret the other four data sets 
and allowed me to capture the richness of the interactions. Field notes were therefore 
taken and analysed alongside the four main sets of data gathered and I became 
conscious that the research process was supported and informed by ethnographic 
principles and was not simply an ethnography. Therefore, the study should not be 
considered solely to be ethnographic but to be ‘ethnographically informed’ (Currall & 
Inkpen, 2006). This tension between ethnographic data and the other data gathered 
therefore offered both an opportunity to really “dive deep” into the interactions, but 
also had to be consistently balanced with the cautions Parker (1997) and Hammersly 
(1992) present and I had to therefore acknowledge that the data collection involved a 
unique positionality that inevitably influences the data one collects (Clifford & Marcus, 
1986). As is the case when selecting a field site and a focus for the study, the 
overwhelming amount of data one must choose from, coupled with the various lenses 
through which one could interpret the data, make it difficult for the researcher to claim 
any notion of objectivity.  
I am still very much at the start of my academic career, and this process was 
a significant learning curve. As I started the project I erred towards Lofland’s inclusive 
approach and begun by coding anything and everything that was collected – towards 
the end of the project, and with a little more experience (Coupled with a clearer sense 
of the themes emerging from the codes in the data, that I believed to be relevant - and 
having gained “an insider’s view”) I became more decisive as to what information in 
my field notes and in the focus group, interview and Select Committee data was of 
primary interest to the study. I felt that this process of learning through practice 
appropriately represented the practice approach to trust I was developing.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: CASE CONTEXTUALISATION 
 
This chapter provides some contextual information about the three 
stakeholder groups in the study as well as relevant information about the ICB and 
wider regulatory environment. The chapter is structured in three sections, first, the 
chapter provides information to contextualise the parliamentary participants, the 
Westminster Parliament and the TSC. The second section provides information about 
the UK high street banks and some historical context of the City of London as a 
financial centre. The third section describes the role of the FSA to contextualise the 
regulatory environment. This section provides a discussion of the ICB report as well 
as some wider context about the regulatory environment. 
 
The Parliamentary participants, the Parliamentary Estate and the TSC 
 
During the period of the study there were 652 members of the House of 
Commons each accountable to their constituency, typically spending Thursday to 
Sunday in their constituency and Monday to Wednesday on the Parliamentary estate.  
The public elects Members of Parliament (MPs) to represent their interests in the 
House of Commons. Members of the House of Commons and their time is split 
between Parliamentary and constituency business.    
 
Routines and patterns of work for a Member of Parliament  
 
Although it changes annually each year, state opening of Parliament takes 
place towards the end of May and prorogation (the end of a Parliamentary session) 
takes places place in March. The dates are ultimately decided by the Queen, based 
on advice from the Privvy Council. Between May and March, Parliament follows a 
pattern of three sitting periods per year like school terms or academic semesters. 
When the House is sitting Members are likely to be in attendance (i.e. physically on 
the estate) to vote. These times are (1) Monday 2.30pm–10.30pm, (2) Tuesday 
9.30am– 10:30pm (3) Wednesday 9.30am–5.00pm when debates are taking place in 
the Chamber and when Parliament is sitting.  
However, there is no formal requirement for parliamentary participants who 
are Members of the House of Commons to stay on the estate to vote or to engage 
with the process. They are essentially employed as individuals by the House of 
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Commons as elected representatives. However, it is simply assumed that to progress 
one must be present for debates and vote based on the oversight of the Parliamentary 
Party’s Whips offices. Therefore, there is clearly a degree of autonomy as each 
Member of the House of Commons is accountable to their constituency once elected 
and does not in fact physically have to attend Parliament, however the party maintains 
informal tacit control over the behaviour and pattern of business of the Members 
through the incentive to advance to more senior positions in Government or shadow 
Government roles provided one “tows the line”.  
 
The Parliamentary Estate  
 
The House of Commons and House of Lords function effectively as two 
separate organisations. For instance, their kitchens ordered food from different 
caterers, they used different suppliers for most office related supplies and even the 
passing of a Bill from one House to the other was done formally (A clerk from one 
House would meet a clerk from the other House at the point at which the two Houses 
physically join to exchange the paper work).3 Space was subtlety controlled. The 
different levels of clearance allowed Members or Officers of the House to access 
different parts of the estate. This was controlled informally. However, lanyards, clearly 
marked out statuses and parliamentary police officers would remove an individual 
without the correct pass from the area. However, boundaries were not explicit and 
were waived on occasion. Rules were highly idiosyncratic. For example, researchers 
working in the House of Commons could use the House of Lords dining room out of 
term time and on a Friday. This was not written down, but assumed wisdom that had 
become a fact over time.  
Over fifty percent of the House of Commons was on parts of the estate that 
were not in the palace of Westminster. Figure (4) shows Millbank, Norman Shaw, 
Parliament street and Portcullis Houses were all part of the Parliamentary estate. With 
the exception of Millbank House, one could move freely between the palace and the 
cluster of buildings to the West once inside the Parliamentary estate through an 
underground walkway. This created a sense of enclosed space once inside the estate 
referred to as the “Westminster bubble”.  
Access to the estate itself was heavily controlled. Depending on your lanyard 
there were up to seven different entrances that you could use to enter the estate. 
However, there were two main public entrances where guests could enter the estate. 
                                                 
3 Since 2002 email copies of the bills are sent as well to facilitate this process.  
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One was to the south side of Portcullis House and the other was on the North side of 
the Palace of Westminster (Marked with white dots on figure (4) below) Guests 
passed through airport style security and, depending on your lanyard, passholders4 
could bring guests on to the estate. The most guests that any one passholder could 
bring onto the estate was four at a time.  
 
Figure (4) Map showing Parliamentary estate and related buildings  
 
Adapted from Parliament website: https://www.parliament.uk 
 
 
 
The Treasury Select Committee  
 
The TSC decides its topics of inquiry independently depending on the topic 
being examined and time constraints. There is no formal pattern and scheduling 
Committee meetings is managed by the Table office, subject to the requirements of 
the Committee. It is also commonly acknowledged amongst Members of Parliament 
that, together with the Foreign Affair select Committee the TSC is a prestigious 
Committee on which to sit. The Government and opposition have a balanced 
representation on each Committee. Being asked to be a member of a Committee 
means one of two things. Either, it is an acknowledgement that the member has the 
potential not simply to remain a backbencher, but might in time take a seat in cabinet 
                                                 
4 “passholder” is a commonly used term for a member of staff who had access to the estate.  
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and sit on the front benches of the debating chamber. Secondly, it might be because 
of the expertise of the individual in the area. In this second example, the Member will 
tend to define themselves in these terms and may remain on a Committee for several 
parliamentary cycles as a subject expert. This is Particularly true of Committee Chairs 
who are elected by their peers and can often remain in post for many years and 
become established as the subject experts in the House of Commons. 
 
 
The Bankers, the UK high Street Banks and the City of London  
 
There are five independent UK retail banks headquartered in the UK at the 
time of the study. These were HSBC Holdings, Lloyds banking Group, Royal Bank of 
Scotland Banking group (RBS), Barclays and Standard Chartered. These five banks 
were estimated to have total assets of around six billion and a market value of around 
300 billion pounds. The important distinction I make here in this study is that, although 
there a raft of other banks and financial institutions that are relevant to this study, the 
two facts that mark these five banks out are first that they are universal (i.e. retail and 
wholesale banks operating as one) and second, that they have their headquarters or 
at least operate the majority of their wholesale functions in London.5 Each of the five 
banks have their head office either in the City’s square mile or in Canary Wharf. The 
figure below shows where each of the banks is located.  
Although fundamental to the ecosystem of the financial services sector in 
London, the major UK high street banks represent a small amount of the financial 
services activity that takes place in the city. According to the annual report published 
by the CityUK, in 2012 banks from ninety different countries had offices in the square 
mile or Canary Wharf and there were 18,156 organisations on the FSA’s register who 
were based in London. The financial services sector in London employed around two 
million people and firms operating in the City of London managed over four trillion 
pounds of assets. London was also home to the five of the ten largest law firms 
globally by revenue as well as home to the four biggest management consultancy 
firms globally by revenue, with a combined revenue of roughly half a trillion pounds. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 RBS and Lloyds Banking Group both also have a head office in Edinburgh. However, the majority 
of their wholesale business takes place in their head office London.    
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Figure (5): Head offices of the five UK headquartered retail banks   
 
 
The Financial Services Authority and the ICB Report 
 
Much of the success of the City of London had come about because of the 
intended or unintended consequences of regulatory decisions by the predecessor of 
the FSA, the Securities and Investment Board (SIB). The FSA was a quasi-judicial 
body set up in 2001 to replace the Securities and Investments board. The FSA was 
based in Canary Wharf and was mandated with two objectives (1) to ensure the 
macroprudential stability of the UK economy and (2) to address instances of financial 
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misconduct at individual banks. It had a staff of approximately 3,800 employees. Its 
board and Chief executive were chosen by the Treasury Department. However, it was 
self-governing and maintained an independent status. The SIB, operating as a limited 
company during the Thatcher years had made decisions in the 1980s that defined the 
regulatory environment and established London as an international home for finance 
leaving a legacy for the FSA, which made regulation of the sector a balance between 
enabling business and preventing financial misconduct. The recommendations of the 
ICB report contextualise the position that the FSA was in during the period of the study 
as it attempted to address both the failings and misconduct that had contributed to 
the crisis whilst also ensuring that London remained an attractive place for financial 
services (and the raft of ancillary firms) to undertake their business. Therefore, this 
section will briefly discuss the ICB report and global regulatory challenges that were 
being faced, as well as decisions about regulatory changes that had already taken 
place or were in the process of being debated. 
In light of the concerns following the failure of Lehman Brothers and its impact 
on the British economy, the Rt. Hon. George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer 
of the British Government, announced a review of the banking industry at the 
Chancellor’s annual Mansion House Speech On 16 June 2010.6 Professor Sir John 
Vickers was asked to chair the Commission.7 The opening pages declare the ICB’s 
mandate as one of generative change to the UK banking system. The third paragraph 
begins: 
 
Beyond the immediate task of repairing bank balance sheets while restoring 
the normal flow of credit to the economy at large, the challenge is to make the 
UK banking system more stable, and markets for banking services more 
competitive (ICB Report, 2011: 1) 
 
The initial ICB report made some more detailed preliminary recommendations that 
covered three broad issues: (1) the concept of a regulatory ring fence, (2) capital ratios 
for UK headquartered banks. (3) Developing twin peaks of regulation. The response 
from policy-makers and leaders in the financial services to the interim report focussed 
largely on these three areas. The following section explores each of these 
recommendations in turn. 
                                                 
6 The Mansion House speech takes place at an annual dinner, hosted in the Lord Mayor’s residence, and is 
customarily accepted to be an occasion for the Chancellor to reflect on the previous year and to take a broad look 
at opportunities and challenges that might impact the state of the British economy. 
7 Sir John Vickers is a British economist and was the Warden of All Souls College, The University of Oxford 
when asked to Chair the ICB.  
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The regulatory ring fence. The ICB summarised the reason for creating a 
ring fence in its draft report. The logic given as to why the Commissioners supposed 
a ring fence would be the best structural intervention was that it would provide a 
compromise between the option of a complete separation of retail and wholesale 
banking or the continuation of the stasis of the universal banking system which was 
currently place. Presented with the binary option of total separation or continuation of 
the current system, the ICB recognised that there needed to be a measure of reform 
and suggested a third option of ring-fencing noting that, although change was 
necessary, ‘structural reform, in sharp form, would end universal banking and require 
retail banking and wholesale and investment banking to be carried out by separate 
banks.’ (ICB Report, 2011: 4). The report further observed that ‘This [the ring fence] 
would aim to isolate retail banking services and taxpayers from the risks of global 
wholesale and investment banking but would have a less significant immediate impact 
on the British economy’ (ICB Report, 2011: 4).  
Capital ratios for UK headquartered banks. Aside from the ring fence, the 
Report’s recommendations regarding the banks’ liquidity requirements was the 
second substantive issue that focused the attention of the three stakeholder groups 
involved in the study.  The ICB report made two statements that were challenging to 
the three groups. Firstly, that ‘systemically important banks should have an equity 
ratio of at least ten percent provided that they also have genuinely loss-absorbing 
debt’ (ICB Report, 2011: 14) and secondly that this ‘should be agreed internationally’ 
(ICB Report, 2011: 14). The view of the ICB Report was that ‘such a limit on banks’ 
freedom to deplete capital would be proportionate and in the public interest’ (ICB 
Report, 2011: 13), and would preserve benefits of universal banking while reducing 
risks. The report suggested that ‘without it, capital requirements higher than ten 
percent across the board might well be called for’ (Ibid.). The ICB argued that the 
current highly leveraged system they observed illustrated that the higher a bank’s 
leverage (the more it borrows for any given asset base) the more volatile the bank’s 
return on capital, such that ‘relatively small declines in the value of their assets 
threatened insolvency’ (ICB Report, 2011: 13). The report subsequently surmised that 
this risk was further tempered by the existence of implicit government support (ICB 
Report, 2011: 13) and encouraged by the more favourable tax treatment of debt over 
equity since debt interest is deducted from profits, whereas dividends are distributions 
of it (ICB Report, 2011: 13). Therefore, ‘If debt holders only bear losses on the 
insolvency of a bank and governments cannot, or will not let banks become insolvent, 
then debt holders have no incentive to monitor what is done with their money’ (ICB 
Report, 2011: 17). These asocial incentives were presented in the report as an issue 
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that should be addressed to realign the banks’ relationship with the society within 
which it exists. 
Twin peaks of regulation. The ICB was realistic in acknowledging that the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) presented a ‘potentially a vital spur to competition 
in banking’ (ICB Report, 2011:17) and would have to balance the competitiveness of 
the banks with protection for the customer. The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) 
would therefore provide a second ‘twin peak’ (ICB Report, 2011: 19) to ensure that 
the role of the regulatory functions in the UK should have a clear duty to promote 
effective competition as well as protection for domestic interests against 
macroeconomic risks. The potential separation of the FSA into these two separate 
‘twin peaks’ of the FCA and the PRA provided a type of regulatory ring fence which 
the ICB believed would enable the regulator to function more effectively. By 
separating the functions of competitiveness and risk management, the FCA could 
‘exist to ensure that markets work well so that consumers get a fair deal’ (ICB Report, 
2011: 18) and the PRA could focus on ‘the safety and soundness of financial firms’ 
(Ibid.). This would mean that the regulator could consider domestic risk and domestic 
economic advantage in moderate isolation before deciding on where the trade-off 
should be between the two. Given the historic tendency for decisions to focus on the 
shareholder, the separation ensured that both perspectives would be considered.  
Therefore, to address the challenges set out by the ICB of achieving financial 
stability against macroeconomic risks to the British economy, whilst ensuring 
competition in the banking industry and a prompt return to responsible lending, the 
overall theme of the ICB’s Report was of divestiture – through ring fencing of banking 
functions but also through the separation of regulatory functions. The ICB was clear 
that conflating the goals of regulators or of the UK banks was the overarching factor 
that stopped the organisations functioning in the best interests of both the public and 
the UK banks. For the reasons outlined above, universal banking and the FSA had 
ensured that the bias was in favour of the shareholders and towards a sales culture 
rather than the customer and a service culture (ICB Report, 2011). By articulating the 
different responsibilities of aspects of the banks and the regulators, the ICB was 
attempting to address the balance between these competing goals and ensure both 
the interests of the shareholder and the customer was taken into account in the best 
interests of the long term of the UK economy.    
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CHAPTER FIVE: TRUST-BUILDING PRACTICES BETWEEN 
THE BANKING, REGULATORY AND PARLIAMENTARY 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
This chapter examines the interactions between the banking, parliamentary 
and regulatory participants. It explores first the bankers’ use of managing knowledge 
flows and storytelling in attempts to build trust with the other two stakeholder groups. 
Second, it explores the role of the spaces in which the participants met, played an 
active role and how they were actively curated by parliamentary participants in order 
to attempt to build trust in different ways with the other two stakeholder groups. Third, 
the chapter examines the ways that the regulatory participants addressed the banking 
participants in focus groups as they attempted to manage flows of knowledge in order 
to establish control.      
 
Table (4): Trust-building practices discussed in chapter five 
Stakeholder group Trust-building attempted and practices observed 
Banking participants’ 
attempts to build trust 
 
1. Managing knowledge flows to attempt to build 
trust in the TSC meeting  
2. Storytelling to build trust in the focus group 
meetings 
 
Parliamentary 
participants’ attempts 
to build trust  
 
3. Controlling space to focus conversation to attempt 
to build trust in the information shared in the TSC 
meeting 
4. Creating boundaries and barriers to establish a 
space that controlled the banking participants as 
they attended the TSC meeting 
 
 
5. Identifying with individuals beyond the sphere of 
work in order to build trust through knowledge 
about the individual as well as their role at work  
6. Using space to show ability of the organisation 
and their own status   
 
 
 
Regulatory participants’ 
attempts to build trust  
 
 
7. Managing knowledge flows in order to clarify 
boundaries in an attempt to establish a basis for 
calculus-based trust  
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The bankers: managing knowledge flows and storytelling to build trust  
 
In the formal environments, the banking participants appeared to be 
attempting to build trust in ways that were shaped by their organisations’ agenda. This 
was observed in the formal environment of the TSC meetings where the banking 
participants met with their parliamentary colleagues. The banking participants 
approach to the TSC meetings is explored in the first half of this section. The second 
half of this section focuses on the storytelling techniques that the individual bankers 
used to talk about the crisis in the focus groups meetings where they appeared to be 
building trust with the Parliamentary and regulatory participants through talking about 
the crisis using stories.   
 
1. Managing knowledge flows to build trust  
 
To avoid sharing certain information in the TSC meetings, the banking 
participants worked with public affairs officials to monitor and control the flow of 
information that they provided to the politicians in the TSC. This act of withholding 
information and sharing specific information indicated that the banking participants 
were focused on maintaining control of the relationship with the parliamentary 
participants through the management of flows of knowledge between their 
organisation and the parliamentary participants in the meeting. This practice shows 
that the individual participant was operating as a functionary, shaped by the 
organisation they represented.  
The act of ‘sticking to a narrative’, as one banking participant commented in 
their discussion about TSC meetings, presented the banking participants in their 
public interactions with the parliamentary colleagues squarely as representatives of 
their organisation. As one of the banking participants observed in a private interview 
it was a role the banking participants recognised as important in ‘presenting the 
organisation in a positive light’ to the parliamentary participants.  
The public affairs officials were referred by the banking participants as “blue 
suits” in the interviews. They were also described as ‘hovering around the fringes of 
meetings’ listening to the conversations. “Blue suits” would know parliamentary 
procedure in detail and would network with more junior staff in Parliament such as the 
Committee clerks or MP’s researchers to ensure that they got the best possible idea 
of what would be asked in the Committee and what the ideal narrative was for the 
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organisation to take to the Committee through the banking participants’ statements. 
“Blue suits” reflected the interchangeability of the public affairs officials. ‘You can 
easily pick up another blue suit on a lunch break in Canary Wharf and have it tailored 
by the end of the day’ one banker joked to me when asked about the reference to 
“blue suits”. The “blue suits” were also simply an organisational function that the 
organisation tailored to its needs and the banking participants valued them purely for 
the function they performed.  
The “blue suits” were expected to be able to provide information quickly for 
the banking participants. It was a demanding job with long hours and the job involved 
attending receptions and other networking events in Parliament and long periods out 
of the office. It was considered, for example, perfectly normal for the “blue suits” to 
spend the whole of September at the three main party conferences. Their role was to 
be out gathering and codifying tacit information for their organisation about Parliament 
in preparation for eventualities such as TSC meetings. In doing so they insulated the 
banking participants from “incorrect” information sharing.  Often the “blue suits” would 
have previously worked in Parliament. It was an “open secret” that there were two 
reasons why someone became a Parliamentary researcher. Either you took this role 
to progress into politics and become an MP or to become a “blue suit” and work in 
public affairs for an organisation such as one of the high-street banks, managing the 
information that was shared by the organisation with parliamentary participants. 
Below is an image taken from a well-documented TSC hearing that took place 
during the study, where Bob Diamond, CEO of Barclays was called to give evidence. 
The image shows us more now we have this insight into how involved the “blue suits” 
were in the curation of the information shared with the politicians in the TSC meeting. 
The two individuals on the front row to the left of the picture and the individual on the 
front row to the right are “blue suits”. Their manner is earnest and we see how they, 
compared to other individuals in the picture who mostly look unengaged, are actively 
involved in the what is being said by their Chief Executive. One has a tablet PC and 
the other is taking notes. They are both making eye contact with the Committee 
whereas most of the other attendees are distracted. This is because the TSC meeting 
is their meeting as much as their Chief Executive’s. In some way, it is more their 
meeting since environments like these are what they are paid specifically to manage. 
They are not able to interact directly in the meeting as it is the individual not the 
organisation that is called to be a witnesses but they are listening, making eye contact 
and preparing for any further appearances that may be requested of individuals from 
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their organisation or any follow up to the meeting that their organisation might be 
required to take.  
Figure (6): Photograph of a wittness sitting before the TSC 
 
 
A senior executive from one of the banks involved in the study explained that 
they prepared for TSC meetings with ‘carefully written statements that were drafted 
by the organisation’s public affairs department’ and he was confident that his 
colleagues did the same: ‘after all why would [UK high street bank] have a forty-strong 
public affairs team in the UK alone’. The fact the banking participants’ positions and 
views for the TSC meeting were written down by colleagues in the public affairs 
department, assigned to memory by the participants before a TSC meeting and then 
‘performed as required’, as one participant put it, further showed that the banking 
participants were controlling the information that they shared in their interactions with 
Parliamentary colleagues in the TSC meetings – they were controlling knowledge in 
order to build a relationship that best controlled the losses and maximised the gains 
that could be made for their organisations and the script was not entirely their own, 
rather the result of pre-agreed organisational narratives with the “blue suits” that they 
then presented to the parliamentary participants in the TSC meeting.  
The banking participants recognised their function in the TSC meetings was 
to manage knowledge and present the “right” facts. As one banking participant 
commented: ‘I have a team of advisors and we make sure that we present ourselves 
appropriately’. However, as the comments from the private interviews highlight this 
was a role that they knew that had to play and what ‘appropriately’ really means in 
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this sense is the agreed version of the facts that the organisation had decided to 
present.  
As one might expect the personal views of the banking participants differed 
from those that they were required to present publicly by their organisations and that 
the “blue suits”, the wider organisational structures and a narrative that had been 
established within their organisation directed the knowledge shared by the banking 
participants in the TSC meetings. The banking participants involved in the study were 
senior executives and, on the surface, were free to speak as they wished. However, 
the idea that they would go “off message” and give their own thoughts about the ICB 
report was considered ‘entirely unthinkable’ as one banking participant put it: ‘I won’t 
stay long here by flaunting my own opinions’. Table 46 below shows how their 
personal views differed from the organisational narrative that was presented in the 
TSC meetings. What we are observing in the TSC on the part of the banking 
participant is knowledge flows being carefully managed by the individual and the 
organisation. 
 
Table (5): Comparison of banking participants’ comments in private interviews, 
focus groups and TSC meetings 
 
Interview Focus Group  TSC Meeting  
 
Banking participant (6): 
‘I’m not going to tell them. 
Ten percent is not feasible. 
As it is we must not discuss 
it because banks create 
money and money makes 
people happy and happy 
people re-elect their 
government’. 
 
 
Banking participant (6): 
‘Capital ratio requirements 
will be a significant barrier to 
growth in the industry and 
we must make sure we 
address this. It will be a 
challenge for [UK bank]’. 
 
Banking participant 
(6): 
‘It is important that we 
address the issue of 
capital ratios. I think 
the ICB is right in 
recommending at 
least ten percent’. 
 
The act of curating information by the banking participants in the TSC ensured 
that exchanges of information were based in fact and established a basis for the 
organisation to share information – the team of “blue suits” would prepare detailed 
reports for the TSC where required and it was not that the banks would not offer up 
information when it was requested. Indeed, the opposite was true: detailed letters 
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were written in follow up to specific questions raised in Committee. The approach of 
pre-preparing the information that would be shared with the Committee by the 
individual banking participants and following up with written responses was to ensure 
that the Committee received a response that was representative of the organisation.  
Despite the fact that there was a lack of alignment between what was said in 
private and what was said in the TSC meetings, as we see in table five, did not mean 
that the banking participants were not attempting to build trust with the parliamentary 
participants in the TSC meetings, nor did they disbelieve what they themselves were 
saying in the TSC meetings, but rather they viewed the process as a was a way in 
which they could manage knowledge in a way that their organisation was able to 
present a coherent organisational position. We therefore see in this section the 
banking participants shaping the image of their organisation through the way that they 
shared information in the TSC meetings to make sure that their organisations could 
keep control of certain information as required and the individual banking participants 
could present the best narrative about their organisation. 
 
2. Storytelling as a trust-building practice  
 
In the focus groups the banking participants adopted a very different approach 
towards their Parliamentary colleagues. The banking participants interacted with both 
the Parliamentary and the regulatory participants in the focus groups through 
storytelling to relay information about the failures that brought about the crisis in a way 
that showed that they had fully internalised the perspectives of the other two 
stakeholder groups 
We see in the focus groups evidence of attempts by the banking participants, 
as individuals, to align themselves with the other two stakeholder groups through the 
practice of storytelling to attempt to build alignment around cultural or moral issues. 
Since the focus groups were informal “off the record” meetings they were free to speak 
as they chose without the supervision of the “blue suits”. The bankers chose to tell 
stories to align themselves with their colleagues from the other two stakeholder 
groups and distance themselves from the failings of the 2008 crisis.  
There were four types of stories that the banking participants told. Each of the 
four types presented an opportunity for the banking participants to demonstrate to the 
other two stakeholder groups that they identified with the Parliamentary and 
regulatory participants over important issues and that they shared the same set of 
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principles, without necessarily going into detail about the specifics of the debate that 
was taking place. This helped the banking participants to avoid sharing the “wrong” 
information. The four types of story that were observed were: (1) historical stories 
about banking ethics, (2) anecdotal stories told in the third person, (3) fairy-tale stories 
and (4) discussion that relied heavily on personification.    
The four types of story settled on were established from the themes in the 
second tranche of coding. Once it became apparent that stories might be of interest I 
returned to the data gathered in the focus group and identified all the examples of 
storytelling that I could find and cross-referenced them with the categories that I had 
established. I noticed that there were broadly three types of story that could be 
identified. These were historical, third person, and fairy-tale. The forth type of 
storytelling that is described in this chapter (personification) was originally contained 
within the historical and third person categories, but, after reading some of the 
literature on storytelling (See, in particular Boje, 1995), I decided on inclusion of the 
fourth category because it neatly captured the subjectivity and role of the storyteller.  
The stories functioned effectively to build alignment with the other 
stakeholders. They were a way for the banking participants to demonstrate shared 
views with the participants from the other two stakeholder groups and align 
themselves emotionally with the perspectives of the other two stakeholder groups and 
in doing so this made the banking participants appear individually more trustworthy 
as individuals. Presenting a detailed anecdote whilst ensuring they themselves 
remained removed from any personal implication in the crisis allowed the banking 
participants to make a connection with their colleagues from the other stakeholder 
groups.  
The first type of story that was shared were fanciful stories of historic events, 
which allowed the individual telling the story to align themselves with values they 
believed the other stakeholders held whilst simultaneously distancing the focus from 
the 2008 crisis. For example, in a focus group discussion about the culture of banking 
and possible avenues that might be explored one senior figure from a bank told the 
following story:   
‘I looked at the history of the financial system to try and understand how we 
came be where we are as a sector. During my investigation, I found an 
example of a man who had been an executive of [UK High Street bank] in 
the late 1930s. This man, we will call him Greybeard, undertook some 
remarkable feats that we today would not consider. He was in occupied 
enemy territory, he put himself in remarkable peril by taking provisions into 
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prison camps. This meant that the people in the camps were able to stay 
alive. He also ensured vital communications were sent back to the UK 
telling them of what conditions were like. When he was eventually caught 
he was put to death’.   
 
Historical stories such as that of Graybeard are told in such a way as to idealise his 
actions for the bank and, more importantly, for the public good, sharing mutual values 
with the group about public-spirited leadership and demonstrating to the group that 
they themselves were invested emotionally in values and aims they believed the other 
participants wished to see.  
This was a way to demonstrate that they personally identified with the 
importance of the values and ethics that had been discussed by the group without 
discussing the actions of their organisation. The practice of telling the historical story 
had the effect of building an alignment of values in the focus group between the 
individuals. Notably however, the story does little to directly address the question of 
culture in banks, which had been the topic of the discussion for the previous five 
minutes. Instead it presents an historical account of a benevolent act that a banker 
did over eighty years ago. The story does not acknowledge the current crisis and there 
is little substantive content. The participant is simply saying obliquely through the 
telling of the story that they recognise that bankers should be selfless and principled 
risk-takers like Graybeard. Therefore, we see in this type of storytelling an attempt by 
the banking participant to express values through a historical story that (1) implies 
they agree and uphold these values and (2) presents values that the participant 
believes participants from all three stakeholder groups will identify positively in order 
to build a connection through individually identifying with their colleagues. 
The second type of story that the banking stakeholders told were specific, 
emotive anecdotes told from a distance with no reference to their context. For 
example, one banking participant told the following anecdote: 
‘There is an organisation in Chesterfield which had been established for nearly 
twenty years in the electronic and manufacturing field. It undertook a huge 
variety of primarily defence and aviation work. Last year they were in position 
where they had a good level of profitability and eighty members of staff. They 
had reached capacity and want to expand. They couldn’t do that and do you 
know why? Because the banks would not lend to them’.  
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Notice here how the banking participant makes no reference to themselves directly in 
this anecdote. This is striking because from the later discussion it became evident 
that it was his bank that did not lend the money to the organisation. The participant 
was also in a significant leadership position relating to the Merlin Agreement8 during 
the period that the organisation in the anecdote was struggling and the banking 
participant does not deny this nor does he acknowledge it in the anecdote above or 
the proceeding focus group discussion. Instead he appears to simply focus on telling 
a story that their colleagues will identify with. This provides the banker with a chance 
to critique the actions of the banks, admitting the failures without directly 
acknowledging their own liability or responsibility. 
The third type of storytelling that appeared to take place in the focus groups 
was what might be described as allegorical or fairy-tale. In this type of storytelling, the 
person is entirely removed. For example, one banker described the 2008 crisis in a 
focus group in the following way:  
‘Fairy dust relies on trust. Essentially the banks’ trust that you’ll return it, but 
also your trust that the banks will not abuse their power to make it. In the build-
up to a financial crisis, the banks often do abuse their side of the trust. 
Sometimes it’s because politicians want them to, because if you have more 
credit than you can afford, it briefly makes you feel richer, kindlier towards 
politicians and more likely to vote for them. And you’ll be paying more taxes, 
which is what politicians need to pay for the things that will make you vote for 
them (they don’t have any other supply of money, so they either have to takes 
yours or borrow it). Since 2008 the trust has gone. Trust will only come back 
when the fairy dust is once again liberating you and not enslaving you. That 
means we should be making more of it, for those who can afford it, particularly 
for the companies who create jobs and make stuff that enriches our lives, and 
for new infrastructure and the low-carbon technologies that will help preserve 
our little planet for our children’. 
 
This type of storytelling helped to build identification between the individual and the 
other participants because it sanitised the events of the financial crisis whilst also 
acknowledging that mistakes were made. In this case, describing credit as fairy dust 
suggested that trust was based on the fairy dust that the banks create removed the 
reality of the responsibility that the banks had. The idea of credit as fairy dust creates 
a fantasy world that allows the banker to say some things about the banks that 
                                                 
8 The Merlin Agreement was an arrangement between the British Government and four of the high 
street banks to lend more money to small and medium-sized businesses in the UK. 
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acknowledge the reality of what has happened without admitting liability directly: 
‘Trust will only come back when the fairy dust is one again liberating you and not 
enslaving you’ creates images of an imaginary world where the banks “save the day” 
and the fairy dust returns back so we can ‘preserve our little planet for our children’ 
[my emphasis added]. 
The forth type of storytelling that appeared in the focus groups was allegorical. 
In the case below we see the banking participant personifies the organisation. For 
example, one banking participant, who was Deputy CEO one of the banks during the 
onset of the financial crisis reflected in a focus group:   
  
‘There is the belief the reasons for the financial crisis are more severe than they 
appeared on the surface. because banks lent too much, they showed a lack of 
care. In cases where banks overvalued they showed a lack of consideration. 
When banks disobeyed regulations, they showed a lack of restraint’.  
 
The language this participant uses to describe the crisis personifies the bank. The 
participant states ‘because banks lent too much, they showed a lack of care. In cases 
where banks overvalued they showed a lack of consideration. When banks disobeyed 
regulations, they showed a lack of restraint’. [emphasis added]. However, the crisis 
was not caused by how the banks as organisations behaved. An organisation cannot 
lack care, consideration or restraint; these are personal qualities.  
Despite the fact this comment was made by a senior member of one of the 
banks who was directly accountable together with the board for the organisation’s 
actions in the UK, there is no admission of personal liability for the mistakes that were 
made, but rather the participant appears to present the banks failings by personifying 
the organisation and in turn this description of the organisation as its own entity with 
personal traits allows the participant to talk about the events of the financial crisis in 
a way that implies that they identified with the challenges facing the sector moving 
forward and that they personally were invested in the future of the sector and that it 
was the banks as organisations that made the mistakes. By placing distance between 
the individual and the organisation in the discussion the individual banker is, in this 
case, able to highlight to the other participants that they identified with the challenges 
and were united with their colleagues in tackling the problems that the banks had 
caused. 
The aim of these four types of storytelling appears to be to create a world – 
either allegorical, fairy-tale-like, historical or simply in the third person – which 
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sanitises the events and removes the individual from the organisations they are 
describing. This allows the banking participant to address questions and talk about 
things with the group without directly admitting their involvement. It is a confessional 
to the other participants that they are not able to make when they have to stick to the 
organisational positions they have agreed with the “blue suits” and storytelling allows 
them to tell the truth and make this confession without directly acknowledging their 
own guilt. The act of storytelling also has the effect of showing to the other two 
stakeholder groups that they recognised the issues facing the group and that as 
individuals they shared the same values as the participants from the other two 
stakeholder groups and that they were not simply the sum of their organisation as we 
see in the TSC encounter.  
By telling a story rather than engaging directly with discussion it gave the 
impression in the focus groups that the banking participants were personally invested 
in addressing the issues that had arisen within the sector without acknowledging their 
own role, or their organisations role in the events that had led to the crisis and it also 
allowed them an opportunity to be honest without admitting guilt. The use of 
storytelling techniques allowed the banking participants to remove themselves from 
the incidents and aligned them with the participants from the other two stakeholder 
groups. It also allowed them to tell the truth without implicating themselves. This 
appeared to be a way in which the banking participants attempted to build trust with 
the other participants, implying through stories that their desires and intentions were 
aligned, that they recognised the failures and that they wanted to act in the best 
interests of the group and support the work of reforming the sector.   
 
Parliamentary participants curating spaces for control: two stories 
of the Select Committee meeting 
 
The structure of the TSC rooms, the tradition of the Select Committee, the 
implied meanings of phrases such as ‘Select Committee inquiry’ and the complex 
array of meanings implied by the physicality of the meetings themselves were not 
accidental and were continually curated by the Parliamentary participants. This meant 
that both the activities of the banks and the banks’ perception of their relationship with 
the politicians when engaged in a TSC meeting were structured in a scene of activity 
that removed the opportunity for the banking participants to lead the discussion. This 
explains in part why the responses that the banking participants gave in this 
environment were pre-prepared. 
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The discussions between parliamentary and banking participants were 
directed entirely by the parliamentary participants, orchestrated firstly by material 
objects such as the room itself with its array of traditions and symbols and secondly 
by the process that the Banking participants went through to arrive at the Committee 
meetings. This section will explore how the Parliamentary participants used the 
physical layout of the room and the process by which the banking participants arrived 
at the Committee hearings as instruments to maintain a certain image that enabled 
them to control the discussion. 
The TSC was a formal environment that shaped the interactions of the 
participants and this meant that it symbolised very different things to the banking 
participants and the parliamentary participants – one banking participant commented 
when asked about their recent TSC appearance in a private interview: ‘the Select 
Committees are so turgid. It becomes confrontational. It is not the best way to conduct 
the inquiry’. On the other hand, the Parliamentary participants valued the distance it 
provided and them with control over the discussion; ‘on our terms’ as they put it. As 
another Parliamentary participant commented: ‘Like statutory instruments, the 
Committee meetings are a tool to make sure we have the appropriate control we 
require over how legislation develops and to keep Government to account’. This 
sense of control they felt in the TSC meetings appeared to be a way for the 
Parliamentarians to feel they could begin to build trust with the banking participants.  
 
3. The theatre: seating, symbolism and language in the TSC 
 
Firstly, the seating arrangement of the Committee rooms in Parliament heavily 
influenced the options that the banking participants had to alter their orientation with 
the parliamentary participants whilst in TSC meetings or to influence the flow of the 
discussion. Even the more modern Select Committee Rooms in Portcullis House 
shown in figure seven on the follow page are deliberately formal and their design is 
purposely to ensure the Committee can scrutinise evidence with an appropriate 
degree of control. As one can see from the picture below, there is a formality to the 
arrangement of the room. TSC members sit in a horseshoe seating arrangement 
around the participant who has been invited to give evidence. Officials are taking 
notes to the left-hand side and a public gallery of up to 150 people sit behind the 
individual giving evidence to the Committee. The witness is the focal point in the room.   
In figure eight on the following page there are two individuals giving evidence. 
The microphones in the picture in front of each participant records everything that is 
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said for the official record and creates further distance between the participants, 
despite the fact they are relatively close together in this room. The ornate wooden 
panels towards the back of the room and the green leather desks and green leather 
studded chairs create a formality that serves to remind the witness that they are in the 
meeting to give evidence not debate with the Members of the Committee. The scene 
is constructed in a way that appears more like an interview rather than a debate.  
 
Figure (7): Photograph showing the physical layout of a Select Committee room   
 
 
 
This atmosphere of interview and evidence gathering is further consolidated 
by the fact that the Committee sits in a closed session before the meeting and, with 
the help of the Committee Clerks, they prepare questions and agree who will ask 
which question and in what order. There is therefore minimal scope for any Committee 
member to dominate the discussion because of this planning and control of the 
discussion is carefully maintained. There are also two doors to the Committee rooms. 
One is for the Committee Members to enter and the other is for witnesses and 
members of the public to enter. This creates further physical distance between the 
Committee Members and the banking participants and makes it clear that boundaries 
are being marked, that it is a meeting to examine facts, not to debate opinions or 
views on how legislation should be developed.  
During the course of study, The House of Commons issued each Member with 
a tablet PC. These were regularly used in Committee meetings as a tool to emphasise 
the fact the meetings were business meetings. Notice in figure nine below how the 
72 
 
Member to the right of the picture has his tablet PC propped up on the table. Often 
the tablet PCs were propped up in such a way, but they were rarely used for the 
purpose of discussion. In fact, quite the opposite was true. The members used them 
to glance at emails or, as it appears in figure nine, as another physical barrier between 
the banking participants as witnesses and the Committee members as in control of 
the evidence gathering.  
 
Figure (8): Photograph II showing a Select Committee Room 
 
 
Figure (9): Select Committee Example in the Palace of Westminster 
 
 
 
The TSC is a formal instrument of Parliament and the language used in the 
meetings by the parliamentary participants in the meetings is deliberately formal since 
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its purpose is focused on control and establishing a legalistic environment for 
politicians to scrutinise evidence. For example, the way that members of the TSC 
referred to each other follows a highly formalised pattern. A Member of the Committee 
is meant to be addressed by their colleagues as “the honourable member of 
[constituency]”. However, if the Member has ever previously held a Ministerial office 
they are addressed by their colleagues as “the right honourable member from 
[constituency]. However, this does not apply to the most junior of the three tiers of 
ministerial office: Parliamentary Undersecretary of State. If the Member has held this 
position they are to be referred to as simply “the honourable member of 
[constituency]”. The language is deliberately formalised to curate a legalistic 
atmosphere. 
The language reinforced the message of the physical arrangement and helped 
the TSC maintain control of the conversations. This did not mean the Parliamentary 
participants did not adopt a more conversational style on occasion, but rather that 
they made sure that the focus was on the legislation they were scrutinising. The 
exchange below is taken from a TSC meeting and eloquently demonstrates how the 
formality kept the control with the TSC Members and what happened when the 
banking participant attempts to adopt the same conversational tone: 
 
Parliamentary participant (4): It is good to be back in Committee. It has 
been an eventful Easter recess, not least for the honourable member for 
[constituency], who got married. I am sure that the Committee will want to 
congratulate him on that.  
 
Banking participant: What a honeymoon! Indeed, I hope that this does 
not qualify as his honeymoon, and that he enjoyed a more 
companionable honeymoon with his wife. And Thank you very much 
Andrew for the comments in your letter, let me say my wife is signed up 
to what you’ve said, she never ceases to remind me of my public duty to 
spend more.  
 
Parliamentary participant (4): And we should get down to business as 
we have a good deal to get through today and I know two of our 
colleagues need to leave promptly at 11am this morning. At the moment, 
we have the most rigorous jurisdiction for pay in the world, but we want to 
go further and make it tougher. 
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In this example, the witness was called before the Committee to discuss remuneration 
in the banks. However, the banking individual has attempted to enter into a more 
conversational tone before the business of the Committee begins. This is quickly 
closed down by the parliamentary participant who does not acknowledge the bankers 
attempt to lighten the mood with his joke. The banking participant attempts to build 
alignment through the focus of the honeymoon rather than the business of the 
Committee and that the Parliamentary participant is swift to ensure that the focus 
returns directly to the debate about executive pay. 
 Therefore, despite attempts by the banking participants to change the tone in the 
TSC meetings, the Parliamentary participants use the TSC meetings as a space to 
gather information, finding agreement through clarification of specific pieces of 
legislation and use the formality of the environment to ensure that they maintained 
control over the focus of the discussion. The conversation above continues in a much 
more scripted manner afterwards. The Parliamentary participants ask the questions 
they have prepared before the meeting and the banking participants ensure that they 
share the “right” information that they have agreed with the “blue suits” in their 
organisation before the meeting. It is an elaborate scene played out in a theatre that 
controls the language, the tone of the language and even the opportunity to speak 
freely.    
 
4. The Fortress: A journey to a Treasury Select Committee meeting 
  
The process of getting to the Select Committee hearing further shaped the 
process of keeping the politicians in control of the discussion and influenced the way 
the banking participants viewed the Committee, which appeared to change during one 
encounter I had with a banking participant as they arrived to give evidence at a TSC 
meeting. I will briefly describe that journey to a TSC meeting that the banking 
participant made in order demonstrate the intended and unintended barriers that were 
encountered, which visibly changed the banking participant’s demeanor as the 
journey progressed. Although this was the only journey that I made with a banking 
participant, it is representative of the challenges the banking participants faced when 
attempting to get to the Committee meetings. It seemed that the journey to the 
Committee meeting was perhaps as important as the Committee itself in shaping the 
banking participants views of the Committee. 
The banking participant arrives at 8:45am in a black car outside Portcullis 
House (shown in figure ten), where there is no parking as it is on a busy intersection 
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of Bridge street and Victoria Embankment. This lack of parking is the first barrier they 
meet. Nobody in Parliament drives to work. Being driven in a car is for those senior in 
Government therefore no provision is made for parking unless you park inside the 
estate, which guests are not permitted to do. 
 
 
Figure (10): Portcullis House photographed from the corner of Bridge Street 
and Victoria Embankment 
 
 
 
In the car there is the banking participant, two advisors and the driver. The 
driver stops the car and holds up the traffic on Victoria Embankment so the other three 
can get out and the participant tells me that it is their first time going to a Committee 
meeting. The location of the room they have been asked to report to is ambiguous 
and this is the second barrier they meet. They seem to think the Committee meeting 
is in Portcullis House (The very name of the building implies a barrier). I explain the 
room is in the main Palace of Westminster, but that I will walk them to the correct 
Committee room. Committee rooms are given letters, but it is not clear to those who 
don’t work with the Committees whether a meeting is taking place in the Palace 
Committee rooms or in the Portcullis House Committee rooms. One of the “blue coats” 
should perhaps have picked up they are not at the right entrance for their Committee 
meeting. They could have entered at St Stephens Hall for a slightly quicker journey, 
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but this has not been made clear by the information sent out by the Committee Clerks 
either. They have simply been asked to go to Committee Room G.  
 
Figure (11): A photograph of the main entrance to Portcullis House facing out 
towards Victoria Embankment  
 
 
The entrance to Portcullis House itself is the third barrier we meet, an entrance 
which the banking participant observes is ‘not obvious’. Figure eleven above shows 
the main entrance that faces out towards Victoria Embankment. The revolving door 
to the foreground is for those who work in Parliament and the revolving door to the 
background is for those visiting but neither is signposted. Nor is it clear that this is an 
entrance to Parliament. It looks like an ordinary office building. There is a queue of 
about thirty people outside the visitors’ entrance which is the fourth barrier we 
encounter. I explain to the banking participant that they will have to join the queue and 
that I will meet them once they have passed through security. This is the first time he 
has been asked to give evidence and he does not appear pleased that he is being 
asked to queue to do so. His manner is tense and he is curt with me as the group 
joins the back of the queue.  
I wait for ten minutes for the group to reach the front of the queue. They are 
looking more frustrated now. They arrive at the fifth barrier: airport style security where 
their photograph is taken and they are asked to empty their pockets, take off their 
belts, watches and jackets and one of the participants has to take his laptop out of his 
bag. The manner of the guards is sullen. Many of the House staff who previously 
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performed the role have been replaced by G4S staff recently. I wait for a further five 
minutes as one of the security staff looks through the banking participant’s bag. The 
banking participant is looking across at me indignantly, although one of his colleagues 
appears to be looking in some detail at his newly acquired visitor’s lanyard that he has 
been asked to wear ‘clearly at all times’. By the time the group have put their belts, 
watches and jackets back on it is 9:10am according to the annunciator. ‘Nobody said 
we’d have to do all this’ comments the banking participant. ‘I’d have arrived earlier’ 
clearly angry at the fact he has not accounted for such a delay but he also appears to 
have been rather annoyed by the process of having to take off his jacket, watch and 
belt. Outside of an airport, he is unlikely to have done this and I sense he is a little 
disorientated by the process as he was not expecting it.  
 
Figure (12): Photograph of the entrance to Portcullis House post-security 
clearance 
 
 
 
 
 
Once through security we are faced by the sixth barrier pictured above in figure 
twelve. These two rotating doors require someone to use their keycard to allow people 
through. I tell them to ‘wait on this side of the doors’ whilst I use my key card three 
times on the keycard reader on the other side of the door to let them through. It keeps 
jamming as they don’t leave enough time between each other. This jolt clearly annoys 
the banking participant and the impracticality of the process remains unsaid.  
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Figure (13): The scene once we have passed through the revolving doors 
 
 
Once through the doors we are faced with the scene shown in figure thirteen 
above which makes the banking participant comment that he likes the trees. He smiles 
as he says this to me and the mood has lightened. The banking participant’s assistant 
says it feels ‘like a shopping mall’. They are clearly a little disorientated by the open 
feel of the environment now we are inside. There are lots of people walking around 
and people sitting drinking coffee. We walk past a Post Office, which they comment 
is an odd feature. Since they mention the oddity of the Post Office, as we walk, I 
explain a little bit about the “Westminster bubble” telling them how employees work 
long, anti-social hours here so there are most things you need on site. I mention that 
there is also another Post Office in the main Palace as well as a barber, a florist, four 
gift shops, a crèche, a rifle range and seventeen different places to get food. They 
find it amusing that they have just entered this microcosm in the centre of London. A 
closed world that they had not considered before. There is a sense of simulacra. The 
trees and the glass atrium further add to the curiosity of the closed-off world they have 
entered that covers around eight acres of London.    
As we descend an escalator it brings us along the main route past Parliament 
Square and into the Palace itself there is the seventh barrier, but it is invisible to the 
participants. Two statues, one of a Lion and one of a Unicorn either side of the 
walkway mark the entrance to the Palace but there is no security to clear now we are 
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inside the estate. As we walk through the cloisters pictured in figure fourteen the 
banking participant’s attitude changes again. He observes how different the cloisters 
feel to the modern scene in Portcullis House that we have just passed through. He is 
also impressed as he looks out to the right of the cloisters and can see out across 
Palace Yard. His manner has changed. He is not angry anymore, more intrigued at 
how the “Westminster Bubble” functions. He is quiet as we walk through the cloisters 
and he tries not to turn his head as we walk past a prominent politician. He appears 
to have accepted the inconvenience of queuing and security clearance now he is 
inside the Palace.  
 
Figure (14): The cloisters across Parliamentary Yard 
 
 
 
Eventually, after a further ten minutes of walking we arrive at the corridor 
shown in figure fifteen on the following page. The banking participant and his team 
thank me for helping them and they comment that they ‘would have had no idea where 
to go’ and the mood has changed from our initial encounter. The atmosphere is tense 
now but the banking participant is not angry at the inconvenience of having to queue 
and pass through security and the general lack of information they have been given. 
Instead he seems to be a little nervous or perhaps disorientated from his journey to 
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the Committee room and the idiosyncrasies of the “Westminster bubble” he has just 
discovered.  
 
Figure (15): photograph of a Committee meeting room corridor   
 
 
 
I leave as a “bluesuit” comes out of the door armed with piles of papers and a 
mobile phone. He explains that the Committee is running a little behind and the 
banking participant does not seem inconvenienced. By this point the banking 
participant seems to be clear where the power lies in the meeting he is about to have. 
He is arriving as a witness not just a guest. What has been left unsaid by both of us 
is why someone was not there to escort them, why it took nearly forty minutes to get 
to the room from leaving the car and what precisely the banking participant should 
make of the physical and symbolic barriers that were placed between the Committee 
and the banking participant before they even arrive at the room. 
These barriers mean more than simply their primary purpose to ensure 
security. They are meaning making: shaping the banking participants attitude before 
he even enters the Committee hearing. The curation of space is at once disorientating 
and controlling and ensures for a certain type of atmosphere in the Committee 
meetings. The banker is taken into another world away from their own sphere and this 
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is an opportunity for the Parliamentary participants to focus on gathering information 
in an environment where they are able to control proceedings.  
 
Parliamentary participants curating space to establish and align 
identities  
 
From the focus groups observations, the Parliamentary participants tended to 
behave in their orientation towards the other two stakeholder groups in ways that were 
more typical of behaviour one might observe between individuals who had personal 
relationships with one another. The Parliamentary participants used the focus groups 
to build trust with the two other stakeholder groups by gathering information about 
their colleagues’ individual lives. They particularly used the fringes of the meeting as 
an opportunity to get to know their colleagues personally.  
In the fringes of the focus group meetings the Parliamentary participants were 
keen to learn more about their colleagues’ personal lives. Before and after meetings 
one-to-one conversations took place, or they talked in small groups stood around the 
room. There were two ways I observed this taking place, which demonstrated that the 
parliamentary participants’ intentions were to gather personal information about their 
colleagues’ individual lives and that trust-building was being attempted through a 
scene of action that used the physical space, small verbal gestures as well as 
establishing and aligning common identities beyond the sphere of work that informed 
about the workplace. Two examples are described in the following two sections.    
 
5. A room with a view: building identification through the use of space  
 
Three of the morning focus groups were in meeting room Q in Portcullis House, 
which has a view over Parliament Square. I observed in the study that that this view 
led a pattern where the regulatory and banking participants would occasionally 
separate themselves from the circle that gathered by the tea and coffee desk and 
walk over to the window to look out at the view. I noticed that the parliamentary 
participants would then join the participant who had separated from the group to take 
in the view and the Parliamentary participant would begin to point out parts of the 
Parliamentary estate from the vantage point they had from meeting room Q in a way 
that one might give a guest a tour of your house if you were so inclined. For instance, 
Room Q in Portcullis House looks over bridge street into the Palace. One of the 
Parliamentary participants explained that there was underground walkway beneath 
Bridge Street that joined Portcullis House and the Palace of Westminster. At this point 
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they mentioned the exit under Bridge Street from the walkway, which went directly 
into Westminster Tube station and required a Parliamentary key card. They are 
posturing here. Showing off their home and their status in this enclosed private 
Members environment, but there is more to this description than simply ego. They are 
revealing things about their world, offering up pieces of gossip about their place of 
work and their commute that is not related to the meeting they are about to have. A 
snippet of gossip that there is an entrance into Parliament from Westminster tube 
station is offered instead.  
 
Figure (16): Photograph showing the location of room Q taken from the 
entrance to Westminster Hall   
 
 
 
All the relationships observed were professional in nature (i.e. between the 
organisations that the participants’ represented rather than between the individuals 
and it was not obvious from observing the discussion that there were any significant 
personal relationships between the participants that extended beyond their work) but 
it was clear that, when participants were waiting to begin the morning meetings that 
the parliamentary participants took care to learn about the personal lives of the other 
stakeholders and they used anecdotes about the physical features of Parliament such 
as the underground entrance to begin a discussion that was related to their place of 
work rather than work-related. This is an important distinction since talking about the 
physical place of work rather than work itself allowed discussions to lead more 
naturally to topics that went beyond the scope of the work.  
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For instance, on one occasion I was involved in a discussion where one of the 
banking participants noticed out of the window one of the bike racks in the grounds of 
the Palace of Westminster and he asked whether MPs really cycled to work. The 
Parliamentary participant said that it was mostly researchers and other staff that 
cycled but pointed to another smaller bicycle rack which was for Members only, which 
was full. This led to a discussion about the images of David Cameron and Boris 
Johnson cycling in the press at which point the banking participant revealed that they 
cycled parts of the Tour de France route in their vacation time. My own interest in 
cycling led me to ask what bicycle he had and the parliamentary participant listened 
as we discussed the styling of the make of the bicycle, where the top tube tapers to a 
square from a cylinder and why the banking participant had chosen to replace the 
tires with some more suited to the particular part of the course he was preparing to 
undertake that year. The Parliamentary participant is silent for the minute or so that 
we discuss this and then asks who the banking participant goes on the cycling 
vacations with. It turns out the banking participant does these alone. The conversation 
moves on, the Parliamentarian has gathered some personal knowledge about the 
individual that has no apparent relevance to the business that is to be discussed 
shortly, but he has gained insight into the personal life, and potentially the mentality 
of the individual not just the person that they are when they are at the bank or about 
to be in the meeting.  
Some further examples of discussions observed in the fringes of the focus 
groups that appeared entirely unrelated to the discussion in the focus groups 
themselves can be seen in the table six on the following page. Parliamentary 
participants did things before and after the meetings like ask how the participants’ 
families were and attempts seemed to be made by the parliamentary participants to 
get to know personal bits of knowledge about colleagues as individuals. One of the 
parliamentary participants later commented in an interview, when asked why they had 
stayed for twenty minutes after one of the morning focus groups: ‘I always like to find 
out something about their partner or children so I can ask about it the next time I see 
them. It breaks down the barriers between us and gives me a better sense of how 
they are likely to behave when they are not here’.  
The act of offering up pieces of information about their own life was a way that 
the Parliamentary participants gathered individual knowledge about the other 
participants. This gave them an insight not just into the organisations but the 
individuals leading the organisation. The Parliamentary participants could gather 
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information about organisations easily enough in Committee meetings, but these 
encounters allowed them to get a better idea of the person as an individual.  
 
Table (6): Examples of conversations taking place before or after focus 
groups 
 
Parliamentary participant (9):  
I understand you are involved in 
[charity]. It is a wonderful organisation. 
How long have you been a trustee?  
   
Parliamentary participant (2): 
‘[banking participant] tells me you 
have a place running the Royal Parks 
this year. I did the London Marathon 
in 2001.  How are you finding the 
training? 
 
Parliamentary participant (8): 
‘I used [Nursery] in Islington. It was 
very good and they did have places a 
while ago. The crèche here is also very 
good.  
 
Parliamentary participant (15): 
‘We went to the British Kebabs 
Awards last night. [Parliamentary 
participant] was also there. There 
were quite a group of us.  
 
 
It was noticeable that it was the Parliamentary participants that adopted this 
approach rather than the banking participants or the regulatory participants and 
reflects their own view of themselves as social actors creating legislation through 
interacting and building consensus through personal relationships with their 
colleagues rather than functionaries of an organisation that had a strict hierarchy. 
 
6. A visit to Strangers Bar: showing ability through the use of space   
 
Three of the focus groups took place at 7pm and there were two places that 
Members could take guests if they wished to continue the discussion afterwards: 
Strangers Bar and the Sport and Social bar. On one occasion the parliamentary 
participant made an offer to the group at the end of the formal discussion to join them 
for a drink in Strangers Bar to continue the discussion.  
The offer to go to Strangers Bar is made to the group and three of the 
participants take up the offer; a regulatory participant and two banking participants. 
Here the parliamentary participant is acknowledging that they see the participants as 
individuals and everyone is included despite the heated debate about capital ratios 
that had taken place, where there had been a strong disagreement between one of 
the regulatory participants and the banking participants. The offer to go to Strangers 
Bar suggests that they want to spend more time talking about the issues from the 
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meeting whilst socialising with anyone who wants to do so. However, there are two 
things that this Member’s guests do not know that are implied by the timing of the offer 
(at 9:15pm) and the suggestion that they go for a drink specifically in Strangers Bar. 
 Firstly, timing. It is a Monday and Parliament is still sitting in session and the 
Parliamentary participant knows that they need to be within seven minutes of the 
voting chamber when a vote is called in order to walk through the voting chamber 
even though they are not required in the Chamber for the debate. They will not be 
able to predict when a vote will be called and the debate is not expected to finish 
before 10pm, potentially requiring a vote before 10pm. It is a three-line whip on this 
particular evening but the Member’s guests will not know this. The Member has the 
choice between going back to their office in Portcullis House or spending further time 
getting to know their colleagues in a social environment. The parliamentary participant 
sees both as legitimate work. They choose to welcome the regulatory and banking 
participants into their “home” by suggesting that the discussion continues and that 
they will take them to Strangers Bar implying an interest in socialising more generally 
as they continue the discussion about capital ratios. 
As we leave the room the banking participants and the regulatory participant 
appear pleased to be invited into a space that they don’t normally have access to and 
to be hosted by the Parliamentary participant in the bar after the meeting has finished. 
There is no reason that our group has to leave Dining Room D to continue the 
discussion since I have booked for the room for the entire evening and the 
Parliamentary participant knows this is the case but he chooses to make the offer to 
go to Strangers Bar anyway. The offer is about more than a drink it is a “welcome into 
my home”, an acknowledgment by the parliamentary participant that they recognise 
the other participants as more than simply their organisation’s position or the words 
that have been shared in the discussion that has taken place, and, as it appears to 
the guests at least, the Parliamentary participant wants to take more time out in an 
evening to spend socially with them.  
The Parliamentary participant has asked the three guests if they have ever 
been into Strangers bar. They have not. This is the Parliamentarians opportunity now 
to flatter their guests by bringing them into their closed world and they will use the 
space to direct the conversation. As the group leaves, the regulatory participant and 
the banking participants are excited to be welcomed into this world for a short while. 
One of the participants takes their name place card from the focus group, which has 
a picture of a Portcullis on it and places it in his pocket suggesting despite their 
seniority in their own sphere that they feel that the meeting was to be remembered 
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perhaps because of its location and perhaps also because of the eclectic mix of 
participants in the focus group.  
 
Figure (17): A photograph of the sign on the door to Strangers Bar  
 
 
 
As I leave with the group I note that they will be unlikely to miss the sign on 
the door to Strangers bar that is photographed in figure seventeen: this sign is not 
intended really for those who work in Parliament. The rules are known to those who 
work there, but the sign will likely remind the three participants that they are honoured 
guests by the Serjeant at Arms as they step into Strangers Bar. They might be 
wondering who the Serjeant at Arms is, but none of them ask. Like his counterpart 
‘Black Rod’ in the House of Lords, the Serjeant at Arms is responsible for security 
matters concerning the House. The sign also highlights this is a place for HEO9 grade 
staff and Members only, again reinforcing the private, exclusive nature of the place. 
As we enter the bar, the regulatory participant and the banking participants also 
continue to wear the visitor lanyards such as the one below in figure eighteen 
                                                 
9 HEO grade refers to Higher Executive Officer and is equivalent Civil Servant Grade A3 
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reminding them again how they are being welcomed as visitors into this exclusive 
place.   
Figure (18): Examples of visitor lanyards  
 
 
 
Once inside the bar the surroundings are familiar. It looks like any other bar. 
In fact, one might have forgotten that we are in the House of Commons if it was not 
for the Green panelling on the bar, the green carpet and the annunciator on the wall. 
The regulatory and banking participants are impressed by how normal it seems and 
comment to this end. There is even a dart board on the wall, which draws attention 
and amusement initially. Figure nineteen below shows a picture of the bar area  
There is plenty of seating in the bar. We line up behind the Parliamentary 
participant as he asks what everyone is drinking and addresses the bartender by his 
first name. It is made clear by this action that the Parliamentary participant wants to 
remind us that we are in his space and we are welcomed by the offer of ‘what would 
you like to drink’. We give our various requests to the bartender. The Parliamentary 
participant has ordered first and has asked for a pint of beer. The regulatory and 
banking participants follow suit all requesting alcoholic drinks. The discussion that had 
ended just five minutes ago about capital ratios is not returned to for the rest of the 
evening. We are now five men standing at a regular bar talking as we wait at the bar 
for the drinks to be poured. The flow of events feels natural, but is being 
choreographed carefully by the parliamentary participant to make it feel like we are 
just five ordinary men in a pub. The beer, the dartboard and the ordinariness of the 
bar makes it difficult to return to the intensity of the discussion about capital ratios. 
During the pause as we are waiting for our drinks the parliamentary participant talks 
about his family and there is some discussion about how to balance constituency life 
with their role in Westminster. The Parliamentary participant asks lots of questions, 
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none are related to the previous discussion. He jokes about his diary and that his 
colleagues in London constituencies have an advantage in Westminster because they 
don’t have the same commute he has between his constituency and Westminster.   
Figure (19): A photograph of Strangers Bar 
 
 
The parliamentary participant recalls a time when they were a junior minister 
and how his wife brought in cups of tea throughout the day as he went through the 
paperwork in his red ministerial box on a Sunday. He tells the other three participants 
that the secret to being a minister is to take the paperwork out of the ministerial box 
and work from the bottom up because ‘this is where civil servants hide stuff they hope 
you won’t get to. You know you are pretty safe to sign off on most of the stuff they put 
at the top’ he comments. The member is casually implying how hard working he is, 
how he recognises the support his wife gives him, how important he considers himself 
to be. All of this is conveyed in what appears to be a light-hearted anecdote told in an 
ordinary bar. He has told this story before, it is rehearsed but does its’ purpose of 
making his three guests feel at ease, whilst also reminding them of his status, allowing 
him to direct the flow and tone of the discussion. It is noticeable that the reason the 
participant suggested a trip to Strangers Bar in the first place has not been addressed 
yet. There has been no discussion of capital ratios as we stand at the bar.    
The Parliamentary participant’s anecdote about his previous role as a Minister 
leads the regulator to talk about his previous role in the Treasury which had an old 
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wine cellar underground where he used to work if he wanted to avoid interruption and 
the bankers explain why no one walks above ground in Canary Wharf: ‘all the tall 
building funnel the wind’. Conversation has shifted from how to regulate capital ratios 
to gossip and anecdotes about their own worlds. Stories that give information about 
the individual and their organisational lives. One of the banking participants offers up 
that he thinks the next financial crisis will be because of store card credit; a comment 
that he later repeats in a focus group.  
Once the drinks are poured, despite there being more than adequate seating 
in the bar, the banking participant casually delivers the line that the regulatory 
participant and banking participants are not expecting, but is familiarly heard in 
Strangers Bar: “shall we sit outside?” The group agrees. None of them appear to know 
there is an outside seating area in this bar but they all take the Parliamentary 
participant’s lead as they had done so at the bar when ordering drinks. The member 
gestures to another door at the far end of the bar. This leads out on to a terrace 
overlooking the Thames. A picture of the terrace is included below in figure twenty. 
The door we emerge through is to the upper right of the photo. The bar inside remains 
almost empty. 
 
Figure (20): A photograph of the terrace outside Strangers Bar 
 
 
 
Unlike the photo above, on this particular occasion the sun has just set. We 
find a seat and the Parliamentary participant acknowledges the space for the first 
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time. He has waited for this moment to show he is at home in these surroundings. He 
simply says ‘Its wonderful out here. The only problem is the view from the other side 
of the bank is much better.’ We laugh. His script has finished now and we return to 
being five men drinking beer in a pub, sharing stories as the regulatory and banking 
participants casually glance around at the grandeur of the palace and the uniqueness 
of their surroundings. 
Despite their statuses in their respective spheres, the Parliamentary 
participant knows this is a special occasion for the other participants and his casual 
attitude further creates an environment where they begin to talk more freely about a 
whole host of topics. They eventually return to the financial crisis and an anecdote is 
told by one of the banks about Lehman Brothers that surprises me in its candour. The 
banking participant comments in passing, as if it was nothing of significance, ‘we could 
all see it coming on Friday when we went home, but there was nothing we could do, 
we just came in on Monday and tried to fix the mess’. Here the individual is talking as 
an individual. As a man in the pub, not as a functionary of his organisation sharing 
information that tells the parliamentary participant about his attitude towards the crisis, 
the impotence that he personally felt and his resigned attitude to the fact he knew it 
was coming and that his colleagues did too. The implication that it was an open secret 
that one of the banks would fail eventually and specifically that they were willing to 
share with a group they did not know well that they knew that Lehman was about to 
default before it was made public was brought about by way the parliamentary 
participant used the surroundings to set a tone where comments such as this could 
be made. The banker appeared to be trying to impress the parliamentary participant 
in some way about his position in his own sphere by offering a piece of knowledge 
about his own world. 
The politicians behaviour in this scene of action might appear disingenuous 
and it was staged, but there was a sincerity behind this behaviour – one parliamentary 
participant, when asked directly about an incident similar to the two described in this 
section commented in a private interview: ‘we must gather as many different views as 
possible here on the Committee so we can take a decision that alleviates the problem 
sufficiently for as many people as possible and we need to better understand the 
challenges they face’ [My emphasis added]. The focus on the individual in this way 
appeared to be a way of getting the banking participants to talk more freely about the 
banks they represented but also the challenges the banking and regulatory 
participants faced as individuals. As one parliamentary participant commented: ‘it is 
important to recognise that these are all just people that we are dealing with’ despite 
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their roles in their respective spheres. As another Parliamentary participant 
commented, ‘the fringe of the meeting provides a time to really get to know them … I 
have firmer facts to work with if I know more about their circumstances’. The 
Parliamentary participants were attempting to get to know the banking and regulatory 
participants as individuals through these scenes of action. They believed that the 
insight they gained about the individuals through such episodes helped them to better 
predict the unpredictable behaviour of their organisations.  
What is left unsaid in this Parliamentarian’s earlier comment ‘really get to know 
them’ is that the group rarely met in environments such as the focus group. This was 
not anticipated at the beginning of the study and was highlighted by one of the 
participants after the first focus group. Indeed, there were very few opportunities for 
the participants to spend time in a round table environment where senior colleagues 
were represented from industry as well as the regulatory and legislatory spheres. It 
was made particularly rare by the fact that the meeting was not “owned” by any of the 
three stakeholder groups. If a group of senior individuals from the three stakeholders 
were to find themselves in a room together ‘there would normally be an agenda’ 
according to one participant. For example, the banks might organise a meeting or an 
event to lobby on a position. Likewise, the TSC meetings would see representatives 
from FSC or the banks presenting to them as witnesses and they would be present to 
discuss an agenda item relevant to a specific TSC inquiry. This perhaps suggests why 
the Parliamentarians were active in their attempts to gather knowledge about 
individuals. 
 
The Regulators: Managing flows of knowledge to control the banks 
 
The regulatory participants from the Financial Services Authority interacted with 
the participants from the banking sector in a way that focused on rules and an 
orientation that suggested they wanted to control the behaviour of the banking 
participants. They remained quiet and did not contribute to discussions on topics such 
as values and ethics that took place but dominated the discussion about the regulatory 
ringfence, interrupting the flow of the conversation and reading from pieces of paper 
that they had prepared in advance of the meetings. This section will examine how the 
FSA used the management of knowledge flows in two different ways to establish the 
basis for trust between their organisation and the banks and to attempt to build trust 
in the regulatory environment.    
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7. Placing paper between the regulator and the banks to control  
 
The following episode from a focus group involving one of the regulatory participants 
highlights the rules-based orientation that the regulator took to their interactions in the 
focus groups and their desire to control the actions of the banks more effectively. 
Standing up to address the room and reading from typed notes on a sheet of A4 paper 
one of the regulatory participants commented:  
 
There will be new information handed out about Basel II in the 
following month, which, which we will develop. Requirements will be 
outlined in a supervisory statement, that we will send out   
 
The act of reading from a sheet of paper about rules and regulations in a group 
meeting showed that the focus for the regulator was on what the rules were, that they 
needed to be clearly understood by the banking participants and that they believed 
their role as the regulator was to enforce the rules through a ‘supervisory statement’. 
The participant had written down what they wished to say and stuck to their script. 
They explain that the requirements will be outlined in a ‘supervisory statement’ that 
they will develop and they will send out. The regulatory participant leaves no 
opportunity here for the banking participants in the focus group to influence the 
content of the statement and the banking participants are simply told ‘requirements 
will be outlined in a supervisory statement, that we will send out’ asserting control not 
only over the regulation, but also the timeline in which the regulation is developed. 
This action contrasted entirely with informal and more general discussion of the focus 
groups up until this point and the politicians’ approach to the meetings that has been 
discussed in the previous section. The fact the regulator stood up to read from the 
piece of paper indicated that he intended his statement to have a dramatic effect. 
At the beginning of the each of the focus groups participants introduced 
themselves briefly. This, I expected would mean that the representative would say 
they were attending the focus group in place of their colleague. On both occasions, 
there was no explanation given for why the colleague was not there, nor did the 
participant seem to think this could be an issue for the group. They just introduced 
themselves and made no reference to the fact the name place card they had picked 
up as they came in the room and put in front of themselves had their colleague’s name 
on it. However, the way they seemed entirely comfortable with the fact they were not 
the person whose name was written on the card suggested that this was a regular 
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occurrence for them when they represented their organisation – it was as if they 
thought that the other participants should expect anyone from their organisation might 
turn up and that a name was just a place holder for the organisation at the focus group 
meetings.  
Figure (21): Reproduction of the front cover of the document placed on the 
table by the regulatory participant in focus group two 
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Although all three examples here of the regulators’ behaviour appear 
adversarial, this third behaviour provided insight as to why the individual 
representatives behaved in the manner they did in the first two examples. They saw 
their contribution to the focus group meetings as purely presenting their organisation’s 
perspective (much like the organisational narratives the bankers used in the TSC 
meetings). Therefore their responses would remain the same whoever was in the 
room as they were organisational statements, in fact precisely because they were not 
who it said on the name card only further consolidated the impression that they were 
there simply present in the bureaucratic function to deliver information or convey 
messages on behalf of the organisation and therefore it was the message they 
conveyed to the banking participants in the focus groups that was important to the 
regulatory participants not the individual relationships with those around the table.  
 
Figure (22): FSA website December 23 2011 (From National Archives) 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20111222123220/http://www.fsa.gov.uk/ 
 
 
 
The regulatory participants’ focus on rules and punitive action, and the way 
they delivered their message “by the book”, was therefore defined by the way they 
viewed themselves in the focus group meetings as functionaries of their organisation. 
An organisation that they believed existed to ‘police the activities of the banks’ as one 
of the regulatory participants suggested in a private interview. The participant 
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however is again reflecting an organisational view here not their own. For example, 
the description of the FSA’s role on their own website and emphasised that the 
organisation was mandated to use a ‘wide range of rule-making, investigatory and 
enforcement powers’. The tone of the statement about their regulatory approach is 
shown in figure twenty-two in an archived copy of the FSA website from December 
23 2011, which reflects the type of organisation that the FSA believed it was mandated 
to be. 
What we see in the in the regulator’s orientation towards the UK high street 
banks as they discuss the ICB’s recommendations is a desire for further clarification 
of the rules that both reflects their understanding of what their organisation was 
mandated to do as a result of the statutory powers granted in 2001 by the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) and their desire to place distance between 
the banks and the regulator. Placing paper between themselves and the banking 
participants either as statements on a website, a 492-page document, the wrong 
name on a place name card or a piece of A4 paper made it clear how they wished to 
conduct their relationship with the banking participants in the post-2008 environment 
that the ICB report discussed. It was about clarity on paper with rules not personal 
relationships. Given the FSA’s situation in the proceeding discussion clarity about 
what role the FSA played was of course of significant import. 
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CHAPTER SIX: TRUST-BUILDING ATTEMPTS BETWEEN 
THE BANKING PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
This section explores the banking participants attempts to build trust 
collectively in the sector and therefore focuses primarily on the interactions of the 
banking participants in the various environments in which they interacted. It also 
makes use of ethnographic material and interview data to contextualise some of the 
conversations that were captured amongst the banking participants. Since there were 
participants from the other stakeholder groups present throughout, this section does 
not suggest that the conversations took place in isolation, but makes an attempt to 
capture the discussions that were important to the banking participants 
First, I explore how the banking participants attempt to build trust collectively 
through creating a collective identify as the City of London. The banking participants 
did this by acknowledging collectively that the City of London was a home as well as 
a place to conduct business and also through references to the benevolence of the 
City of London as a financial centre.  
Secondly, I show that the banking participants also attempted to build trust 
collectively through the acknowledgement of the perceived unfairness of the 
American Legislation. This created both a collective adversary against which they can 
unite and identify but also allowed the participants to share examples of how their 
organisations were addressing the “problem” of the American legislation.  
Thirdly, I examine how the banking participants choose to share information 
in their discussions about European financial services regulation and in particular the 
European Commission in order to collectively mediate knowledge to agree a version 
of the facts that best suited them collectively and then I explore how they form a 
collective knowledge around the inabilities of the European financial services 
regulatory structure, to present themselves as a group with collective 
knowledgeability, which they could use as the basis for trust-building.  
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Table (7): Examples of trust-building between the banking participants  
 
 
Discussion  Relevant observations  
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1. Curating a home for ‘finance, food, fashion and film’  
- Acknowledging the benefits of working and living in London 
- Building identity through a collective living and working 
space 
 
2. Promoting the benevolence of the City of London 
- Reflecting on the importance of London’s history 
- Allowing unsubstantiated claims about the City of London’s 
wider benevolence 
 
T
h
e
 A
m
e
ri
c
a
n
 l
e
g
is
la
to
ry
 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t 
 
3. Tacitly acknowledging a lack of control and collectively 
identifying a lack of perceived fairness of the American 
legislation 
- Placing distance between the participants’ organisations 
and the American legislation  
- Identifying with colleagues who may get ‘caught out’ by 
American legislation 
 
4. Mediating knowledge to establishing new ways of knowing 
- Placing competence-based trust in the banks’ American 
regulatory affairs departments 
- Sharing experiences of how their organisations’ regulatory 
affairs departments functioned  
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5. Collectively mediating knowledge about the European 
Commission  
- Highlighting a lack of transparency of the Commission 
and bias towards the UK banking sector 
- Privately acknowledging the failings of the three 
stakeholder groups in presenting a collective position to 
the Commission 
 
6. Collectively acknowledging the inabilities of the regulatory 
structure 
- Presenting the complex lines of communication 
between regulatory organisations as a ‘barrier to 
business’ 
- Identifying specific points of dislocation between the EU 
and UK regulatory positions  
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The City of London: creating a collective identity 
 
1. Curating a home for ‘finance, food, fashion and film’ 
 
A collective identity was developed by the banking participants by making 
statements about what made London different from other financial centres. One 
example involved a discussion where one of the banking participants referred to 
London as ‘a centre for finance, food, fashion and film’ several times during the hour-
long focus group meeting, a phrase which was repeated by colleagues in later focus 
groups. The choice of words here is important. The alliteration in the phrase gives the 
statement a soundbite-like quality, something that is easily remembered and 
repeated. The participant is choosing specific words to remind colleagues that it is not 
just finance, but food, fashion and film that make London a place where the banks are 
well-served; a place to live as well as to work. The participant added ‘our employees 
want to live in London. They don’t want to live in the middle of a desert … it is 
particularly the second-tier services that are here, I’m thinking legal services and 
consultancy services in particular, that mean you can do the deal in the morning, the 
lawyers can complete for you in the afternoon and you can be back in Abu Dhabi by 
the evening’. Again, this reference to London in contrast to living ‘in the middle of the 
desert’ presents London as a place that the individual participants would want to live 
as well as work.    
The participant is using the focus group to highlight the importance of the 
quality of the wider environment beyond the financial services sector that London 
provided for employees, which was a persistent theme in the banking participants 
interactions with one another – reminding one another of the provision for families in 
terms of internationally recognised public schools, a cosmopolitan environment with 
opportunities for partners to work, top international universities for children, healthcare 
as well as easy access to Europe that enabled the banks to provide a package 
supportive of the employees’ families and life beyond work, which, as the participant 
suggested, was a significant factor in attracting and retaining the best, most 
experienced staff but also, importantly, what is implied by the participant’s comment, 
a place that the banking participants themselves want to live where there were 
benefits beyond the sphere of work.  
However, when this participant discusses London in a private interview he 
states that he presents the bank to external stakeholders beyond the sphere of the 
financial services in a way that focuses solely on the quality of the financial services 
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firms that operate in London placing less emphasis on the fringe benefits that were 
discussed in the focus groups: 
 
‘When I am asked, I normally point out that London is a world leader in financial 
services. There are over fifteen-thousand firms operating here in the City and 
the financial services sector employs over half a million people in the UK. There 
are nearly four-hundred foreign banks operating successfully here. This remains 
the single biggest factor in why companies chose to do business’. 
 
Comments such as the ones made in the focus groups to colleagues about fringe 
benefits contrasted with comments such as the above in the private interview and 
those made in public fora, where the value of the financial services sector is presented 
as the primary concern for the banking participants.  
It appeared that the banking participants recognised that amongst their peer 
group they could built a collective identity between their organisations not through a 
focus on the quality of the financial business they undertook, but the other elements 
of working in London, which they all shared together. As the same participant 
commented later in an interview: ‘It is not just how it really is, it is the optics of the 
situation that are important for us. London helps with this’. The image of London as a 
home as well as a financial centre was something therefore the banking participants 
acknowledged to one another but was notably left unacknowledged in conversations 
outside of the banking community. The following discussion was observed between a 
group of bankers in focus group three that further showed that the banking participants 
recognised the importance of London as an attractive place to live and a place to call 
home but that this was a conversation that took place within the auspices of the 
banking community:   
 
Banking participant (4): ‘We should celebrate the rise of Canary Wharf. There 
has been little public investment. It was nearly lost in a wasteland. Over 1,700 
local companies have benefited. When I started out in the 1990’s people used 
the area for five days a week only. This has changed significantly’ 
Banking participant (5): ‘Canary Wharf is the place for this. It’s a deliberately 
domestic cylinder’. 
 
Although the participants recognised that they should focus on the quality of the 
financial services sector when presenting themselves to other stakeholders, the 
physical space they occupied served to corroborate the collective identity that they 
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described in the focus groups to one another. Each of the banks studied had an office 
in Canary Wharf, a space that supported the notion that London was a centre for 
finance, food, fashion and film’. Canary Wharf was a physical space that consolidated 
the statements that the banking participants made about London as a home for 
‘finance, food, fashion and film and contrasted with the focus on finance in their 
discussions with stakeholders beyond the sphere of the financial services sector.  
 
Figure (23): Map of Canary Wharf Mall adapted from Canarywharf.com 
 
 
 
Red dots indicate where there is an entrance from a bank directly into the mall  
 
  
 
Figure (24): Text copied from the landing page of the Canary Wharf website at 
www.canarywharf.com 
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The shopping mall, pictured in figure 23 has 197 shops and 78 restaurants and is 
underneath the banks’ office space. The red dots indicate there is a direct entrance 
into the mall from one of the banks. The participant’s words in the focus group are 
therefore supported by the physical space where the banks chose to locate their place 
of work. The integration of the banks workspace and a space for entertainment, food 
and shopping physically reflected the participants comments that the banks 
considered their operations in London to be more than simply a place to work, but an 
attractive place to live. This was further demonstrated by activities that took place in 
Canary Wharf. For example, the London Independent Film Festival (LIFF) was hosted 
in Canary Wharf in April each year of the study. Although these benefits remained 
unsaid personally by the banking participants in their wider communications, the 
physicality of the space they occupied reflected the other benefits referred to in the 
focus groups were an important element of their collective identity. For example, the 
description from the Canary Wharf website copied above in figure twenty-four shows 
how the space is deliberately curated online in order to be a space that is not simply 
a work destination but a place where there is a ‘fantastic programme of music, film, 
theatre, dance, art, fashion and more throughout the year’. 
The phsyical space that Canary Wharf provided was integral to the way the 
banking participants understood the importance of building trust through creating a 
community. This was further shown by the fact that this space was actively curated 
by the banks through branding on the site. The adverts that the banks placed in 
Canary Wharf demonstrated that, just as the participant has curated the image 
verbally in the focus group and the description of the space online, the organisations 
also curated their physcial space using words that sourrounded them in their 
workspace. For example, during the course of the study there was an advertising 
campaign that one of the high-street banks developed around Canary Wharf. There 
were no images, just text. Bold statements on billboards such as ‘Do you think like a 
Barclays person’, ‘Barclays people are more romantic’ and ‘Barclays explorers follow 
in the footsteps of no one’. It was notable that this campaign was only adopted within 
Canary Wharf and that only text was used reflecting again the idea that this was a 
message aimed at colleagues within the sector. See figure twenty-five on the following 
page for examples of the campaign. These images were part of a branding campaign 
specifically focused on curating space in the same way the participant used the 
sound-bite to highlight that ‘finance, film, fashion and food’ come as a package. The 
images attempt to remind the participants that the individual and the organisation are 
aligned beyond the scope of the financial services sector. 
102 
 
 
Figure (25): Examples of Barclays branding campaign in Canary Wharf 
between October and December 2010  
 
 
Furthermore, the entrance to the banks themselves presented messages that 
demonstrated how the banking participants understood themselves as the City of 
London. For example, the images in the reception of Barclays bank’s headquarters at 
One Churchill Place during the period of the study had a display that is presented in 
figure twenty-six on the following page. Notice the River Thames and the skyline of 
London portrayed in the entrance poster. The picture in the bottom half of the figure 
shows a close-up of the right-hand side of the sign at the top. The poster reads ‘Being: 
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London by Barclays’. Being London was an important part of the banks’ identity post-
2008 and a way to establish transference between London’s image to restore the 
bank’s image. It is also noteworthy again that we see another alliterative sound-bite 
in the phrase ‘Being London, by Barclays’. 
 
Figure (26): Example of branding in lobby of Barclays headquarters  
 
 
 
 
The physicality of the space that the banking participants operated in was 
reflected in the comments they made to one another and influenced the ways that the 
banking participants developed a collective identity. The focus groups served to 
provide an opportunity for the banking participants to reiterate their corporate 
messages to one another about the importance of London and benefits of 
headquartering in London beyond it simply being a centre for finance. This was the 
story they told one another. They avoided dwelling on the fringe benefits with 
stakeholders beyond the sphere of the financial services sector. Perhaps because of 
the tone it would set, but it became clear as the study progressed that the fringe 
benefits described in the phrase ‘a centre for finance, food, fashion and film’ were an 
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integral part of how the banks understood themselves collectively and what they 
viewed as important in their decision to locate the head offices in London and their 
identity together as a potential basis to build trust amongst their organisations.   
 
2. Promoting the benevolence of the City of London 
 
The benevolence of the City of London was a discussion between the banking 
participants that showed a similar attempt by the banking participants to create 
collective agreement about the City of London as something more than simply a place 
to conduct business. One of the banking participants concluded that ‘it feels like a 
special time for the City as we rebuild from the foundations. There is a reassurance 
about London, its history and its resilience to weather even the worst of storms. There 
is a collective identity here that we should trust. It works for all of us’. Here we see the 
focus on the concept of the City of London as an entity that served all the participants 
as a safe place because of its ability to ‘weather the worst of storms’. The participants 
recognised that the history of the City of London served to maintain confidence and 
to build trust across the sector. A banking participant alluded to this in one of the focus 
groups: 
 
‘It comes in cycles. We know this is a fact. Working in London magnifies the 
impact. When the City is confident, it makes people feel more confident. London 
is seductive. The history. I think the history infects people’.   
 
Over the course of the study it became clear that the banking participants’ attempts 
to present the City of London as a safe place to do business because of its history re-
enforced the perceived benevolence of the City to individual participants and that the 
history ‘infects people’. The City of London is presented as a collective identity that 
unites the organisations and the individuals representing them and supports the 
sector. The following comment was made by one of the banking participants in the 
second focus group:  
 
‘I am grateful that we have such a dynamic community here in London. Our 
colleagues around the world have attempted to recreate what we have here in 
the City with variable success. The success is largely thanks to vision of the 
City of London’.  
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The participant is suggesting here that the dynamic community here in London is 
thanks to the vision of the City of London. However, what is left unsaid here is that 
there is no clear consensus as to what the City of London actually meant to the 
participants. It was not clarified in any of the focus groups and became a leitmotif for 
their discussions. It was a symbol that they used to unite their organisation.   
However, the idea of the City of London as a ‘force for good’ appeared to 
become more important than presenting the facts and participants made 
unsubstantiated claims in the focus groups about the City of London’s benevolence. 
The following comment from a focus group sums up how the desire to maintain a 
benevolent image of the City of London on occasion become more important that 
presenting facts about the City of London:    
 
‘Between 1990 and 2010, the global economy grew from about twenty-two 
trillion US dollars to about seventy-five trillion US dollars. That’s a difference of 
about fifty-three trillion dollars, and in truth most of it thanks to the City of 
London. And over the same period, the percentage of the world’s hungry went 
from sixteen percent to under fourteen percent of a population that grew by 
almost two billion. Thanks to the growth of the global economy, fueled by 
financial centres such as the City of London’ 
 
This participant makes rather bold claims in the statement above. He suggests that 
the City of London is responsible for the percentage of the world’s hungry decreasing 
by two percent between 1990 and 2010. By making the statement that the City of 
London was responsible for the growth of the global economy and then suggesting 
the global economy is responsible for the decreasing number of people going hungry 
in the world, the banking participant is suggesting that the financial services sector in 
London collectively understood as ‘the City of London’ supports those in need more 
widely beyond the purview of the financial services sector. London is therefore 
portrayed as a means to provide the necessary conditions that allows wealth 
generated by financial institutions (Such as the UK headquartered banks) to benefit 
organisations beyond the financial services sector and – if the participant’s comment 
above is to be believed – ultimately reduce the percentage of the world’s hungry by 
two percent.  
It is clearly a stretch to claim that there is a direct causal link between the 
success of the organisations such as banks operating as the City of London and 
reduction in food poverty but the notable observation is that the statement went 
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unchallenged by the other banking participants in the study. The participant does not 
provide any evidence of a link between the financial success of the City of London 
and the hungry being fed. The participant simply observes that over the same period 
that the City of London prospered, the percentage of people in the world going hungry 
decreased. Instead of any challenge to its veracity, the comment was met with 
affirmation by another participant who commented that they ‘very much agree’. Since 
there was no means to find collective agreement about what the City of London was, 
there appeared to be no way members of the group could challenge or confirm the 
veracity of these assertions, but it suited them to maintain this image of benevolence 
beyond the sphere of the financial services sector. The participants were, it seemed, 
focused on perpetuating a group identity through their agreement of a benevolent City 
of London. 
The lack of challenge to the earlier quote contrasted with much of the other 
discussion observed in the study (The minutiae of which was often challenged by 
colleagues). Furthermore, the comment directly ignores the prominence of other 
financial centres such as New York, Singapore, Frankfurt and Tokyo for example as 
well as the economic impact of emerging economies post-2008. Nor is it clear how 
the figures the participant gives are arrived at, or are we clear how specifically the 
City of London achieved the feat. In short it is puzzling that the participant can make 
this statement unchallenged by a room full of experts unless we are to accept that 
maintaining the image of the City of London as benevolent and a source of mutual 
identity was a primary concern for the banking participants. 
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The American legislation: identities and collective adversaries   
 
As well as creating a collective identity the banking participants also appeared 
to build trust by acknowledging the challenges that the American legislatory bodies 
presented to their organisations. The American legislation that had been passed 
became another collective focal point for the banking participants and they used this 
to create a collective adversary. They used the challenges that the American 
Legislation posed as an opportunity to build a form of identification-based trust 
through the acknowledgement of the lack of fairness of the American legislation. The 
banking participants did this in two ways. Firstly, by acknowledging the limitations that 
the American legislation presented to the UK banking sector and secondly by 
acknowledging openly in the focus groups the ways in which their organisations were 
addressing the lack of unpredictability presented by the American legislation. 
 
3. Tacitly acknowledging a lack of control and collectively identifying a 
lack of perceived fairness of the American legislation 
 
The banking participants appeared to feel they had little control over the 
American legislation that was being enforced and they used the focus groups to 
acknowledge this to one another. As they did this, the banking participants placed 
distance between themselves and the American legislatory bodies. They described 
the American legislation by making bold statements to their colleagues about the lack 
of fairness of the American legislation and contrasted it to the regulatory environment 
in the UK. For example, the following conversation in focus group three shows how 
the banking participants are placing distance between themselves and the American 
legislation, whilst also aligning their organisations collectively as British banks 
engaging with British legislation.  
 
Banking participant (5): ‘When the Act was first broached, I never believed 
that there could be a more prohibitive legislatory framework possible. Reflecting 
back, I see that this view, although it was a miserable one, completely failed to 
realise how restrictive the legislation would be’.  
Banking participant (8): ‘Striking a balance between financial risk and financial 
misconduct’. 
Banking participant (5): ‘Precisely. It has been a period of misunderstanding, 
with features similar to a bank that has endured a failure and merger at once’. 
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Banking Participant (3): ‘We need to ensure the same mistakes are not made 
here. Careful thought needs to be given to what we mean by a regulatory ring 
fence and how we move forward’.   
 
The banking participants in this exchange are focused on the way legislation was 
applied by the US regulator suggesting that the American legislatory environment 
meant they had a lack of control and are ‘penalised for making loans’. However, this 
exchange also indicated that that they are identifying with their colleagues’ situations 
with regards to the American legislation implying that they were attempting to build a 
collective voice for the UK banking sector not simply their own individual 
organisations. For example, when asked about American legislation one of the 
banking participants observed in an interview that: 
 
‘Regulatory decisions can often travel across the pond very quickly and are 
added to the patchwork we have here. It is a constant state of flux. We need to 
keep a close eye on the decisions made by the US regulators; [one of the UK 
high street banks] was caught out only last week by US regulation which 
seemed, at least I thought, not to have much to do with their activity there. I 
guess he just got bad information or thought it was worth the risk or something’.  
 
 
The participant is specifically observing that their colleague was ‘caught out’ by the 
American legislation and appears to empathise with their position showing that he 
both identified with his colleagues’ situation, whilst also indicating that they felt that 
the American legislation lacked fairness. The theme of lack of fairness of the American 
legislation recurred throughout the focus groups as the banking participants 
discussed the American legislation. See table eight below for further comments about 
the American legislatory environment to this end.   
The American legislation was described as lacking fairness by the banking 
participants, but also underlying this was a tacit acknowledgement of the lack of 
control that the participants felt they had over their own organisations when dealing 
with the American legislation. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act was signed into federal law before the policy debate observed in the 
study and it became clear that being ‘caught out’ by American legislation was viewed 
by the group as a risk towards the UK banking sector and not just the participant’s 
individual organisations. As the participant in the earlier quote suggests, the banking 
participants felt they were trying to follow rules but sometimes ‘simply unable to do 
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so’. The perception of a lack of fairness was, as the participant above indicates, 
because there was a large amount of new US legislation to comply with over which 
they felt they had a lack of control and this further aligned the banking participants as 
a group against the American legislation as a collective adversary.    
 
Table (8): Examples of a lack of perceived fairness in the American regulatory 
system from comments in focus groups 
 
 
Banking participant (3): 
‘I’m not sure that I agree with the spirit of the 
American regulations that were introduced. It 
seemed heavy handed’.  
 
 
Banking participant (6): 
‘The Dodd-Frank Act is isolationist at best. You 
would be extremely hard-pushed to find anyone in 
the US or here who would not agree that the 
legislation takes little regard for concerns beyond 
American economic recovery’. 
 
 
Banking participant (11): 
‘There is really no kind way to say this. The Act is 
a bullish piece of legislation. The over-regulation is 
going to damage the American economy and 
impede the success of organisations that are 
doing business there’.  
 
To put these comments into perspective it helps to acknowledge the scale of 
the new American financial services legislation that was being put into place during 
the period of the study. The final legislatory document which described the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was 1,376 pages long and 
the final Act, when put into effect on the 21 July 2010, introduced 243 new regulations 
into the American domestic banking system. There was simply too much information 
for the banks to address and their inability to do so meant that their comments to one 
another in their focus groups were intended to create a collective identity united 
against the unfairness of the American legislation. 
There is a certain legitimacy to this collective position that was being 
developed by the banking participants. Being ‘caught out’ by US regulations indicates 
the seemingly arbitrary nature in which the regulations were applied since the 
regulations were not necessarily concerned with the participants’ organisation’s 
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operations in the United States, but rather the business their organisation undertook 
with any organisation that operated in the United States. The large number of 
prescriptive US regulations that impacted third party transactions in particular that 
might not be directly undertaken in the US (Coupled with the volume of new financial 
services regulations introduced by Dodd-Frank Financial Regulatory Reform Act) 
meant that participants were not always sure if they (or importantly their colleagues, 
as shown in the indented quote on page 108 had transgressed a US regulation and it 
appeared to be difficult for the participants to clarify whether they were in breach of 
any of the financial services regulations that had been recently enacted in the US.  
The seemingly arbitrary application of the regulations specifically to third party 
transactions were viewed by the participants collectively as lacking fairness. However, 
the significance of these comments is not simply acknowledgment that the application 
of US financial services regulations to third party transactions was unfair but that they 
are collectively agreeing that is unfair.  As one participant commented: ‘there seems 
to be a lack of consistency in the application of American legislation … and I don’t see 
this changing in the short term until the dust has been allowed to settle we have all 
had a chance to catch up’ [my emphasis added]. The following conversation shows 
another instance of the banking participants developing agreement collectively about 
the lack of fairness of the American legislation: 
 
Banking participant (6): ‘America needs a smarter approach to regulation I 
think we would all agree’.  
Banking participant (7): ‘hear hear’ [bangs his hand on the table]. 
Banking participant (6): ‘In the US they think they can account for all 
eventualities. Cases from the simply irritating, a rule for playgroups that 
stipulates how many pencils must be in each tin, to the downright impractical. 
The idea that somehow Dodd-Frank can mitigate against every eventuality. It is 
absurd’. 
Banking participant (13): ‘If something becomes more complex there are often 
more loopholes’. 
Banking participant (7): ‘Quite simply the regulations need to be much 
simpler. They need to spell out the spirit of what is required by the banks rather 
than try and anticipate every possible eventuality that nasty bankers might 
dream up’.  
 
What is noteworthy about this exchange and the earlier comments in the focus 
groups is not simply the fact that the American legislation is being described as 
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unpredictable and unfair because of its impact on third party transactions, but that the 
banking participants are using the American legislation to build consensus between 
their organisations and agreeing that they are all affected by the unfairness of the 
legislation and building a collective position against the unfairness of the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  
 
 
4. Mediating knowledge to establishing new ways of knowing 
 
It became apparent that the participants were attempting to address the lack 
of control they felt they had over their operations in the US by relying on experts within 
their American regulatory affairs teams, who provided them with insight into the new 
US legislation that had come into force. Comments included in table nine on the 
following page provide some evidence of the banking participants referring to their 
American regulatory affairs teams as a way to address the challenges presented by 
the US regulations. Using information provided by their American regulatory affairs 
teams the participants weighed up the risks against the possible rewards when 
interacting with the American regulatory institutions and accepted that there would be 
some degree of financial liability for their own organisation – their attempts to trust 
were therefore also reliant on the competence of their American regulatory affairs 
teams who helped to minimize the financial liability of doing business that might be 
affected by the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. They 
were calculating the risk and placing trust in the competency of their regulatory affairs 
teams.  
The participants managed the lack of control they had over the American 
regulation by ensuring that there were enough capable staff in their own individual 
American regulatory affairs departments to address the complexity of the American 
legislation and ensured that they were surrounded by suitably qualified experts. The 
in-house expertise meant that they could operate effectively to some degree in their 
US operations.  
The banking participants were also very open in sharing their experiences of 
developing their American regulatory affairs capabilities which contrasted with the 
lack of information sharing about other aspects of their business. Each of the banks 
in the study had between five and thirty people working in the regulatory departments 
focused specifically on interpreting American regulation, this was information that was 
shared openly in the focus groups and discussed in detail as to why it was necessary.  
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Table (9): Example comments demonstrating that the competence-based trust 
was being placed in the American regulatory affairs teams  
 
Participant (8)  
Focus group (2): 
‘The Volcker Rule could be a major contribution to financial 
stability or it could flop. Either way we must approach it 
carefully weighing up the risks of doing certain types of 
business in the US. There might very well be an opportunity 
for the British banks in all of this, particularly if we make 
good use of our in-house teams and trust them.’ 
 
Banking 
participant (12) 
focus group (1): 
‘I personally weigh decisions up every day. My job is 
essentially to say yes, yes, no no, yes, to things. Dodd-Frank 
is no different. We will assess the rules. Ensure we comply, 
take a decision on what we change and move on. It is 
because I am supported by a lot of very able employees.’  
 
 
Banking 
participant (9) 
Focus group (5): 
‘I hear a lot of grumbling about the legislation overseas. Let’s 
get our house in order first and then decide how we are 
going to approach the American context … Now we have the 
benefit of hindsight let’s make use of the experts that we 
have here.’ 
 
The banking participants described their reliance on the fact they had ‘experts 
providing accurate data to make business decisions’ was the way they felt could make 
decisions about the American regulatory environment that they felt they could trust – 
the participants shared with one another that they mitigated the risk by working with 
a team of competent experts within their organisation that they could trust and 
developed a collective knowing about the new American legislation.  Therefore, we 
see competence-based trust being placed in the American Regulatory affairs 
departments of their organisations by the participants in the study and notably that 
they are discussing this openly with one another.  
The participants were sharing their experiences in the hope that they were not 
‘caught out’ by American legislation. By sharing this information with one another they 
began to agree collectively a new mode of operations – of placing trust in the 
competency of their American regulatory affairs teams and it appeared that they were 
sharing examples of ways of operating that ensured that their American regulatory 
affairs teams were competent. The discussion below gives an indication of how the 
banking participants shared their experiences in the focus group environment of how 
they structured and worked with their teams. This type of information was not shared 
about other aspects of the banks’ business: 
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Banking participant (9): ‘I trust the team to do good work. There are 
challenges and given the task we have to do we are really a little thin on the 
ground, but these guys are some of the best regulatory experts around. We 
are lucky to have them and I trust their judgement but sometimes this is not 
enough’. 
Banking participant (4): ‘This is a wider problem. Finding the people to do 
the job is a significant challenge. We simply do not have enough knowledge 
about the American system. We rely on [xxxx] organisation for a lot of our 
information.  
Banking participant (14): ‘We also need to be better at trusting our teams 
to do the work as [banking participant 9] says. This is an increasing problem 
because regulatory roles are just not what they were twenty years ago. 
Hiring from the US has been effective’.  
Banking participant (9): ‘And this is only going to happen if we can trust the 
leadership of our regulatory affairs teams.  Our group head of compliance is 
part of the management team at [High street bank] but this is only the start. 
We need to take the problem much more seriously’.   
 
Here we see the banks collectively identifying a common threat and each attempting 
to mitigate the risk by relying on the competence of their American regulatory affairs 
teams. There are two things happening here in this sharing of knowledge. Firstly, the 
participants are acknowledging their lack of control over the American legislation. 
Secondly, and most significantly, they are sharing their experiences about business-
critical aspects of their organisation in ways that were not observed elsewhere in the 
study. The threat of ‘being caught out’ and the identification between the banking 
participants that this brought about appeared to outweigh the risks of sharing 
information with their competitors. The process of sharing key pieces of information 
about how their organisations was operating with regards to the American regulatory 
environment seemed to be a collective process of agreeing a new mode of operations 
– collectively becoming knowledgeable to mitigate the risks of the US regulatory 
environment to avoid being ‘caught out’.  
 
Collectively mediating knowledge and identifying regulatory 
challenges presented by the EU financial services regulations      
 
The banking participants used their interactions in the focus groups to further 
build a collective identity by firstly agreeing a collective orientation towards the 
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Commission and secondly collectively acknowledging the inability of the regulatory 
networks that operated within the auspices of the Commission. By doing these things 
in the focus groups the banking participants are locating their roles collectively in the 
European networks within which they were operating. This process served to help the 
banks build consensus about their identity as the UK banking sector rather than simply 
as individual banks operating in the UK and this further served as an attempt to build 
trust amongst the group. In this section, the focus is less on creating an adversary, 
but the focus is more on aligning roles and expectations together as they come into a 
place of better knowing and alignment in the ways they interact and behave in their 
interactions with European financial services regulation and the European 
Commission.  
  
5. Collectively mediating knowledge about the European Commission  
 
In the focus groups the banking participants appeared to be building 
agreement in their discussions about the European Commission that European 
legislation was weighted towards other European countries banking sectors – this was 
observed in the banking participants’ discussions about the Commission’s 
relationship with Germany’s banks. For example, the following comment was made 
by one of the banking participants to his colleagues in a focus group:  
 
I’m not sure how [German Bank] does it. They have a smaller team than us in 
Brussels. They are at less of the information sessions and yet they always 
seem to get what they bargain for.  
 
The participant is suggesting to his banking colleagues in the focus group that the 
German bank invests less time and resources into influencing the European 
Commission’s agenda, yet repeatedly gets a favourable outcome. The following 
conversation between banking participants was later observed in one of the focus 
groups showing the banking participants building collective agreement about the 
Commission’s bias towards the German banks:   
 
 
Banking participant (3): ‘It is really a question about leverage ratios’.  
Banking participant (4): ‘I am no great supporter of Basel II, and am yet to 
meet anyone who is. Basel actually has three pillars to it - the third pillar is 
transparency’. 
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Banking participant (12): ‘We’ve got a situation where we have different 
requirements for British banks operating in the UK and German banks operating 
in the UK’. 
Banking participant (10): ‘And, you’ve got a situation when [German bank] is 
able to choose whether to conduct business in Frankfurt or London’. 
Banking participant (4): ‘Information is just handed down to us by the 
Commission’. 
 
In this exchange, the banking participants appear to feel that although they remain 
stakeholders in the European discussion and that there should be transparency in the 
decision-making process that the Commission took, they felt that the ‘information is 
just handed down by the European Commission’. The participants are finding 
agreement in this exchange that the European Commission is not aligned with the 
interests of the UK financial services sector as a whole not just their own organisations 
and that information is simply ‘handed down’ to sector by the Commission with no 
transparency.  
What remained unsaid in this discussion between the banking participants 
however was that in private the interviews the banking participants acknowledged that 
the German approach to lobbying the Commission was more effective than the British 
approach not because of any bias against the UK banking sector nor did they consider 
that the Commission lacked transparency. Instead, in the private interviews, the 
banking participants acknowledged that the European lobby process in Germany was 
approached in a unified way where regulators, legislators and banks in Germany 
agreed on a position and shared the weight of reinforcing a position to the 
Commission. Furthermore, the banking participants also recognised in the private 
interviews that the three stakeholder groups in the UK appeared not to come together 
in the same way as their German counterparts to decide on a united lobby position 
when interacting with the Commission. This difference between the German and 
British approach was not addressed publicly in the focus groups by the banking 
participants – rather the banking participants used the focus groups to create a 
collective position with their parliamentary and regulatory colleagues that the 
Commission lacked transparency and was biased against the UK banking sector even 
though they did not appear to believe this when asked privately in the interviews. 
The banking participants’ private views are valid, but the fact they did not share 
them in the focus groups is what is more significant. In the European context of 
twenty-eight member states, logically it is more efficient if messages across the three 
stakeholder groups in the UK are aligned if they are to engage effectively in Brussels, 
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since the bureaucrats Brussels are unlikely to take a decision if there is not a 
harmonised approach to what is required from pieces of legislation by a Member State 
and the organisations it represents. For example, in a private interview one of the 
banking participants commented to this end: 
 
‘We have a fragmented approach to lobbying here in the UK which does us a 
tremendous disservice and we could learn a thing or two from friends on the 
continent who know how to get things done in Brussels. We do not invest 
enough time first and foremost, but what I find most peculiar is the way we 
make successive demands on the Commission without first agreeing amongst 
ourselves what we want to achieve’. 
 
This comment provides some insight into why the German bank is much more 
successful in ‘getting its own way’ but importantly, also shows the contrast between 
the public statements made to their banking colleagues in the focus groups and the 
statements the banking participants made in the private contexts. It is not the 
Commission’s bias or lack of transparency that was the issue, but rather the lack of 
unity with which the three stakeholder groups in the study communicated with 
counterparts in Brussels. Table ten below shows some further evidence of the private 
views of the banking participants about the Commission that contrasts with their 
discussions about their German counterparts in the focus groups.   
The discrepancy between the focus group discussions and the private 
interviews shows that the banking participants are choosing in the focus groups to 
agree that the Commission is biased against the UK banking sector as they search in 
the focus groups for collective agreement about their orientation to the European 
Commission. It appeared from the focus groups that rather than acknowledging that 
a more unified approach to engaging with the European Commission might be the 
solution, they chose instead to focus on the fact that the German banks are ‘getting 
their own way’. Rather than addressing their own (And their regulatory and 
Parliamentary colleagues) failings publicly in the focus groups, they chose to agree a 
collective orientation towards the Commission as an organisation that lacked 
transparency and was biased towards the interests of the German banks, rather than 
acknowledging collectively their own private sentiments that ‘there is a lack of work 
put into building relationships with the Commission’ in the UK’s approach to lobbying 
the European Commission. 
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Table (10): Examples from the private interviews of lobbying in Europe 
 
Banking participant (9): ‘Britain’s 
ability to make changes in Brussels 
continues to waiver. I suspect there 
are two reasons. Firstly, a lack of 
interest in the amount of regulatory 
revisions but also that we do not 
present a singular message to the 
Commission’.  
 
Banking Participant (5): ‘If we don’t 
take immediate steps to address our 
approach to lobbying in Europe we 
will continue to suffer, Basel II is a 
good example. We simply did not 
know what we wanted to achieve’.  
 
Banking participant (12): ‘I think 
that our attitude over the years to the 
EU and the Commission in general 
has been no less than hostile. We 
seem to simply be a mass of angry 
voices’.  
 
 
Banking participant (4): ‘There is a 
lack of work put into building 
relationships with the Commission. 
Other countries take this much more 
seriously’.  
6. Collectively acknowledging the inabilities of the regulatory structure 
 
The theme of focusing on the negative aspects of the Commission continued as the 
banking participants discussed the network of relations that existed around the 
Commission’s financial regulatory structures. This was the second challenge that was 
cited by the banking participants in the focus groups. They chose to build alignment 
with their colleagues through critiquing the EU regulatory structure that they had to 
operate within. This provided an opportunity for the banking participants to collectively 
build agreement amongst their organisations as they united in providing accounts to 
one another about the challenges that the EU regulations created for their 
organisations. Again, we see here the banking participants creating a collective 
identity by focusing on the challenges they faced as a sector in the complexities of 
European financial regulations.  
Again, the banking participants’ views were not unfounded. A Parliamentary 
Commission published towards the end of the fieldwork suggested that the bi-partite 
regulatory system in Europe left those working in the financial services sector 
‘confused about primary and secondary regulations’ and ‘further hindered new entries 
to the market’ (European Union Committee, 5th Report of Session 2011-12: 23).   The 
reality was that the regulatory environment was complicated and this impeded the 
banks’ ability to operate effectively. Figure twenty-seven below shows the lines of 
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communication in the European financial services regulatory framework giving an 
indication of the complexities of the European financial services regulatory structure.  
 
Figure (27): Lines of communication between international, European and 
British regulatory organisations  
 
[Adapted from House of Commons guidance note on financial services regulation] 
 
 
 
The banking participants in the study highlighted that this complicated nexus 
of interactions between regulatory bodies in Brussels presented in the table above 
presented a ‘barrier to business’. This was stated upfront in the focus groups in to 
assert themselves as the group that are attempting build a new way forward; one 
banker in the study observed in the opening minutes of the first focus group: 
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‘The difficulty is that quite often it is impossible to know who is responsible. 
There is now potentially going to be the PRA looking after UK interests on one 
hand and the ESRB on the other hand looking after Europe’s interest[s]. But our 
history with Brussels tells me that these will never be aligned. We are going to 
see very little direct alignment - oversight should be undertaken by a single 
body, it currently sits fragmented between Brussels and Westminster. It is bad 
for business’.   
 
The banker is referring here specifically to the relationship between the UK and the 
European regulators that manage macro-economic risk at British and at European 
level. The participant is highlighting that the proposed PRA and the ESRB will not 
necessarily have the same opinions, rules or incentives to operate and that they are 
likely to contradict one another. The unclear lines of communication are ‘bad for 
business’. Therefore, the specific issue that the banks were making to one another by 
highlighting the regulatory confusion was that the continued lack of clarity over who 
was ultimately responsible for macro-prudential regulation in the UK hindered the 
banks’ ability to undertake their business. 
In the UK, macro-prudential risk analysis existed in a wider European 
regulatory framework. The body that led this work at a European level - the European 
Systemic Risk Board - was created in 2009 by policy makers in Brussels to fulfill on a 
European level a similar role as the PRA was expected to undertake in the UK 
environment as it replaced the FSA. The key difference is that the ESRB was 
mandated to act in interests of all twenty-eight European member states rather than 
just the UK and this discrepancy appeared to be problematic for the banking 
participants and was voiced as a way to justify why they are not able to effectively 
conduct their business and as a form of orientating themselves in the ‘mess of 
European regulations’. The banking participants are presenting the EU financial 
services regulatory framework as the antagonist that hindered their ability to 
undertake their business creating a distraction from the mistakes the banks 
themselves had made. 
Again, there is a degree of truth in this collective position that the banking 
participants took. The ESRB had been operational for eleven months prior to the start 
of the field work and therefore had become the de facto regulator. In contrast, the 
FSA’s influence was weakened by the speculation in the draft ICB report that the FSA 
was going to be split into two distinct ‘twin peak’ functions of the PRA and the FCA 
and presented an uncertainty that was a collective threat the banks’ business. It is 
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therefore understandable in the earlier comment that there is confusion ‘about primary 
and secondary legislation.’ And a need for clarity. The banking participants made 
repeated reference to this divergence and the need for clarity.  
The banking participants essentially used the divergence the British and the 
European financial services regulation to form a collective position that the European 
regulatory system was a hindrance to their efforts to address challenges the sector 
faced and orientated themselves as the stable actors in the changing landscape. The 
question they repeatedly posed to their colleagues in the focus groups was did the 
FSA still have a valid mandate, or was the ESRB’s tacit influence important? There 
was no concrete answer to this question and the banks used it to their advantage 
presenting the lack of clarity over regulatory responsibilities as the primary problem 
that needed to be addressed in order to move forward from the crisis rather than the 
reform of the banks.   
The tone the banking participants took as they did this is summed up by one 
of the banking participants who commented: ‘it is beyond a joke. How can we have 
two organisations responsible for financial stability? It is at odds with common sense 
and utterly incompetent’. Here the participant again highlights in strong terms that the 
specific challenge of macroprudential oversight being undertaken by two separate 
entities is ‘beyond a joke’ and ‘at odds with common sense, suggesting that the 
common sense lay with the banks who were attempting as a sector to work towards 
an arrangement that would move them on from the financial crisis. As another banking 
participant commented, ‘on one level we don’t mind what the rules are, just that there 
is clarity, consistency and a long-term perspective taken. We need to make 
investments for the next twenty-five years, not the next five. European regulation 
needs to support British business.’10 Again, the banking participants are highlighting 
that the regulatory environment was the key problem for the sector as organisations 
unable to conduct their business because of a lack of clarity over how the regulatory 
structure worked. 
The aim of these comments therefore appeared to be to unite against a 
dislocated and complex European regulatory system that hindered their business and 
the sector as a whole. As the banking participants acknowledged the inabilities of the 
regulatory networks this created a sense of identity for the UK banking sector that was 
‘battling against inefficiencies’ and a regulatory environment ‘at odds with common 
                                                 
10 The participant is alluding here to the five-year electoral cycle in the Westminster Parliament. The 
twenty-five-year investment that the participant refers to is likely the decision of where to headquarter 
the bank.  
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sense’. The conversation below was observed between the banking participants, 
which shows how they are collectively acknowledging the inabilities of the regulatory 
structure as they discuss the regulatory structure in the presence of their colleagues 
in the focus groups.  
Banking participant (3): ‘But can we please avoid overzealous 
interventionist regulation? How do we strike the balance? It’s not easy, 
let’s not hide that’. 
Banking participant (5): ‘Why is the Commission continuing to generate 
this meaningless drivel that we send out to people and pretend offers a 
level of protection, and pretending that people read it? It’s being forced 
down our throat’. 
Banking participant (8): ‘I agree with you, though it’s not my field. I 
haven’t got time to read this stuff’.  
Banking participant (5): ‘We don’t need more regulation. We need 
better regulations. This is not something that can be ignored and it is the 
responsibility of the British regulator to engage’. 
 
The reality is that the banking participants are accurate in what they say here, the 
regulatory networks were inefficient and they hindered the banks’ ability to undertake 
their business. However, they are using he discussion not to address the underlying 
challenges of a lack of unity in the British efforts to engage with the European 
regulatory network since they offer no solution. Rather it is a means to building a 
common agreement about the complexity and dislocation of the EU regulatory 
structure and to orientate the banking sector as a whole in the events of the 2008 
crisis as restricted by the complexities of European financial services regulation.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION 
 
 
In this chapter I first identify three trust-building practices that provide new 
thinking on how interorganisational trust is built: the practice of storytelling, curating 
space, and managing and mediating knowledge flows. The second half of the chapter 
focuses on how we might consider the challenge of reconciling macro and micro 
conceptualisations of trust, referring to the five aspects of trust discussed in chapter 
two, I discuss how considering the concept of a liminal space between the individual 
and the organisation might offer further insight into this question. 
Where there is such complexity in considering who to trust, what to trust and 
even how to trust, new ways of trust-building must therefore be established. We know 
trust is ‘context specific’ (Bachmann et al., 2015) but this is an aphorism to explain 
our inability to capture the richness of social life. Showing whether trust is being built 
is more than an issue of context-specificity.  
The trust literature also suggests that we can understand trust as domain 
specific ability (Mayer et. al, 1995), as knowledge of (Levin & Cross, 2004) or 
identification with the trustee (Mooradian, Renzl & Matzler, 2006), control (Möllering, 
2005) or calculus-based (Mayer et al., 1995) provided we caveat examples with the 
fact the study is context-specific. This will continue to provide a barrier to 
understanding how trust is built in an interorganisational environment since trust is 
beyond context specific, but exists in constantly-evolving states enacted by 
individuals, organisations, their surroundings and the material objects they come into 
contact with.  
The subjectivities this discussion presents does not mean we depart into 
Relativism; referring to Geertz’s seminal lecture Anti-anti Relativism, attempting to 
explore interorganisational trust-building should not ‘scare us away from certain ways 
of thinking and toward others’ (Geertz, 1984: 263) but rather that we should 
acknowledge our own positionality when focusing on our understanding of our 
relationship with trust-building. 
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Table (11): Explanation of trust-building practices observed 
 
 
 
124 
 
In Media Res: The practice of storytelling and trust-building  
The role of storytelling as an identification-based trust-building practice  
 
We see identification-based trust being developed through the practice of 
storytelling in section two of chapter six where the banks discussed the benevolence 
of the City of London and the storytelling observed in the focus groups in section two 
of chapter five. We see that identification-based trust is established through the 
collective alignment storytelling brings. We explore this in three ways. Firstly, 
storytelling allows actors to reframe the past, secondly, storytelling provides a way for 
actors to build collective identity and establish alignment and values in the present, 
and thirdly storytelling is a cathartic process to move into a new future. Each of these 
practices shows an attempt at building identification-based trust.  
Wittgenstein (1969: 130) acknowledged, ‘the more definite our account of 
story or plot, the more indefinite our account of the act. The act is what constructs or 
makes, in part, the story, and the more we take that story as finished and whole, 
assigning to it a fixed and reliable meaning, the more we interfere with and change 
the values of what constitutes the act’; the more an actor owns the story and ‘shapes 
the narrative act’ (Boje, Fedor & Rowland, 1982: 23), the more it provides the actor 
with a way to use it to shape the views of others to bring their own interpretation to 
the fore.  
We tell ourselves stories about one another (Krotter, 2002), about our 
organisations (Hatch & Schultz, 2003) and about the environment around us 
(Hopkinson, 2003). Unconsciously and consciously our world is shaped by stories of 
who we are and how we are known (Boje, 1991) and stories shape how we know and 
interact with the world (Boje, 1995) and how we understand our relationship with and 
in our organisations (Boyce, 1995) and what we believe to be true and who and what 
we trust. Storytelling therefore provides identity, identification with the other; 
storytelling imparts knowledge in ways that may not be achieved by other means 
because stories are flexible and help to provide individuals with ‘thick description’ 
(Geertz, 1973:81) about themselves and the world around them to align a collective 
narrative of the reality of our worlds. We see for example in chapter five that the 
banking participants are storytelling to build identification-based trust and create a 
collective view of a benevolent City of London in which they can trust. This storytelling 
as a trust-building practice enables the banking participants to align their values and 
identify common values in an uncertain environment where there are multiple actors 
and activities taking place.   
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Why is the practice of storytelling effective in building identification-
based trust?  
 
The flexibility of interpretation of a story is why the literature on strategy and 
storytelling for example, continues to provide insight for leaders (Fleming, 2001). 
Since strategy, like interorganisational trust-building is a flexible evolving process 
reliant not on precise details but ideals, principles and values (Czarniawska, 1997), 
identification-based trust-building through the practice of storytelling can therefore 
exist beyond the deed: ‘In the beginning was the deed’ (Wittgenstein, 1969: 3), but 
enduring beyond the deed is the story - a fluid construction that can be imagined and 
reimagined with multiple meanings and interpretations depending on the audience 
present and future. Stories and storytelling therefore present an opportunity to 
address the complexities of trust-building in an interorganisational environment in new 
ways that we have not previously considered. 
Identification-based trust-building through storytelling is effective because it 
can (1) reframe the past, (2) help the actor orientate themselves in the present and 
(3) allow the actor to imagine a possible imagined future. In a complex 
interorganisational environment stories with multiple meanings and interpretations 
depending on the audience allow actors to create a ‘fiction based on truth’ (Doležel, 
1998: 4), building identification-based trust through alignment of values rather than 
facts in an attempt to establish trust in an interorganisational environment in an 
uncertain present and an unpredictable future.  
Storytelling has been implied in previous studies of trust-building, suggesting 
that although the practice of storytelling as a means to build trust has not been 
discussed by trust scholars, there is reason to propose that storytelling will be an 
important aspect of the interorganisational trust-building process. For example, we 
see an indication that storytelling may be significant in studies of trust between 
individuals where culture (Brien, 1998) or interpersonal narratives (Driscoll & McKee, 
2007) are discussed in studies that explore the relationship between individuals as 
they develop trust between one another (See also Lewicki & Bunker, 1995 and 
Gillespie & Mann, 2004). The same is true of studies between organisations (Kong, 
Dirks & Ferrin, 2014). However, the fluidity of stories, with their multiple meanings and 
ability to align values to bring about identification in an interorganisational 
environment presents the first significant departure from our current thinking of trust-
building that I propose, not as relying on mechanisms that bring about organisational 
trust (Bachmann et al., 2015) and reflect on past mistakes (Dietz and Gillespie, 2011) 
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but that help ‘individuals and organisations make sense of the ‘complexities of social 
life’ (Luhmann 2000: 94).   
The specific reorientation that storytelling brings to our thinking about the 
process of trust-building is that interorganisational trust can be considered as a 
tapestry of narratives told about the past, about identities in the present and reflecting 
possibilities about the future by individuals all of which are influenced by their own 
stories, stories of their organisations (Cunliffe, Luhman & Boje, 2004), the stories they 
themselves bear witness to - and indeed those they may ‘never or are yet to hear’ 
(Ibid.). A study of interorganisational trust-building will always therefore begin in media 
res – in the midst of activity, with unknown things past and an uncertain future shaping 
the trust-building process that is taking place in a present that will be interpreted by 
individuals in different ways depending on their own orientation to the other actors 
involved. This reorientation of our thinking of storytelling (and restorying) as a trust-
building practice therefore presents the second significant departure in our thinking 
about the way that trust-building takes place. 
Boje (1995: 998) comments that ‘much of management is about judging 
stories and storytellers and capturing story characters in a panoptic, interconnected 
network of interpretative-disciplinary relationships.’ The financial crisis and the 
multiple attempts at trust-building we see from the different stakeholder groups 
provides evidence that this is the case in the management of trust-building. As 
Luhmann’s (1973: 113) words echo, ‘the potential for complex forms of social 
organization afforded by agency seems infinite at the level of the system: global 
exchanges unencumbered by distance, time, commodity, or familiarity, economies of 
scope and scale, transactional liquidity, expanding temporal possibilities and 
protection from risk’ make it impossible to identify every detail in coming to a 
conclusion that will take into account of all the actors’ motives and actions in a system-
wide environment where organisations exist’. 
 Trust-building in an interorganisational environment observed amongst the 
stakeholders in the period studied following the financial crisis therefore presents a 
different challenge and Boje’s insight into the role of storytelling in making sense of 
the fact that there is an unlimited ‘potential for complex forms of social organization 
afforded by agency [which] seems infinite at the level of the system’ (Luhmann, 1973: 
113) provides a way forward in our thinking about interorganisational trust-building. 
Storytelling as a trust-building practice also shows us that trust decisions are 
ultimately in the eye of the beholder (Möllering, 2002) as we see in Lempicka’s 
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decision not to provide any reason in the play Tamara11 to sell her art to the highest 
bidder, the labyrinthine stories that unfold in relation to this event and the multitude of 
paths the spectator may choose to take (Boje, 1995). The reasons for these paths are 
unknowable because in an interorganisational environment we find ourselves in many 
rooms, hearing many different voices and guessing who is trusting, where the trust is 
taking place and simply “how” we are to trust. We will ultimately be influenced by our 
own situation, unaware of the seemingly infinite number of variables taking place in 
other rooms or between other actors as different stories are told. 
  
Storytelling to build trust: considering the past, present and emergent 
future 
 
Reframing the past. Where there is a breakdown in trust stories are an integral way 
that we shape our views on what the world was and how it has come to be as it is 
(Jackson, 2005). Reframing the past to build trust firstly places distance between the 
story teller and the previous actions: instructing and binding the decisions made about 
the storyteller and collectively sculpting the views of the present (Gabriel, 2010) in a 
practice of storytelling where the storyteller controls the narrative of past events and 
reframes it in an attempt to build identity-based trust.  
Firstly, storytelling is a practice that builds identity-based trust by reframing 
past events in a way that sanitises them. We see storytelling used by the banking 
participants in their discussions with the Parliamentary and regulatory participants in 
the focus group to sanitise the events that led to the financial crisis - referring to credit 
as fairy dust for instance. Secondly, stories of the past are also used to place distance 
between the present and past events to build identification between actors in the 
present. Stories that are allegorical - told in the third person for instance - are used to 
place distance between the past to tell a version of events that espouses values that 
those hearing the story will identify with since stories in everyday lives ‘create the 
present’ (Ochs & Capps, 2009: 42).  
The practice of storytelling of the past enables the storyteller to reframe the 
past placing distance between past misdemeanours and the present. It also allows 
the storyteller to sanitise the past events and to shape their identity in the present 
(Van Zanten, 2012). This was an important part of the trust-building process for the 
banking participants as they removed themselves from the ‘mistakes of the past’ and 
created a new version of themselves in the present based on reframing the past. The 
                                                 
11 See Boje, D. M. (1995). Stories of the storytelling organization: A postmodern analysis of Disney as 
“Tamara-Land”. Academy of Management journal, 38(4), 997-1035. 
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example of the banker Greybeard for example is used to such effect in the focus group 
discussion.    
Stories of the past therefore become a series of simulacra that present a 
palatable version of events that goes beyond the scope of the individual telling the 
story (Deuten & Rip, 2000). Trust-building through storytelling can therefore firstly be 
understood as reframing of the past by the storyteller to establish a basis for 
trustworthiness. The past is reimagined through telling stories by sanitising the past 
and placing distance between the past and the present to allow a “clear deck” for 
participants to build trust in the present. 
 
Aligning values in the present. Stories do not take place in isolation, they are retold 
and restoryed (Rosile & Boje, 2002), they are contested (Davis, 2004), whether the 
purpose is to make sense of shared or individual histories (Boje, 1992) to establish 
an acceptable reality and allow a “clear deck” but also to ‘locate the present within a 
historically emerging process’ (Llewellyn, 2001: 36). Participants told stories in the 
present in such a way that they create a version of events that uses the ‘cues of past 
of identities’ (Dunford & Jones, 2000: 1208) to allow stories to be told that imply 
trustworthiness of the identity of the storyteller in the present and therefore we see an 
attempt to build identification-based trust in the present that is salient with the stories 
of the past. This process further serves to reinforce identify and as the basis for the 
participants to build identification-based trust.   
Key to storytelling as a trust-building practice in the present therefore are the 
different interactional resources that actors use to build interorganisational trust to 
bring about the alignment of values with others or with collective ideals (Stivers, 2008). 
Stories allow actors to orientate themselves in the interorganisational complexity of 
the present through identification-based alignment of values using various media as 
forms of communication. We see in the visit to Strangers Bar and the branding of the 
space in Canary Wharf space for instance that storytelling goes beyond the story 
itself. These stories we observe, the contributing artefacts and the embodiment of the 
stories in place, which the participants told about themselves in the present therefore 
imparted an alignment of values and attempts at trust-building through stories in the 
present since stories are physically ‘transmitted by gestures, words, or actions in 
social interaction’ (Blumer 1969: 276) that provide an opportunity to attempt 
identification-based trust in the present (Suchman 1987), which the sharing of facts 
or might otherwise not make possible (Gershon & Page, 2001). 
Furthermore, storytelling as a trust-building practice is an effective means to 
build alignment of values in the complexities of the present because of the multitude 
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of interpretations and meanings one can take from the story depending on how, when, 
where or by whom it is told. Telling anecdotes about the City of London for example 
brings alignment because it does not rely on establishing a singular truth, but 
establishes a consensus of identification told in manifold ways. These stories create 
a sense of collective identity when past histories and events may mean that the 
individuals telling the stories have little in common and may have very ‘different 
interpretations of past realities’ (March & Olsen, 1975: 42). In fact, the process of 
alignment can be considered more important in the establishment of 
interorganisational trust than establishing facts. As Diane Setterfield comments in the 
Thirteenth Tale:    
 
My gripe is not with lovers of the truth but with truth herself. What 
succour, what consolation is there in truth, compared to a story? 
What good is truth, at midnight, in the dark, when the wind is roaring 
like a bear in the chimney? When the lightning strikes shadows on 
the bedroom wall and the rain taps at the window with its long 
fingernails? No. When fear and cold make a statue of you in your 
bed, don't expect hard-boned and fleshless truth to come running to 
your aid. What you need are the plump comforts of a story. 
Diane Setterfield, The Thirteenth Tale (2006: 53) 
 
At the heart of the discussions about the financial crisis was a desire for the 
participants to find agreement where the context presented a range of past 
experiences from stakeholders about the crisis and were trying to find collective 
agreement about an uncertain present. To establish trust in the system, storytelling 
served as a practice to attempt to build identification-based trust: a way to find 
collective agreement presenting unquantifiable truths in the form of a story – the story 
of the benevolence of the City of London and the percentage of the world’s hungry 
decreasing by two percent between 1990 and 2010, for example.   
Weick (1995: 61) points out that a good story holds ‘disparate elements 
together long enough to energize and guide action, plausibly enough to allow us to 
make retrospective sense of whatever happened’. Stories that are told in the present 
– orally, but also through the use of reports, branding of space and organisational 
narratives - are often reactive to a situation to ‘energize and guide action’ through an 
alignment of values rather than a focus on failings of the past or attempting to assert 
a truth about the interorganisational environment. This process of building 
identification through alignment in the present to ‘energize and guide action’ showed 
an attempt by the participants to build identification-based trust in ways that were not 
‘”some talk” running alongside actually occurring events’ (Llewellyn, 2001: 54), but 
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that were part of an enacted process of identification-based trust-building, reliant on 
artefacts, restoryed (Boje, 2002) and presenting an opportunity for the participants to 
attempt to build identification-based trust  
Therefore, when individuals find themselves in a complex disorderly situation 
like the financial crisis, where trust is dogmatic and truths are unreliable, establishing 
who to trust, what to trust about them and how to play your own individual role in any 
trust-building process remains elusive. The truth that Setterfield refers to becomes 
secondary to the process of alignment and collective agreement that a story will allow 
and storytelling becomes a practice that builds alignment to best navigate the 
‘disparate elements together long enough to energize and guide action’ and enable 
trust-building based on alignment of values and collective identity in the present. 
 
Storytelling to shape the emergent future Storytelling also allows the storyteller to 
imagine how things could be – to create a ‘fiction about a possible future’ (Petrick, 
2014: 354) and to move forward from past events. The practice of storytelling about 
the future contributed to identification-based trust-building in so far as it allowed the 
participants firstly to tacitly acknowledge the failings of the past by ‘restorying’ them 
(Boje, 2002) and in doing so, build trust through an imagination of how things might 
be in the future  
The process of storytelling about an imagined version of the future highlights 
that identification-based trust-building relies on ‘articulating claims for future identities’ 
(Petrck, 2014: 354), not simply of how things were or who we are in the present, but 
of proposed identities in the future. A fiction about the future is a step away from the 
past, guiding action in the present into an imagined future. In times of crisis or 
uncertainty where there are immeasurable actors and organisations engaged in the 
process of trust-building, there is a need to look forward away from the ‘perceived 
failures of the past’ (Turner, 1969: 34) and to begin new page, again placing distance 
between the actor and the actions of the past.  
Since the failure might not be directly because of the actions of the individual 
or the organisation, this process of storying an imagined future provides a catharsis 
(See Schein, 2006 for an example) as the individual is able to move to a discussion 
about the possibilities of the future and beyond the failures of the past for which they 
may feel as individuals they are not well placed to address. As Giddens (1991: 44) 
comments:  
 
‘Abstract systems depend on trust, yet they provide none of the moral rewards 
which can be obtained from personalised trust, or were often available in 
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traditional settings from the moral frameworks within which everyday life was 
undertaken. Moreover, the wholesale penetration of abstract systems into daily 
life creates risks which the individual is not well placed to confront; high-
consequence risks fall into this category. Greater interdependence, up to and 
including globally independent systems, means greater vulnerability when 
untoward events occur that affect those systems as a whole’. 
The individual and their organisation often take on a risk inherent in a system 
over which they have no control. Individuals and their organisations take on a degree 
of responsibility for the ‘high consequence risks’ that an abstract, depersonalised 
system presents. Therefore, the practice of storytelling about the future presents an 
opportunity to move forward from a crisis for any leader of an organisation that is part 
of a globalised abstract system. This became of interest, particularly in the discussion 
of rebuilding the City of London, as a process of catharsis, to tell a story on a new 
page, to imagine a new emergent future and to tacitly acknowledge the lack of control 
they had as individuals and organisations over the abstract system of which they are 
a part. It provided an opportunity for ‘articulating claims for future identities’ (Ybema, 
Keenoy, Oswick, Beverungen & Ellis, 2009: 300) beyond the system in which ‘they 
were beholden’ (Ibid.) as the basis for identification-based trust-building based on a 
‘fiction about a possible future’ (Gibson, 1992: 167). 
The concept of catharsis is underexplored in the storytelling literature and 
provides new thinking about how trust-building takes place linking a “framing of the 
past” with the “imaging of an emergent future”. Typically, trust-building has focused 
on simply looking backwards, acknowledging past mistakes (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009) 
or showing explicitly that reforms have been put in place for the future (Reed, 2001) 
or about factual details about the future such as how the individual will secure the 
financial health of the organisation (Williamson, 1993).  
This process of cathartic storytelling about how things might be in the future 
through storytelling allowed the participants to acknowledge both the failings in the 
past, the current uncertainty and the possibility of a future system that could be which 
was not limited by specific details in the same way previous studies of trust-building 
have theorised (Dietz & Gillespie, 2009) and present a new way to think about 
interorganisational trust-building as imagined stories of future identities. These stories 
further became a form of confessional that allows the individuals to tacitly 
acknowledge that the system needed to change, that they don’t have the power to 
make the change but that they imagine a better future without providing specific 
examples of what the future might look like in a present that is uncertain. Therefore, 
we can think about storytelling as a redemptive act that builds identification based 
trust through the tacit acknowledgment of the inabilities of the individual, the failings 
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of the past, that the organisation spun in an abstract system over which they have 
little control, but with an opportunity to imagine possibilities of what the future might 
look like without the need for precise details provides. Bringing these elements 
together as a storytelling confessional is a new way to think about how organisations 
and their leaders to build identification-based trust. 
Storytelling about the future allows individuals to make promises about the 
future that are immeasurable but speak to a higher ideal and served to address the 
unpredictable future without committing to specific detail, rather describing through 
stories what the future could be. In doing so these stories place the storyteller in a 
position that engenders trust going into an unpredictable future without making the 
individuals vulnerable by making specific commitments that they may not be able to 
meet. Stories about the future therefore allow ‘actors in organisations to make claims 
about who they are or who they are becoming as an organization’ (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977) without the need to provide precise details that the trust-building literature 
suggests that an organisation should present to build trust (Dietz & Gillespie, 2011; 
McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011). The practice of storytelling of about the future allows 
individuals and organisations to reflect on the past building on an alignment in the 
present and consider the future through the creation of an imagined identity in the 
emergent future removed from the failings of the past. 
 
Figure (28): Diagram illustrating storytelling practices to build trust 
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Trust-building and the practice of curating space   
 
 
“I was shown into a room. A red room. Red wallpaper, 
red curtains, red carpet. They said it was a sitting-room, 
but I don’t know why they’d decided to confine its 
purpose just to sitting. Obviously, sitting was one of the 
things you could do in a room this size; but you could 
also stage operas, hold cycling races, and have an 
absolutely cracking game of frisbee, all at the same time, 
without having to move any of the furniture. It could rain 
in a room this big.” 
 
                             Hugh Laurie, The Gun Seller (1996:84) 
 
Space is more than simply a location, ‘it is a combination of material form 
interacting with sets of meanings and values developed over time’ (Gieryn, 2000: 464) 
and places are ‘socially constructed with people arriving at places at which point they 
are continuously revising and reconstructing them’ (Lawrence and Dover, 2015: 374). 
Spaces are therefore ‘enduring elements in social life that have a profound effect on 
the thoughts, feelings and behaviour of individual and collective actors’ (Lawrence 
and Suddaby, 2006: 216) and are central to understanding how trust-building is 
enacted in the interorganisational environment. I suggest in the following pages that 
interorganisational trust-building must be considered in the context of the spaces in 
which it is being built and specifically that the space itself, the relationship of the actors 
to the space and the curation of the space should be acknowledged as we 
conceptualise interorganisational trust in practice.   
Lawrence and Dover (2015: 378) suggest that spaces can either ‘contain or 
mediate … depending on characteristics of the place’. Space plays a role in the 
practice of interorganisational trust-building in these two ways: places of containment 
lend themselves more readily to trust-building through the maintenance of control over 
the ‘patterns of interactions’ (Ibid.: 379) of the actors within the space. Places of 
mediation can provide an opportunity for alignment of values, and can be used as 
opportunities for actors to curate space to build identification-based trust. In both 
cases ‘the dynamic interactions between actors and between the actors and the space 
[my emphasis added]’ (Anderson, 1987: 585) play a role in the practice of 
interorganisational trust-building.  
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Places of containment: building interorganisational trust through control   
 
In chapter five we see the TSC room used by the Parliamentary participants 
to establish control in their interactions with the banking participants. The physical 
space of the TSC room was used by the Parliamentary participants to control the 
discussion ensuring that they could undertake the Committee meeting effectively and 
they attempt to build trust through curating a space of containment that enabled them 
to attempt to build trust.  
The barriers described in sections four and five of chapter five demonstrated 
that consideration had been given by the Parliamentary participants on how they could 
curate the physical space of the TSC within the Parliamentary estate to place 
themselves in a position where they felt they could trust their interactions with the 
banking participants, using the space to maintain control over the discussion and the 
interactions that took place in the TSC room. This process of curating the physical 
space where the TSC meetings were held provided the Parliamentary participants 
with the ability to make informed decisions about the proposals laid out in the draft 
ICB report.  
By curating the TSC environment as a place of control, the Parliamentary 
participants were attempting to establish a basis for trust; the Parliamentary 
participants ensured that questions were answered and that the responses could be 
officially recorded – the space facilitated a form of calculus-based trust. The physical 
space of the TSC gave the Parliamentary participants the ability to trust the banking 
participants’ responses and ensured that they received answers to the questions they 
wanted to address – the curation of the space through the layout of the room and the 
barriers placed between the Parliamentary participants placed between themselves 
and the banking participants showed an attempt to build calculus-based trust using 
the physical space to control the discussion. 
Ownership of a space plays an important role in the trust-building process 
because of the implicit control that it provides to those actors who feel an attachment 
to and an alignment with a place (Tuan, 1975, 1977) but also because ownership of 
a space allows the owner more latitude to dictate how the space is used and to choose 
whether to engage in any form of trust-building. Lawrence and Dover’s (2015) 
observation of the Tri-Cities as a social enclosure (a similar space of containment) 
focused on the existence of pre-existing routines and resources that served to provide 
clear dividing lines for the “owners” of the space and the outsiders. Therefore, the 
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ownership that the actor feels of a space plays a role in the actors’ ability to contain 
the visitor ‘emotionally and physically within the space’ (Madgin, Bradley & Hastings, 
2016: 694). As we see in the example from the Tri-cities in Lawrence and Dover 
(2015) and the interactions of the participants in the Parliamentary estate, space that 
is “owned” can facilitate this containing function, that can then be curated by the 
“owner” of the space. However, in certain environments the control “owners” have 
over the space may be more limited (See Grey & Garsten, 2001 and Alvesson & 
Willmott, 1992) depending on the “ownership” or orientation the actor feels with a 
place (Tuan, 1975). Therefore, what we observe here is an example of ownership 
being used to control the “visitor” in a space of containment in an attempt to build 
calculus-based trust.  
Pre-existing routines and a space where there are clear boundaries to contain 
activity can therefore be used by a trustee to attempt to build trust as it may enable a 
basis for trust-building since as actors are able to use the space to direct conversation, 
focus on detail and order the sequence of interactions in such a way that they are 
able to establish a relationship based on elements of control that minimises 
uncertainty in an uncertain interorganisational environment and uses the physical 
space to imply legal or provision in a way reminiscent of Bachmann’s (2006) study of 
the regulatory environment or the types of institutional arrangements referred to by 
Kroeger (2014). The curation of physical space by the “owner” therefore plays an 
active role in the interorganisational trust-building process, which ensures an initial 
footing for the owner of the space to trust through a process of containment, and as 
a result allows the owner of the space to establish a basis for a trusting relationship 
based on calculus-based trust  
We see in the TSC meetings an example of a space being used to control the 
discussion to build trust. This is a deliberate attempt to control the actions and 
influence of the “others” – in this case the banking participants - and to manage the 
interactions that take place. As Lawrence and Dover (2015) found in the Tri-cities the 
actors worked in a similar way to shift the institutionalized boundaries of solidarity—
the dividing line that distinguished ‘‘us’’ from “others” becomes important in a space 
that is perceived to be owned and control can be established as a means for trust-
building by limiting the actions of the visitor. We see in this study and the study of the 
Tri-cities a deliberate attempt to create an environment that can be trusted as a result 
of the control that the containment provided. A dividing line that formally distinguishes 
“us” from others: ‘spaces do not happen by accident’ (MacCannell, 1973: 594). Actors 
who are perceived to own a space choose how they “welcome” their guests into their 
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home and maintaining control of the conversation through the curation of space has 
been shown here to be a way in which organisations can begin to build trust through 
creating a certainty around the information that is shared.   
In environments of extreme uncertainty as we have observed in the study of 
the interorganisational environment following the financial crisis, controlling a space 
provides a basis for establishing trust formally in a physical way that can be viewed 
as a new way to consider the literature on calculus-based trust. In the same way, an 
organisation may put in place legal protection (Sitkin & Roth, 1993) or implied forms 
of contract (Robinson, 1996) in the early stages of a calculus-based trusting 
relationship, the curation of space by the owner can be an effective means to establish 
a calculus-based basis for trust-building. 
This control of space to establish calculus-based trust is demonstrated in the 
way that the judge in a courtroom curates the space. They not only represent the 
“owner” of the room, but also something beyond that which is intangible – they 
represent the law. Therefore, those in the courtroom behave in the way the judge 
defines. This brings about some basic courtroom rules: that Litigators arrive on time; 
be well-tempered, wear appropriate clothes and seek permission from the judge to 
examine a witness. The judge as the focal point curates the space to imply certain 
rules to create an environment where information can be trusted so that the jury can 
decide based on evidence they hear in an environment that uses ‘architectures of 
enclosure, display, segregation, surveillance, and classification [that] give an 
impersonal and autonomous power over docile subjects’ (Gieryn, 2000: 475) and 
contributes to the trustworthiness of not only the judge but the legal system they 
represent.  
In an interorganisational environment where access to information is 
challenging and where organisations share information in ways that are unclear and 
shifting, the curation of space to contain and to control the discussion provides a 
means to trust the information that is being shared. The owners’ curation of a space 
therefore focuses on establishing an environment where information shared between 
organisations can be trusted  
 
Shared spaces: building interorganisational trust through identification 
 
Space can also be used to mediate as well as contain and provides an 
opportunity for actors to share knowledge and ‘an interpretive lens through which 
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people understand the institutions that actors are working to affect’ (Bathelt, 
Malmberg & Maskell, 2004: 44) allowing a meeting place (Tuan, 1977), a collaborative 
forum (Rourke & Colema, 2009) where views can be shared, identities can be aligned 
and trust is built through ‘interactions and patterns of behaviour’ (Bachmann, 2001: 
350) that brings about identification between actors.  
Lawrence and Dover (2015) argue that some places have the potential to play 
a mediating role because they represent ‘ideas with which people are familiar and 
comfortable’. We see in chapter six the banks are curating space to build 
identification-based trust. Section one of chapter six shows Canary Wharf as a space 
that is actively curated by the banking participants to create a common identity to build 
identification-based trust between the banks. In this example, the banking participants 
are curating the space to remind themselves that London is a home for ‘finance, food 
fashion and film’ and therefore the space is used to build alignment and identification-
based trust between their organisations.  
In this second example, the use of Canary Wharf as a space to create a 
collective identity and to build identification trust contrasts with the previous example 
between the banking participants and the Parliamentary participants; Canary Wharf 
provided a mutual space for the banks to occupy. The estate on which the banks and 
the shopping mall were situated was owned by three separate companies unrelated 
to the banks. The space was therefore neutral and provided common ground that the 
banks occupied in contrast to the clear ownership the Parliamentary participants felt 
of the TSC rooms in Parliament.  
Since spaces both organise, and are subjected to the demands and routines 
placed on them by individual actors with a range of motivations, certain spaces may 
be more conducive to building identification between the individual and creates a 
space conducive to building trust through identification. For example, Dacin, Munir 
and Tracy (2010) description of Cambridge formal dining explores the process 
through shared spaces can bring about identification. Scholars have drawn heavily on 
the notion that spaces provide ‘a social process by which actors, individually or in 
concert, display for others the meaning of their social reality’ (Alexander, 2004: 529) 
and Dacin et al. (2010) focus on the repeated enactment of boundaries of a space to 
transform participants’ identities. As Dacin et al., (2010) comment:  
 
‘We find that Cambridge dining rituals are performances that legitimate the 
concept of social stratification through the repeated enactment of roles and 
boundaries. The performance masks any conflict that may be present under the 
surface, giving the impression of a sophisticated social order that participants 
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want to be associated with. Next, we find that college dining rituals lead to the 
transformation of participants’ identities and senses of self, and their 
perceptions of their images in the eyes of others. The repeated performance of 
the rituals affirms these values and influences participants’ perceived place, 
present and future, in society’.  
 
What is significant about Dacin et al.’s, (2010) study is that they acknowledge 
the importance of agency in enacting the roles and boundaries of a social space. The 
space could be one simply of containment and control, implied by the ritualistic 
behaviour – but the performances required to maintain the identity of the space are 
instead curated by the individuals attending the formal dinner to use the space as a 
space for mediation, suggesting firstly that the structures and routines are ‘reinforced 
locally’ (Ibid.: 1395) and secondly suggesting ‘a more fragmented and less strategic 
conception of institutional maintenance’ (Ibid.) than is often portrayed in the literature 
(See for example, Lawrence, 1999) and that individuals can curate spaces to build 
trust even when the setting is a formal ritualistic one. The specific role of space in this 
study of Cambridge formal dining as a place that helps to mask ‘any conflict that may 
be present under the surface, giving the impression of a sophisticated social order 
that participants want to be associated with’ (Dacin et al. (2010: 1395) becomes a 
focal point of the activity. The space is a part of the foreground of the action, but is 
deliberately curated in such a way as to provide a place to mediate, to talk and to build 
identity, acknowledging the role of the individuals in the space and providing them 
with both an identity and an opportunity to identify with the other.  
We see this process of identification in a mediating space taking place in 
Canary wharf through the branding and common sharing of space. The space 
provides an opportunity to build trust through shared ideals and agreement that allows 
the individuals and their organisations to come together in a mutual sphere through 
an alignment of values and identity and in doing so they are attempting to build 
identification-based trust. Building a collective identity had become important to the 
banks following the crisis and the physical space they occupied at Canary Wharf 
presented a way to reinforce an image of London as home, not just as a place where 
business was conducted. Therefore, in contrast to the Parliamentary estate the estate 
at Canary Wharf was freely accessible, a shared space that could mediate an 
alignment of values.  
The banks therefore built an identity using the space. Their ability to build 
identification-based trust was also reliant on the physical space itself. However, there 
was a conscious practice of curating the space to create a sense of identification and 
alignment. For example, highlighting the importance of ‘being London’ and using the 
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physical space to reinforce the collective identity of London as more than a place to 
work, but a place to live and enjoy the other benefits of working in London.  
What is of note once again is that the practice of curating the physical space 
is influenced by the space itself. The advertising space for example was limited to 
certain areas and was timebound (they only used the billboards for a finite amount of 
time). Unlike the Parliamentary estate there are less obvious formal rules about the 
space but the space still had implicit rules that the actors engaged with as they used 
the space to build a sense of identity. The open plan links between the Docklands 
light rail, the underground stations, the mall and the banks contrast with the barriers 
observed in the Parliamentary estate, but still influence the actors’ behaviour. The 
rapidly changing landscape where new buildings are constructed or new shops 
opening contrast with the permanence of the Parliamentary estate, but in both case 
space plays an active role in the choices and trust building attempts that the actors 
make. 
Furthermore, that the active curation of spaces by the actors engaging with 
the space not only leads to the idea of places as ‘‘constructed’’ (Massey, 1995) but 
as Gieryn (2000: 465) argued, they are ‘doubly constructed’ in the sense they are 
‘built or in some way physically carved out’ and ‘interpreted, narrated, perceived, felt, 
understood, and imagined’ (Gieryn, 2000: 465) by the actors involved in the trust- 
building process as they curate spaces that contain or mediate. Places are therefore 
sites both of containment or mediation in the trust-building process depending on the 
both the space itself but also decisions that the actors take in how they curate the 
space. Depending on the ways in which the participants choose to curate the space 
will emphasise the role of containing or mediating that will lead to different trust 
outcomes. 
 
Containing and mediating spaces in interorganisational trust-building 
 
Firstly, containing spaces can help to build trust through control. The 
parliamentarians curating the TSC space to establish trust confirms what we 
already know from studies of interorganisational trust that legal mechanisms 
can be an effective means to trust-building in a relationship between 
organisations (Bachmann and Lane, 1996), particularly in the early stages of 
a relationship (Mayer et al., 1995) or in times of crisis (Gillespie and Dietz, 
2009). However, what was particularly of interest, was that unlike the findings 
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we see in studies such as Bachmann and Lane (1996) and Möllering (2013), 
about the relationship between trust and control, the legalistic environment of 
the TSC, which provided a space for the Parliamentarians to trust in their 
banking colleagues’ responses was enacted through practice that relied on the 
use of space that controlled and established opportunities for calculus-based 
trust. Previous studies on trust and control examine legal provision (De Man & 
Roijakkers, 2009), reputational risk (Kang, 2008) and financial penalties 
(Bloorargue, 2010) pay little attention to the role of space in influencing the 
ability to build calculus-based trust using space. Here we see the enactment 
of trust in a ‘concerted scene of action’ (Nicolini, 2009: 1392), which through 
the control of the space allowed the participants to attempt to build trust. 
Secondly, mediating spaces also help to build trust where identification-
based trust is important. The shared space in Canary Wharf for example is an 
example of a space that can be interpreted in a whole number of ways by the 
range of actors and organisations involved in the space. However, where the 
precise facts are unknowable mediating spaces allow more flexibility to curate 
a space to build identification-based trust. Therefore, whereas we see how 
space curated to build trust through controlling the conversation and the 
environment, we see that spaces can be curated to define collective identity in 
the process of identification-based trust-building. The way this takes place 
might be different depending on the space.  
Therefore, I suggest that spaces can be shaped by the actors that 
inhabit them, they are shaped by the history and the past events that have 
taken place in the space. They also shape the actions of the actor. The 
interplay of actor and space, where spaces are never fixed as place, but rather 
play an active role in social life and therefore the ways that actors curate the 
spaces they inhabit influences the opportunities for and the types of trust that 
can take place.  
 
Figure (29): Diagram showing places of containment and places of mediation  
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i. The space is 
curated by the 
owner of the space. 
ii. The type of space 
will influence how it 
might be used to 
control.  
iii. The contained 
space allows control 
over the actions of 
the visitor and 
provide potential for 
trust building. 
i. The space is 
curated collectively 
and shared by the 
actors. 
ii. The shared space 
will be more likely 
facilitate 
identification-based 
trust. 
iii. The shared space 
will still influence 
behaviours of the 
actors and will 
require mediation. 
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A glass darkly: managing and mediating knowledge flows to build trust 
 
‘One often makes a remark and only later sees how true it is’ Wittgenstein 
observed in a journal written whilst he was a soldier in the trenches during World War 
One. The context of this comment, later included into Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
(Wittgenstein, 1922) rather sets the scene for our understanding of how knowledge 
flows are managed and mediated by actors in a ‘total nexus of interconnected human 
practices’ (Schatzki, 2002: 11) 
Nicolini (2011: 302) comments to this end that ‘although the idea of a close 
relationship between practice, knowing, and organising is intuitively very attractive 
and full of potential, conceptualising such a relationship is not straightforward’. 
Knowledge is more complex than ‘knowing that’ (Ibid.). In the study, the participants 
appeared to make sense of the complications of knowledge in two ways in their 
attempts to build trust. Firstly, we consider the stewardship of knowledge flows by 
individual actors as organisational knowledge carriers and secondly, we consider the 
process of collectively mediating knowledge flows that took place in the group’s 
attempts to build trust to communicate and align knowledge. 
The practice of managing or mediating knowledge flows is not to be confused 
simply with the act of sharing or withholding knowledge. Managing or mediating flows 
of knowledge to build trust is more than simply a process of ‘knowledge gathering or 
information sharing’ (Crossan, Lane & White, 1999: 527) but an ongoing process of 
knowing, which is established through active management and/or mediation of flows 
of knowledge as actors engage with their surroundings. Therefore, managing flows of 
knowledge becomes more than a matter of simply “who knew this or who know that”.  
Knowledge carriers and the practice of managing knowledge flows to 
build trust  
 
Managing knowledge flows is an ‘essential role of human action in knowing 
how to get things done in complex organizational work’ (Orlikowski, 2002: 254); what 
we see in certain interactions between the participants is that they use the 
management of knowledge flows to get the business of trust-building in the system 
done. Negotiating these challenges requires more than simply the disclosure or non-
disclosure of information, it requires a consideration of the ways that information is 
shared, which provides actors with ‘the capability of operating effectively across the 
temporal, geographic, political, and cultural boundaries routinely encountered in 
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global operations’ (Ibid.: 255). This process therefore will be ‘purposive and reﬂexive, 
continually and routinely monitoring the ongoing ﬂow of knowledge —their own and 
that of others — and the social and physical contexts in which their activities are 
constituted’ (Pierson 1998: 132). 
Withholding information about an organisation or a situation is well-
established in the trust-building literature (Butler, 1995; Culnan & Armstrong, 1999). 
In the early part of a trust-building relationship studies have shown that this can be an 
effective means to build trust (Lewicki et al., 1998) as the organisations or individuals 
begin to establish facts about one another (Ehrmann & Stinson, 1999).  We see in the 
TSC meetings the banking participants withholding information at certain points in the 
meeting but there is a subtle, but important distinction: they are not withholding 
knowledge but rather they are managing knowledge flows in such a way as to 
orientate themselves in the physical environment as organisational knowledge-
carriers.  
The banking participants’ use of “blue suits” to manage the information 
showed that the knowledge flows were ‘carefully arranged and constructed’ (Parker, 
2000: 143) by the banks in such a way that they could present certain information 
about the organisation which they thought would best build trust between the 
organisations and information was not withheld by the banking participants, rather it 
was shared in ways that was conducive to the establishment of trust between their 
respective organisations. We see in for example that the banking participants have 
established an informal mechanism to ensure the knowledge flows are managed by 
their organisation by asking to refer-back to the Committee formally in writing.  
There is a tacit acknowledgement that remained unsaid in the meeting that 
the banking participant is representing the organisation and therefore withholding 
information at certain points – recognising they are organisational knowledge carriers 
- becomes a consideration in how the banks attempt to establish trust between the 
TSC and the organisation that the banking participant represents. The banking 
participant is managing knowledge flows to ensure that the response is the 
organisation’s position not simply their view as the individual. It may simply not be 
helpful, or confusing for both organisations if the individual participant is to share 
information that was not ‘collectively’ agreed within their organisation. The banking 
participant as a representative of the bank therefore plays a role of intermediary – as 
the organisational knowledge carrier - in the TSC managing flows of knowledge 
between their organisation and the Members of the Committee and we see that the 
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banking participant can do this openly; managing the flows of information without the 
appearance of being deceitful or the appearance of withholding knowledge. In fact, it 
appears that the openness in the way the banking participants approach the 
management of knowledge as organisational knowledge carriers creates a 
relationship between their respective organisations that removes the need for the type 
of rules that one might expect to see in a relationship between organisations reliant 
on calculus-based trust that have been studied (Rousseau et al., 1998; Mayer et al., 
1995; McAllister, 1995).  
The practice of openly managing an organisation’s knowledge as an 
organisational knowledge carrier is the first observation I make in how knowledge-
based trust may be established in the complexities of an uncertain interorganisational 
environment. Previously, our understanding of withholding information on the part of 
the trustee was either something that remained undiscovered by the trustor (Shapiro, 
1987) or an attempt to withhold the information might be discovered leading to the 
end of a trusting relationship (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2006). The act of openly managing 
information flows – as an organisational knowledge carrier and appearing at the 
meeting as a functionary of the organisation gave the banking participants the 
opportunity to openly manage knowledge and it appeared, as a result of this practice, 
that the organisations, particularly the TSC in this case, became more trusting of the 
other as a result of this admission that knowledge flows were being openly managed 
by the individual being questioned. 
 
The practice of mediating knowledge flows to build trust  
 
Knowledge is an ‘ongoing social accomplishment, constituted and 
reconstituted as actors engage the world in practice’ (Orlikowski, 2002: 242). 
Knowledge is also ‘a practical accomplishment’ (Nicolini et al., 2003: 22) and the 
practice of assuming an agreed orientation of knowing is where knowledgeability 
manifests as a form of knowledge-based trust. Knowledge-based trust becomes 
enacted as a practice of mediating knowledge flows to build trust. Knowledge in this 
sense is ‘always a way of knowing shared with others’ (Gherardi 2000: 330).  
The relationship between ‘collective knowledge’ (Larsson, Bengtsson, 
Henriksson & Sparks, 1998: 293) that is acquired not simply through discourse but is 
‘a way of knowing shared with others’ (Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000: 235) where the 
management of knowledge flows become a vital way to manage the texts, discourses 
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or communication suggests we reconsider our understanding of knowledge-based 
trust. The collective management of knowledge produces certain chains of signs that 
signify an intent to build knowledge-based trust through the collective process of 
mediating knowledge flows to build trust through collective knowing. As we see in the 
banking participants discussions about the ‘unfairness’ of the American Regulation, 
informed learning of how to act as they began to articulate collective ways of sharing 
knowledge in order establish flows of knowledge that stabilise and build trust 
collectively in a system in which they were operating become a collective activity. 
Therefore, firstly collective knowing enables a proximity, which finds agreement 
through direct discourse with others (Oerlemans, Meeus & Boekema, 2001). As we 
see in the case of the American regulation collective activity amongst the bankers can 
affirm a collective understanding of an environment and establish a basis for trust-
building through the decision to collectively share knowledge and connect with other 
actors in a collaborative drive and commitment (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006). This 
shifts our understanding of knowledge-based trust from knowledge gathering to a 
collective social accomplishment reliant on collective mediation of knowledge flows. 
Furthermore, mediating knowledge flow provides the organisation with the 
choice of what information to share. As Nicolini (2007: 893) observes, collective 
practices help to ‘perform identifiable power regimes’ which ‘stem from the position 
which agents occupy within life sustaining practical activities’ (Ibid.). Practices 
therefore perform ‘unequally empowered social positions’ and the relation of power 
between them constitutes the horizon within which ‘un-reflexive reactions, actions, 
utterances, linguistic acts, behaviours, and routine conduct acquire meaning identity, 
so that the question of what people and things are depends upon the practices in 
which they are involved in’ (Thévenot, 2001: 786).  
This collective mediating of knowledge in order to assert a position of power 
is shown in the participants’ discussion about the European legislation. In this 
discussion, the collective mediation knowledge flows to position the European 
Commission as somehow ‘biased’ and ‘incompetent’ is enacted collectively by the 
knowledge the participants choose to share; specific information collectively to bring 
collective knowing about the Commission based on the participants’ mediation of 
knowledge flows. We see that privately the knowledge they choose not to share about 
the incompetence of the British efforts to lobby in Europe is withheld, since the 
purpose for the participants is not simply about the synthesis of information to affirm 
a collective position, but mediating knowledge flows to find a collective knowing that 
allowed participants to create a reality where ‘collective knowledgeability’ (Nicolini et 
146 
 
al. 2003) presents the group with a ‘form of social expertise’ (Gherardi, 2006) that 
allows for a collective orientation of the group as expert knowledge carriers who are 
able to trust one another attempt to build knowledge-based trust.   
 
 
 
Conclusion: reflections on the usefulness of the practices observed  
 
One should also consider how useful the practice approach is to our understanding 
of trust. Quoting from Möllering (2001: 343), I mention earlier in this thesis that ‘it 
should be interesting to analyse how the new framing challenges or conﬁrms previous 
ﬁndings’. How can we claim that this perspective is any more than an interesting 
academic exercise? What does this practice approach to trust building contribute that 
is different to our current understanding?  
First, the practice approach allows us to consider the everyday as significant 
in the trust building process. We see in this study how the most mundane discussions 
about cycling, or crèches for example, provide opportunities for trust-building. This is 
a significant move away from our current approach to trust research, which looks 
beyond the everyday in search of grand theories to explain how trust will work in given 
situations.  
This leads us to the second significant aspect of the practice approach: trust 
from a practice perspective embraces the complexity of social life. Stories for example 
become important because of their meaning, their histories, who is telling the story, 
indeed, even where the story is told all become highly relevant in the trust building 
approach. Therefore, we cannot distinguish a story from its context – but rather we 
ought to explain the significance of the story in ways that allow thick description and 
help to understand the ways that a practice such as storytelling might be used to 
advance trust (or in some cases perhaps contribute to a breakdown in trust). 
Therefore, the practice approach allows us to “dig a little deeper” in search of the 
idiosyncrasies that are contributing to the trust-building process. 
The practices that were observed provide an initial starting point to consider 
trust from a practice perspective. There will be other practices that one might identify 
in other studies of trust. However, the three practices observed represent three 
prominent ways that trust was built amongst the group and, broadly represent 
calculative, cognitive and normative aspects of trust that are often referred to in the 
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trust literature (broadly described as calculative, knowledge and identification based 
trust – see Mayer et al., 1995 and Lewicki et al., 2006 for instance).  
Storytelling appeared to be one practice that allowed participants to align their 
values and, in doing so, it appeared that this practice served to build identification-
based types of trust. There are two aspects of this discovery that are of practical use 
to the trust researcher. First, storytelling is something tangible the researcher can 
observe. Often, studies of trust speak in largely hypothetical language about 
identification-based trust. Identification-based trust is diffuse and difficult to identify 
because it exists in the idiosyncrasies of the relationship between the trustee and the 
trustor. Second, storytelling as a practice has a rather lovely social depth to it. We are 
challenged to ask why the storyteller has told a story in such a way and what their 
context is – the very act of identifying the story requires us to engage with the wider 
context. In this sense we all tell each other stories all the time – stories are meaning-
making, they are relational and they are practices that bring together trustee and 
trustor in a spirit of alignment where they can find mutual agreement even if their 
worlds are far apart. In this sense, we might consider storytelling to be a bridging 
practice that brings together trustee and trustor in a mutual alignment of values.  
Curating spaces presents a second practice that allows us to think about trust 
in ways that really are quite new to trust research. Hitherto, trust research has largely 
ignored the role of space in the trust-building process. Space has largely been 
considered a background context – a landscape in which the trust building takes place 
– rather than any kind of significant part of the trust building process. This study has 
identified both the importance of space to the trust building process, but also that the 
individuals and the space interact in ways that matter to the trust building process. 
This is not a new idea to practice theory, but it is a very different way of thinking about 
trust research. The practice of curating space is integral to the trust building process 
but also the space itself curates the ways in which the individual actors behave. 
  The practice of managing and mediating knowledge also presents a new 
dimension to our understanding of trust. In trust research knowledge is something 
concrete that an individual gains about a situation or a potential trustee before they 
commit more fully to a trusting relationship. From this reified perspective, trust is 
something that exists in its own right. However, as we see in the discussion about the 
EU legislation for instance in this study, knowledge in the trust-building process is 
something that is created in the social. It is not something that is the property of or 
about an individual, but something that exists as a part of the process itself. Again, 
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this is not a new idea to practice theory. Studies of knowledge and practice such as 
Brown & Duguid (2001) highlight eruditely the theoretical and practical use of a 
practice-orientated perspective of knowledge. Therefore, the practice of mediating 
and managing knowledge becomes particularly relevant to the trust building process. 
That is to say, not the knowledge per se, but the ways in which the individuals manage 
and mediate knowledge become relevant to our understanding of trust building. 
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Practices of trust-building: The liminal states of organisations and 
individuals   
 
Bachmann et al. (2015) consider organisational trust-building as a process 
that takes place ‘through a series of underlying mechanisms’ positing that we should 
consider the underlying mechanisms of trust our ‘understanding of the interplay 
between repair mechanisms and how these mechanisms can be combined to re-
establish trust’ (Bachmann et al., 2015). The mechanisms present an interesting point 
of departure for scholars to begin thinking about trust-building, but I offer a different 
way to consider how we understand trust-building. This requires a departure from 
levels of analysis, acknowledging the ‘relationality of mutual constitution’ (Schatzki, 
2002: 32) between the individual and the organisation.  
Liminality is the second of three stages van Gennep (1960: 2) describes in a 
rite of passage. ‘Such rites are found in all cultures and can be considered as vehicles 
of transition from one state or status to another. For example, childhood to maturity, 
virginity to marriage, childlessness to parenthood, unemployed to employed’. Turner 
(1969: 95) distinguished the second of these three stages when the actors fall into a 
limbo between two states as an ambiguous state of liminality where they ‘exist betwixt 
and between the positions’. Liminality presents a way of thinking about trust-building 
that acknowledges that individuals and organisations both have the ‘capability or 
power to be the source and originator of acts’ (Ortner, 1989: 681), but where both are 
in a perpetual state of ‘mutual constitution’ never fully acting solely as the individual 
or as the organisation – but existing, and attempting to build trust in a recursive state 
of liminality between the two states.  
In short, conceptualising trust-building in this way is a ‘collage, heteroglossia, 
or even carnivalesque approach’ (Nicolini, 2012: 34), acknowledging actors’ relation 
to specific contexts over time ‘is not fixed or permanent, and can be changed under 
unexpected situations, or over a long historical period’ (Navarro 2006: 16). Using the 
five aspects of trust identified in chapter two, I explore examples of the individual and 
the organisation existing in states of liminality as they attempt to build trust. In doing 
so, I demonstrate that practices of trust are enacted not at a singular level but ‘at once 
underlie subjects and objects, highlighting non-propositional knowledge, and 
illuminate the conditions of intelligibility’ (Schatzi, 2001: 43) and suggest this provides 
an approach that accommodates the mess.  
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Table (12): Aspects of trust and relationships to liminal spaces or status 
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Ability-based trust: navigating the agency of the individual and the 
organisation  
 
Ability-based trust is domain specific (Schoorman, Wood & Bruer, 2015). 
However, the study has shown that the individual and organisation’s ability to build 
trust exists in a permanent state of liminality where individual and organisational 
actors’ abilities are constantly shaped by their environment, their shared histories 
and the uncertain emergent future as they shift to reconstitute one another. To 
consider the banker and the bank, the politician and the TSC, or the regulator and 
the FSA as having ability in a specific domain we must consider ‘a system of 
dispositions of the individual and the organisation that is constantly confronting and 
mediating new encounters’ (Sahakain & Wilhite, 2015, 2015: 25) that shape, and 
recursively reshape the social reality of the individual and the organisation and their 
abilities ad infinitum.  
Making observations of the ability-based trust-building attempts of the 
individuals and the organisation was therefore a highly idiosyncratic process and 
conceptualising trust as ability demonstrated by an individual or organisation in a 
certain domain would have required a constant assessment of each actor at each 
moment of the study. Examples of actors’ abilities demonstrated in specific domains 
were countless. For example, the ability of the banks to operate in the United States 
was reliant on the ability of individuals in the American regulatory affairs 
departments, the ability of the individual regulators to implement regulation was 
instructed by their organisation’s mandate and the parliamentary participants’ 
abilities reliant on the space the TSC afforded them. However, none of these 
examples necessarily showed ability-based trust being built. 
Clearly, the ability to achieve a specific task or deliver an agreement (Mayer 
et al., 1995; Schoorman et al., 2007) is an important aspect of the trust-building 
process if the ‘business of trust’ (Harris, Moriarty & Wicks, 2014: 3) is to be achieved 
at all. If we are to think to the extent to which an organisation or individual can build 
trust through showing ability however, one must still consider ‘the ongoing nature of 
this constitutive relationship between the individual and the organisation’ (Alvesson, 
Ashcraft & Thomas, 2008) – that their abilities are always jointly ‘in the making’ 
(Gambetta, 1988: 42) as the ability of one reasserts the ability of the other; that is, 
we can only accurately record as a series of ongoing ability-based trust 
accomplishments or failures, that may be (re)produced. 
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Ability-based trust therefore cannot be isolated to an individual or 
organisation. Ability-based trust is enacted in a web of ‘endlessly incomprehensible 
significances’ (Wittgenstein, 1969: 87) to which the individual, the organisation and 
the ‘milieus of structural arrangements beyond the scope of the organisation’ 
(Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015: 188) insist that we consider both the organisation and 
the individual in our assessment of attempts to build ability-based trust as ‘beholden 
to the milieus of nonhumans amid which it proceeds, and understanding specific 
practices always involves apprehending material configurations’ (Goodwin, 2013: 9).  
However, the ways that the actors navigate the liminal status between organisation 
and individual serve to help build ability-based trust, if we are to consider the 
individual or organisation neither entirely as one or the other. 
Navigating a liminal state to build ability-based trust. The physical space 
helped the Parliamentary participants to navigate the liminal state between the 
status of individual and organisation. Notably, the visit to Strangers Bar where the 
social environment provided an opportunity to show the banking and regulatory 
participants that their status as individuals with autonomy to act through the casual 
references to their individual achievements as a Member of Parliament aligned with 
the physical space within the organisation where the stories are being shared (the 
terrace on which they sat) which implicitly, through the grandeur and history of the 
space suggested that the organisation had ability to act. The organisation and the 
individual in this example remain discrete but are aligned, reasserting the ability of 
the other providing an opportunity for trust-building based on the abilities presented 
by the individual and the organisation: as the participants sat drinking on the terrace 
bar, they acknowledged implicitly that they were neither the sum of the organisation, 
nor the suggesting that their ability to act relied on the organisation but that they 
should be trusted because of the abilities implied by both statuses.  
 
Knowledge-based trust: collectively knowing in the pursuit of an activity 
 
Knowledge-based trust is well documented in the interpersonal trust-building 
literature. It implies that the individual is attempting to gather information to make an 
informed decision about whether to trust the individual they are engaging with 
(Abrams et al., 2003). In the dyadic organisational trust-building studies, knowledge-
based trust-building is focused on knowledge of the organisations’ structures, its 
functions and its culture (Holste, Scott & Fields, 2010). However, I suggest 
knowledge-based trust-building is not reliant on information gathering about the 
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individual or the organisation but is inherently tied to the ongoing pursuit of an activity 
that is ‘constituted or renovated as actors engage with the organisational world in 
practice’ (Orlikowski, 2002) and therefore that knowledge-based trust is better 
understood when the liminal state or status of the individual and the organisation are 
brought together in the collective pursuit of an activity.   
Considering practices of knowledge-based trust-building in this way requires 
us to consider both knowledge of an organisation and of an individual in ‘a shifted 
self-understanding that invites us to regard agents as carriers of routinized, over-
subjective complexes of bodily movements, of forms of interpreting, knowing how 
and wanting and of the usage of things’ (Reckwitz, 2011: 143) that regards the 
individual and organisational actors in ‘activities or actions that contribute to 
collectively knowing’ (Galaskiewicz, 2016: 33) rather than knowledge gathering. This 
perspective therefore assumes knowledge-based trust exists in an understanding of 
the individual and the organisation in a relationality of mutual knowing.  
Nicolini (2002: 32) speaks of ‘a web of knowledge’ to describe how ‘knowing, 
as an individual achievement, is inseparable from knowing within a community of 
practice’ (Ibid.). To consider knowledge-based trust-building one must consider the 
individual and the organisation together. This collaborative process of knowing, 
where information is gathered about the organisation and the individual 
spasmodically and shared tacitly through ‘actions and deeds beyond the word’ (Villa, 
1992: 308) goes beyond knowledge-gathering and presents a second way that we 
can address the liminal spaces the individual and the organisational actor inhabit 
considering knowledge-based trust as reliant on the status of individuals and 
organisations collectively knowing in the pursuit of an activity suggesting again that 
we can, and indeed should, consider the micro and the macro together.  
This process of collective knowing requires knowing of the individual and the 
organisation. Knowledge-based trust is therefore ‘established based on mutual 
knowledge and common experience’ (Child, 2001: 302) between actors rather than 
gathering of knowledge about actors. Knowing the individual becomes incorporated 
into an assessment of knowing the organisation (McAllister, 1995) and therefore 
implies further we must consider the micro and the macro together in our 
understanding of knowledge based trust since it is not simply a process of 
knowledge gathering, but always a process of collective knowing as an activity that 
takes place in socially constructed environments.  
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Liminal states in the pursuit of an activity. The process of knowledge-based trust 
being enacted through the pursuit of an activity in a process of collective knowing is 
shown in the interactions between the banking participants as they begin to learn 
how to engage with the American regulation. The process of collective knowing 
acknowledges the individual in the process – as they share their fears of being 
‘caught out’ individually by the American legislation as individuals. However, they 
are not simply operating as individuals in their discussions as they attempt to 
establish a basis for knowledge-based trust as they consider how to act in reference 
to the “unknowable” American regulatory environment they have to consider. The 
activity of building knowledge-based trust through collectively knowing relies on their 
organisation regulatory affairs teams and the sharing of information about the ways 
that the teams operate. There is a collective knowing taking place, which allows for 
the opportunity for the organisations to build knowledge-based trust in their 
interactions with the American regulatory system that goes beyond the individual or 
organisational actor and must be understood as a process of collective knowing 
enacted through the pursuit of an activity.   
 
Identification-based trust: spaces of mutual identification 
 
Bachmann et al. (2015) argue that ‘trust is an inherently relational construct, with 
strong social and affective elements’, suggesting that ‘social norms, relative norms 
and the importance of identity’ are important considerations for trust-building (Ibid.:  
34). However, identity and the possibilities for identification-based trust are enacted 
in space and should be understood not as a goal achieved between individual or 
organisational actors as a ‘mechanism’ to be analysed but as a ‘dynamic 
accomplishment’ (Drescher, Korsgaard, Welpe, Picot & Wigand, 2014: 771) 
achieved through the interaction of individuals and organisations in spaces as they 
interact with ‘artefacts and material objects’ (Jarzabkowski, Spee & Smets, 2013) in 
an alignment of values and ideas, where identification-based trust is always in the 
making through the mutual identification of individuals, organisations and the spaces 
they inhabit.  
I therefore suggest that since responsibility is ‘open to interpretation and 
political influence’ (Bachmann et al., 2015) spaces play an important role in 
identification-based trust-building process as space aligns the liminal states that the 
individual and the organisation inhabit. This mutual identification between 
organisation and individual is enacted through space and shaped by the individual 
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orientation of the actors as they enact trust in spaces that develop and shift as 
identification-based trust-building may begin to take place. 
Identification-based trust should therefore be understood as a continual 
process of identification or identity-shaping brought about the repeated and 
continual interactions of individuals in social environments through the dynamic 
‘interplay of words and deeds in space’ (Reichertz, 2015: 317). Identification-based 
trust-building is therefore not a singular construct or series of constructs at the level 
of the organisation or individual as studies of trust-building have attempted to show 
to date, but it is both at once. It is an ongoing process of shaping mutual identities 
that is purposed by the spaces the actors inhabit. This in turn provides opportunities 
to establish a basis for identification-based trust-building, where the present is 
uncertain and the future unpredictable as we have seen in this example of a crisis 
involving multiple stakeholders, but importantly one must observe that spaces of 
mutual identification serve to help us to align the micro and macro 
conceptualisations of identity-based trust in a coherent way.    
However, the role of space to bring together the individual and the 
organisation in mutual identification as they align their liminal states shifts the focus 
toward understanding the meanings, practical, emotional and cultural, of specific 
places and the roles that places play in organisational life and in identification-based 
trust-building. Visual, practical, acoustic, social, cultural influences of a space 
(Brown & Capozza, 2016) therefore serve to weave together the liminal states of the 
organisation and the individual. They are always socially constructed and provide 
emotional and practical value in asserting mutual identification between the 
individual and organisation and allow us to consider identification based trust not as 
an achievement between individuals or organisations but in bringing together the 
status of the individual and the organisation in coherent mutual identity, which allows 
us to consider identification-based trust-building not as a micro or macro concern, 
but rather as the accomplishment of the alignment of organisational and individuals 
manifested in space.  
Identification-based trust: the role of space to bridge liminal states. Stories 
about the City of London and the use of branding campaigns in the physical space 
at Canary Wharf served to bring together the identities of the individual and the 
organisation. The branding campaign was an example of how this worked effectively 
to acknowledge that the organisations’ identity was continually reinforced by the 
identity of the individual. Similarly, we see the individual participants referring to the 
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aspects beyond the financial services that show that their liminal state is informed 
by the physical identity of the organisation as a ‘home’. The use of words, deeds 
and artefacts in a space of mutual identification which bridged the interpersonal and 
the organisational organised the two in such a way so that the banks and banking 
community could build identification-based trust that considered the micro and the 
macro and suggests that considering space allows us to consider levels of analysis 
coherently together.  
 
Control and trust-building: negotiated boundaries informed by liminal 
spaces  
 
In an evolving network of individuals, organisations, spaces and relationships 
Bachmann et al (2015: 13) highlight control as one of the ‘most common and 
ubiquitous strategies’ for building trust and it often takes place through the imposition 
of control mechanisms on relevant actors (Michael, 2006). Whether through internal 
controls (Wiebel, 1993; Wiebel, 2007) or through external regulations placed on 
organisations (Gillespie and Dietz, 2009). Control as a trust-building process at the 
organisational and interpersonal level is therefore considered broadly in terms of 
sanctions to control and regulate the behaviour of the individual or the organisation, 
so that trust can be established. However, these are currently considered to have 
different qualities if control is being enacted within the organisation or whether 
controlling mechanisms are instigated externally on the organisation.   
I argue that in the richness of social life, the complicating and ever-evolving 
process of developing regulations and control mechanisms and the lack of any 
ultimate authority to ensure that punitive action or otherwise is applied, we must 
instead consider trust-building in the present as both an acknowledgement of the 
past actions  but also as a step into an uncertain future – a collective leap of faith 
(Nikolova, Möllering & Reihlen, 2015) that the organisations and individuals must 
take together in order to reconfigure the system in which they are all a part rather 
than simply a singular act of control. There is no distinction between individual or 
organisation in the collective leap of faith and it is a practice of negotiating 
boundaries whether control is external or internal to the organisation.  
Imposition of control in an interorganisational environment is a prevarication 
– the regulators control the banks, the politicians control the regulators, the banks 
control the politicians and the regulators. All attempt to control in different ways and 
all are controlled by the influences of the American and European legislation and 
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ultimately, they are all bound by the need to establish a stable system that they can 
trust. However, the same is true when we consider individual or organisational 
actors. They are active participants in defining boundaries that are acceptable. 
However, defining boundaries of what is acceptable and what is not is as much an 
activity that happens between a husband and wife to agree acceptable 
arrangements for sharing a life together as much as it plays a role in the 
arrangements established between the surfeit of organisations and individuals 
involved in rebuilding trust following the financial crisis. This negotiation of 
boundaries informed by a liminal state takes place at all level of analysis, whether 
micro or macro; control can therefore be considered – regardless of the level of 
analysis - as a process of negotiated boundary setting that is influenced by the way 
that the actors’ liminal statuses are enacted.  
Therefore, the enactment of rule-making and control is not a something 
imposed by a single organisation or individual, nor is it separately a micro or macro 
concern. It is an ongoing process of negotiating boundaries between organisational 
and individual actors, where individuals and organisations exist in liminal states, 
neither fully as the organisation nor fully as an individual. Considering control in this 
way means that control becomes a flexible and negotiated boundary rather than 
simply mechanism that the trusting party imposes on the trustee. Instead boundaries 
define the margins of what is acceptable to the other, whether between a manager 
and an employee or whether between an organisation and an external regulator.  
Control and trust: negotiating boundaries collectively. We see firstly an 
example of this not taking place in the way that the participants from the FSA 
attempted to establish control over the banking participant in the focus groups which 
represents a more typical approach to control. The use of didactic control 
mechanisms (‘we will send out a supervisory statement’) contrasted however with 
the consensus that was agreed between the participants about their orientation to 
the European Commission. The boundaries in this second example were agreed 
and debated. Negotiated boundaries were agreed to provide a collective orientation 
toward the European Commission, where organisations and individuals liminal 
statuses were orientated around a negotiated boundary towards the European 
Commission. This negotiation of boundaries created a state amongst the group that 
allowed the actors to exist both as representatives of their organisations and as 
individuals  
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Calculus-based trust: evolving networks of actors in liminal states  
 
There is very little work on interorganisational calculus-based trust that focuses on 
the role of calculus-based trust and networks. Most of the interorganisational trust-
building literature that refers to calculus-based trust focuses on legal mechanisms 
and formal contracts that are established as the basis for initial trust and tend to 
suggest that calculus-based trust is an early form of trust (Huang & Nicol, 2014) in 
the trust-building process.  
No decision is taken in isolation.  As spaces take on ‘different ontologies and 
play different roles, they connect organisations and individuals to different stabilizing 
mechanisms’ (Lawrence & Dover, 2015: 380) and consequently affect our ability to 
make calculus-based trust decisions about individual or organisational actors in 
isolation and calculus-based trust, either in the early stage of a relationship, or 
located as a level of analysis, does not acknowledge the wider complexities that 
continue to influence our ability to make calculus-based trust assessments as 
individual and organisational actors statuses shift and they evolve and recreate 
themselves in evolving networks that define their statuses.  
I argue that networks of evolving liminal states, where actors exist within a 
network that evolves constantly, shifting the status of the individual or the 
organisation, provides a way of thinking about calculus-based trust that is a 
departure from our current thinking of calculus-based trust as an early stage and 
either a macro or micro trust concern, suggesting instead that actors always exist in 
networks that change their state or status depending on when we choose to 
measure calculus-based trust.   
Halford & Leonard (2006: 663) comment, ‘the multiple nature of contexts 
means that outcomes will not be singular or ﬁxed at either an organizational or 
individual level’. Organisations are ‘constructed through competing and contested 
resources and in internally differentiated across organisational times and spaces’ 
(Ibid. 667) and ‘individuals move through the times and spaces of everyday life, at 
work and beyond’ (ibid.), so the opportunities to make calculus-based assessments 
that are open to actors constantly change. As such, an individuals’ or organisations’ 
ability to establish trust based on calculus-based decision-making shifts as the 
networks that they occupy evolves. This attention to the context of the network in 
the calculus-based trust-building process raises important questions about how we 
might consider the ways in which actors might make decisions even in seemingly 
micro contexts since there will always be a network of actors that to a greater or 
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lesser degree influence the judgement the trustor can make about the trustee in the 
micro. Correspondingly, in a complex system with multiple forms of control and 
controlling dynamics between the individual and organisational actions the notion of 
calculus-based trust must consider the constantly evolving networks that influence 
the status or state of the trustee.    
Calculus-based trust: evolving networks of actors in liminal states. The study 
showed that calculus based trust, unless confined to laboratory conditions was not 
replicable. The concept of calculus based trust as an early form of trust interpolated 
between an estimate of future expectations and the realm of unpredictability could 
be considered. A trustor cannot make a calculative assessment of the actions of an 
actor if they are able to operate within a network of evolving states, therefore after a 
first judgement the trustee exists in a liminal state. Calculus-based trust defined 
beyond the scope of the individual or organisational dyadic relationship sets the trust 
decision in the context of the wider environment and considering this network is 
important to finding a coherent understanding of the interpersonal and the 
organisational conceptualisations of trust. In recognising that often the individual will 
take on different liminal states, one can begin to consider that calculus-based 
judgements of their actions must be taken in consideration of the network they exist 
within. Take for example the interactions between the banking participant and the 
regulatory participants: the regulators decisions to trust – clearly based on calculus-
based trust assessments were informed by the networks they existed within.   
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Conclusion: liminal states aligning individual and organisational actors  
   
If we are therefore to consider that actors are both representatives of their 
organisations and private individuals at the same time – the conceptualisation of 
levels of trust, which to date has been the focus of so much interest in the trust 
research community suggests our thinking about the nature of trust and trust building 
needs to be considered not a question of levels of analysis but of trust-building 
practices. This will allow us to acknowledge the richness and complexity of social 
life and address the challenge of reconciling macro and micro conceptualisations of 
trust.  
The individual and the organisation are therefore linked through ‘concerted 
scenes of action’ (Nicolini, 2009: 764) that take place through the stories that 
individuals and organisations tell and the dynamic interplay of the spaces in which 
the interactions take place, representing organisations and individuals, which ‘serve 
as a sequence of external events in which symbolic structures are manifested’ 
(Watson, 2017: 38). 
The actions of the banks and the perceived trustworthiness of the bankers 
are linked through a sequence of events – of course, just as the actions of a business 
school and a scholar working for a business school are entwined, or the leader of a 
political party and the party itself are entwined. To consider them separately is to 
‘underplay the embeddedness of the actor in empirical social and cultural analysis’ 
(Pike, Lagendijk, & Vale, 2000) and their ability to exist in a liminal state. They are 
at once idiosyncratic and are the product of a series of ‘things, minds, knowledge, 
structures and language’ that make up the realities of the actors in an 
interorganisational environment, co-creating one another through an ongoing 
process that is not fixed in time (Boje, 1992), but curated in space and defined by 
the management and mediation of knowledge flows. 
Thinking about trust-building in terms of the liminal statuses that actors either 
chose or are imposed on them presents an opportunity to capture some of the 
complexities of the processes beyond levels of analysis or underlying mechanisms 
and allows us to consider micro and macro conceptualisations of trust in new ways. 
This view of trust building suggests that the interpersonal and the organisational are 
both discrete and the same in this ‘process of continual enactment’ (García & Leiva, 
2014) – they refer to one another and cannot be fully appreciated unless we consider 
the individual and the organisation in concert and acknowledge the liminal states 
that actors can exist in. One might trust an individual, but not trust the organisation 
they represent, or vice versa but the practices that underlie the decisions provide 
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the basis for trust-building in the organisation and the individual are spun together 
in ‘webs of significance’ (Geertz 1973: 81) that impact the trust-building process as 
actors move through a state of liminality as representatives of their organisations 
and as individuals. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL 
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE AREAS FOR RESEARCH 
 
A better understanding of how interorganisational trust through our understanding 
of trust as the practices of storytelling, curating space and mediating knowledge 
flows changes our understanding about the significance of the physical aspects of 
interorganisational trust-building and begins to allow the researcher to consider the 
different aspects of trust described in chapter two in new ways that go beyond the 
mechanism or construct and consider the complexities of social life.   
 The discussion of liminal states also presents the individual and organisational 
actor as coming together as one, but still being in the process of doing so. This has 
significant practical implications for how we consider the role of leaders in large 
organisations and how we understand how employees are shaped by their 
organisation. 
 This chapter will briefly first discuss three implications of the practice approach 
to trust research that has been described in this thesis. Second, I will discuss three 
practical implications from the findings of the study and finally, third I will comment 
on some of the more surprising aspect of the findings. The chapter will conclude by 
outlining four areas for future research that would help us to develop a trust-as-
practice approach.  
Implications of the practice approach for trust research  
 
The practice approach to trust research outlined in this thesis provides us with an 
approach that presents a departure from science like laws and foregrounds the 
ordinary (both in terms of the social and the material) as having explanatory power. 
One consequence for trust research is that the ‘unspoken background of 
everyday life becomes highly relevant to any study of trust research. Therefore, the 
challenge we face as trust researchers is that we must take into account and 
consider the ordinary differences which may constitute the difference between a 
trusting relationship and a relationship devoid of trust.  
However, by doggedly embracing the task of studying the ordinary, a practice 
theory approach to trust provides an account that maintains coherence across levels 
of analysis. This is central to the usefulness of our practice approach to trust 
research since it addresses the challenge of levels of analysis described in chapter 
two. As discussed in chapter two, the orthodox language of trust research divides 
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phenomena up into levels. Over the past twenty years or so trust research has been 
entrenched between theories of interpersonal (Lewicki et al., 2006), organisation-
level (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995) and institutional trust 
(Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011). Consequently, rejecting the idea that trust comes 
neatly packaged at levels of analysis and choosing to focus on the ordinary (or 
perhaps not so ordinary) practices of individuals, practice theory helps us to begin 
to consider the individual and the collective together. For trust scholars, this is an 
important reorientation of thinking about trust, since levels of analysis have typically 
been considered as discrete in the organisation and management literature and its 
conjugates (for example, see Fulmer & Gelfrand, 2012; Bachmann et al., 2015) 
A practice theory approach to trust therefore causes us to rethink our study 
of trust, without focusing on the level of analysis and ‘this in turn requires us to 
reconceptualize the idea of levels’ (Nicolini, 2012: 18). Therefore, we turn instead to 
practices such as storytelling, curating space and managing knowledge to explore 
how trust building is constructed in the social across multiple levels. 
  Second, there is a significant methodological shift required if we are to 
embrace a practice perspective when we undertake trust research. In the messiness 
of defining trust where there are multiple organisations and for the researcher, an 
unquantifiable number of interactions between organisational actors, we are 
presented with a research challenge that the current research methods used by trust 
scholars are ill-equipped to address (See Bachmann & Zaheer, 2006).     
  The key contribution of this thesis to organization studies therefore lies in its 
critique of the significance of the socio-material nature of trust, neither taking for 
granted apparently inconsequential activities such as, say storytelling, curating of 
space or managing flows of knowledge, whilst rejecting any particular emphasis on 
the actor or the structure. In this sense, my conclusions are broadly aligned with 
ANT. The “actor-network” is an appealing way to address some of the 
methodological and ontological problems set out in the trust literature.   
  This thesis ultimately however stops short of prescribing to anything quite as 
radical as a Latourian view, where one sets out to ‘follow the actors’ because my 
approach does not simply follow the actor – for trust research we need to somehow 
cling on to ways in which we can explore the full range of human characteristics, 
since ‘trust is inherently between people’ (Sztompka, 1999: 22) and we are able to 
negotiate levels of analysis by following trust as an activity rather than as a reified 
concept.  
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 In my view ANT lacks the conceptual tools to understand how systems of trust 
are negotiated in the social. Trust is relational and relies on associations put in place 
over time and is always a turn towards relationships. This social view affirms the 
implications for our understanding of levels of analysis that I have described – as 
with ANT, trust is not vested at a certain level and we do not have to think about 
trust somehow existing at a level. Instead, we see trust as the social accomplishment 
of relationships. In this sense, rather than following the actor we are following the 
social practice of trust building – studying those things relevant to the practice of 
trust building in order to gain a holistic view of trust that does not sit neatly in one 
level – be it the interpersonal, the organisational or the interorganisational.  
  A practice theory approach to trust therefore presents a rather novel way to 
address the challenge of levels of analysis, which is different to much of the work in 
management and organisation studies that has been undertaken to date. Second, 
my approach also suggests that trust research might would benefit from further 
ethnographic and ethnographically inspired methods and finally, a practice 
perspective on trust, asks fundamental questions of theories such as ANT, and 
attempts to find a footing which acknowledges the fundamental importance of the 
material and social aspects of trust-building without reducing the researchers’ ability 
to authentically describe the human domain of trusting.  
 
Practical implications for interorganisational trust-building  
 
There are three things that could be applied practically to the sector. They 
will be addressed in the first part of this chapter: (1) Addressing the relationship 
between the leaders and their organisations (2) Assembling a space for leaders to 
share stories and (3) reframing the role of the regulator as a mediator of boundaries. 
These three propositions present an opportunity to recalibrate how we think about 
the stakeholders leading large financial organisations that could offer a more 
sustainable environment when the UK faces a future financial crisis in the future.  
1. Addressing the relationship between the leaders and organisations  
 
We have established that individual and organisational actors play a role in 
the trust-building practices that contribute to interorganisational trust. This has 
implications for our understanding of leaders as co-creators of trust in their 
organisations and as organisational information carriers.  
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There is currently a huge amount of public scrutiny on the leadership of the 
banks and removing those in leadership positions when something goes wrong in 
their organisations rather than understanding what has accumulated within the 
interorganisational environment. This has resulted in certain sector-wide behaviours 
that have been allowed to take place, which means we can lose a good leader for 
bad reasons. The American regulation is an excellent example of the challenges 
that the banking participants faced as individual leaders.  
It appeared from the discussions observed in the study that firstly culture 
was an extremely difficult issue to manage in the global environments that the 
organisations operated within and secondly that there had developed a culture of 
blame where, as one of the participants put it in chapter five, ‘we seem to lose good 
CEOs on an incredibly regular basis’. This is not healthy for the sector because it 
does not let leaders learn effectively from their mistakes and discourages a culture 
of collective knowledgeability. Leaders are in the process of becoming and being a 
leader – they will make mistakes and what we have learnt from the study is that 
trust-building is a fluid process that takes time and that the leader is neither fully the 
organisation nor fully an individual actor and that there are many more parts in play 
that influence whether trust remains in the leader. Leaders can merely attempt to 
navigate the liminal states they exist in to make best use of their statuses as 
becoming individuals and as becoming the organisational actor.  
This observation is not made in “defence of the culture of banker bashing”, 
but because organisations need to give individuals sufficient time to practice trust-
building behaviours with their colleagues from other stakeholder groups and it needs 
to be acknowledged that in this process leaders will make mistakes, but often, the 
mistake is embedded in a much wider social nexus. Importantly, for the same 
mistakes to be avoided and trust to be sustainable in the interorganisational system, 
it is vital for a culture of collective knowing to be practiced amongst leaders.  
Lord Brown, Former CEO of British Petroleum, once commented that the 
key to being a good CEO was not making a singularly bad decision rather than 
consistently making good decisions. According to a study by A-CE Online Analysis, 
2009 saw ‘277 CEOs in the financial services sector step down from their positions’. 
With such a large churn in the leadership of these organisations it is unlikely that 
interorganisational trust will develop effectively between the stakeholder groups 
studied if we consider the insight that trust is developed through practices such as 
collective knowing, and that the individual is trusted because their role as both an 
individual and an organisational actor. As we have seen from the study, the 
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individuals themselves should not be targeted singularly as the problem and 
removing them and replacing them with other individuals impedes attempts to build 
trust through the trust-building practices suggested in this thesis and just begins the 
cycle again. 
The current CEO circuit that sees CEOs move regularly from one sector to 
another for short periods makes it difficult for any collective knowing to develop in 
meaningful ways. Therefore, we need to see leaders across Government, regulatory 
bodies and the banks themselves remain in posts for longer periods to practice 
collective knowing and learn how to mediate and manage information flows more 
effectively to build trust. Given that trust had been rooted in systemic financial 
architecture prior to the 2008 crash there a good deal of cultural change that would 
need to take place to come to a point where there was sufficient trust in the leaders 
of strategically important organisations to allow them to develop management of 
knowledge flows as organisational knowledge carriers.  
 
2. Assembling a space for leaders to share stories  
 
Storytelling is shown to be an effective way for leaders to make sense of the 
interorganisational environment and provides opportunities for actors to establish 
trust in the Interorganisational system. The City of London did to an extent provide 
an effective a collective story that allowed the participants to place trust in the 
interorganisational system.  
The challenge however was that there did not appear to exist a space that 
allowed the participants to develop their collective identity as the City of London. 
Instead stories were told that were untrue to prop up the benevolence of the City of 
London. Collectively curating a home in the City of London brought about trust in 
the City of London, but this was intangible and relied heavily on the use of the 
physical space at Canary Wharf. It appeared that there needed to be a more tangible 
space for stories to be shared in order for identities to be established and 
possibilities for interorganisational trust-building to take place. The importance of 
collectively establishing trust in an idea of the City of London is an important way 
that participants could establish ongoing trust in the financial services. There are 
three reasons that this is important from a practical point of view.   
First, London has acquired a cluster of strategically important financial 
institutions, which had brought with them ancillary and second tier services that 
together presented the City of London as a brand.  London, it had become ‘a centre 
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for finance, food, fashion and film. The financial services sector success is the root 
of the City of London’s brand success, but as a result of the financial services 
sector’s success and the ensuing infrastructure and wealth it brought with it, 
industries such as food, fashion and film have flourished making the financial 
services sector in the City of London a brand beyond the scope simply of the 
financial services spheres making its attraction something beyond simply the sphere 
of the financial services sector.  
Second, Greenwich meantime had always provided an advantage that 
London had over its competitors, which participants did not articulate. London-based 
firms can trade with markets both in the East and the West simultaneously with 
comparative ease. All things being equal, to headquarter where the sun is rising and 
falling simultaneously in the East and the West of the globe is cost effective and 
collectively acknowledging this identity would further strengthen the idea of the City 
of London as benevolent and as a home.  
Third, London is a gateway into Europe.  It was noted by one of the 
participants from one of the banks in the study that London was the gateway into 
Europe for Middle Eastern investors as they tended to see it as a ‘safe international 
city which make it an attractive place to do business’. As has been discussed in 
previous chapters this is also because of British Law and the second-tier services 
available to international clients to do business in an environment that is competitive 
and safe. Again, precisely how the organisations that played a role in managing this 
could collectively agree its role was intangible as there was no space to discuss it.   
These factors showed that the City of London is a reliable, profitable place 
to do business but did not necessarily help the participants to understand the 
benevolence they appear to have ascribed to it. What was observed in this study 
throughout the threads of the discussion was the participants’ beliefs that the City 
of London was a structure that had a benevolent influence. There was a senior group 
of individuals who all believed the City of London to be benevolent and a good place 
to do business but were not clear where the benevolence was coming from or what 
precisely it was founded on.  
The participants saw the positive factors that made London an attractive and 
safe place to do business and they believed in the brand of the City of London, but 
there simply was not the space or opportunity to talk more openly about how to 
steward this interorganisational concept. This meant that individual participants 
were not able to explore with others what London’s role meant to their organisations, 
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what was meant by the benevolence of the City of London when others described 
it, or how they functioned and engaged with this structure that they believed 
facilitated business a unique way – there was no space that existed for this group 
that consistently allowed the types of conversations between three groups of senior 
stakeholders that were observed in this project to share their stories about what the 
City of London could be and how they should steward it in the present.  
Therefore, despite a myriad of organisations that provided lobbying and 
networking opportunities for the financial services sector12, there was no network 
focused on helping the group ascertain what precisely it was that made them 
collectively convinced that the City of London was a benevolent structure and 
importantly, how to foster the role it played using space and stories to build identity 
and to build trust. 
The current thinking of network-orientated organisations that support the 
work of the financial services sector in London is currently focused on building the 
brand of the City of London and attaining further critical mass for the City rather 
concentrating on building identity between the individuals through storytelling or 
curating space for trust-building amongst key stakeholders. If a network-orientated 
organisation provided a mediated space where stories could be told to build 
identities, new ways of managing and mediating knowledge could be established 
and it may potentially provide an environment where, in time, interorganisational 
trust could be built in the City of London and allow senior leaders to address in more 
detail some of the continuing challenges they face in establishing trust between 
themselves and in the interorganisational system.  
As the study progressed, the focus groups appeared to be an environment 
where the participants could effectively engage in the trust-building practices 
described in this thesis. The focus groups began, to a very small extent, to provide 
the facility that such a network-orientated organisation might provide and therefore 
using what we have learnt from this environment one could begin to consider what 
qualities a more permanent type of network-orientated organisation focused on 
helping the participants better collectively develop their understanding of the City of 
                                                 
12 It should be noted that there are currently three established organisations that do notably good work in 
support of the financial services sector: The CITY UK, The British Bankers Association (BBA) and the City of 
London Corporation. However, none of the organisations address the current need that was observed in the 
study for a mutual space to share stories and collective knowing. These organisations should be supported in 
the excellent work that they do, the issue is that we need a network-enabling organisation for the financial 
services firms, regulators and those involved in policy making that allows them to come together in a mutual 
environment where they can begin to develop collective knowing and collective identities.  
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London’s role but also how they could begin to address wider concerns about the 
interorganisational environment.  
There is an urgent need for such a space that includes not just the banking 
community, but provides a place of mutual meeting for stakeholders from all three 
groups. Currently, conversations between regulators, policy-makers and bankers 
tend to be adversarial. Banking is no longer simply a domestic service industry; the 
globalisation of the sector needs a collective identity across all three stakeholder 
groups about the structures that exist within in the UK and their relationship to the 
global environment. There are three of the ten largest banks in the world located 
within three miles of one another in London. Other countries would go far further 
than simply “levelling the playing field”, therefore consideration of a network-
orientated organisation that fostered trust-building practices between leaders across 
stakeholder groups would be of great use to the sector and go some way to the 
ongoing process of interorganisational trust-building and preserving the long-term 
interests of the sector.  
 
3. Reframing the role of the regulator as a mediator of boundaries  
 
The study showed that the UK domestic regulator does not have sufficient 
explicit or tacit power to act in the strategic interests of the UK’s financial services 
sector and that the FSA was considered by the banking community to be an 
organisation that policed the individual actions of organisations rather than 
moderated the wider environment in a way that enabled the sector to be both 
sustainable and competitive. The globalised environment that the banks operated 
within meant that the domestic regulator was viewed primarily as a hindrance by the 
UK banks, stopping them from doing their business effectively. This attitude of the 
banking participants towards the regulator firstly made the regulator weak and 
secondly meant that the regulators were viewed in an adversarial way by the 
banking participants rather than as enablers of business and created a barrier to 
trust-building.  
The attitudes of the bankers towards the British regulator was evident 
particularly in the discussions about macroprudential risk in chapter six and the 
interactions in the focus groups between the regulatory and banking participants in 
chapter five. The global market had been described as the governing force over 
organisations and individuals. There is currently a lack of consideration that the 
individual participants gave to the role of the regulator in mediating boundaries 
collectively with those working in the banking sector. Rather than controlling the 
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actions, one might consider the regulator as a mediator who helps to bring about 
collective knowing about macroprudential risk through discussion with those doing 
the business of banking. The globalisation of the banks and dislocation of the 
regulatory controls that govern them had left the regulator ill-equipped to deal with 
the macroprudential risks to the UK financial services sector posed by the modern 
globalised banking system.  
This was firstly compounded by a lack of clarity over precisely what powers 
that the British regulator had. The matter of perceived weakness and behaviours of 
the FSA during the study was the result of the external circumstances that the 
regulator found itself in. The transition of the regulator into two twin peaks of 
regulation (The FCA and the PRA) as recommended by the ICB report was the 
acute factor that added to the banking participants’ confusion as to the regulator’s 
role during the period of the study. However, the chronic factor and the root of the 
lack of clarity was the confusion as to where responsibly lay between the British and 
European regulatory bodies and their responsibility for macroprudential regulation 
of the British financial system. The lack of effective networks between domestic and 
European regulators made it difficult for the banks to understand how in practice 
macro-prudential regulation of the UK’s financial services sector functioned in a 
wider European regulatory environment.  Since the ESRB was set up two years prior 
to the ICB’s report and it was expected by European authorities to fulfil a similar 
European role as the ICB’s proposed PRA in the UK there was confusion amongst 
the banking participants about what the proposed PRA would do in practice. The 
ESRB was already doing the work the proposed PRA would be mandated to do at 
a European level, which is why participants viewed the regulatory structure as being 
‘fragmented between Westminster and Brussels’ and that the FSA lacked the ability 
to do its job of establishing trust in the macro-regulatory environment. This lack of 
clarity over where the power lay between the proposed PRA and the ESRB 
effectively demonstrated to the banking participants that trusting the ability of the 
FSA, or any organisation set up in its stead, was not warranted.   
As a result of this lack of clarity, the British regulator was viewed therefore 
as a bureaucratic body that lacked the ability to support the banks in their role. This 
lack of ability was compounded by the way the regulator behaved and the trusting 
practices it focused on – The regulator was viewed and viewed itself as the 
“policeman” of the financial services sector and therefore behaved as such with 
approaches that aimed to police the behaviours of the banking participants through 
legalistic approaches to their interactions.  
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Of course, this is necessary, but providing the regulator the latitude to move 
beyond simply focusing on calculus-based interactions with those in the sector and 
encouraging the regulator to establish ways to manage and mediate knowledge 
flows as well as telling their own stories might well alleviate the lack of clarity over 
where power lay and through the a process of identification and collective 
knowledgeability would position the British regulator beyond the role of “policeman” 
and towards a “mediator of boundaries”. This would in practice also require handing 
more explicit power to the regulator to take political decisions and would mean 
shifting the emphasis of the regulator’s role as an organisation that performed purely 
a bureaucratic function to more of an adhocracy, where sufficient latitude and 
powers could be given to the regulator to take strategic decisions in the best 
interests of the banks and the UK economy as and when it would be needed.  
However, in the discussions the general notion of handing more control to 
the regulator and destabilising the bureaucratic functionality that the regulator had 
been a contentious one and remains so in the public debate, largely because of the 
financial misconduct surrounding the 2008 crisis. However, from the observations 
made in this study it appears that this might be an important ‘leap of faith’ (Möllering, 
2001) that policy makers might need to make to ensure there is more trust in the 
interorganisational banking system. Sufficiently empowering the regulator to take 
macroprudential decisions as an adhocracy, rather than a bureaucracy to address 
uncertainties brought about by other regulatory environments (Such as the 
American context observed in chapter five) would align the regulator with the needs 
of the banks more effectively – the ‘trench warfare’ described  by the bankers in 
chapter six could be avoided if the regulator was seen as a mediator that ensured 
‘checks and balances’ and supported the financial sector rather than primarily 
focused on financial misconduct. After all, the success of London as a financial 
centre historically was largely due to the enabling function that the SIB provided.  
 Giving more power to the regulator to control the macro environmental 
environment and allowing the regulator to play a more active role in shaping and 
promoting the benevolence of the external environment would change the 
relationship between the regulators and the banking community. The regulator 
would likely be viewed as an enabler of business rather than simply a policing 
mechanism for financial misconduct. It would also likely encourage dialogue 
between the regulator and the banking participants about getting the best for the 
sector in the long term. 
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The ICB’s recommendations to split regulations into two twin peak functions 
go some way to addressing this challenge, but there needs to be more than simply 
separation between these two functions – the PRA will need to take a more 
judgement-based role in the overall strategic direction of the sector – perhaps 
allowing more power to organisations such as the BoE to directly challenge the 
Treasury on policy decisions for example. With the right leadership and collective 
knowledgeability this would allow the PRA to also work more effectively alongside 
colleagues in Government as equals and find a balance from the mistakes of the 
past and the needs of preserving he City of London’s pre-eminence in the future. 
 
Surprising discoveries of the study  
 
There were some aspects of the project that were particularly surprising, 
which I will list briefly here. First, the ways in which the participants interacted with 
me as a researcher was surprising. Despite knowledge of the three groups of 
stakeholders prior to the project, it was not until I began to actively study their 
interactions that I began to realise how “everyday” their interactions were. Many of 
the interactions – including the trust-building practices I have identified here – were 
seemingly mundane. This was surprising because of the significance of many of the 
decisions that were being taken or the views that were being shaped and shared. It 
was not until I began working on the project that I noticed how frequently the 
participants relied on everyday – and recognisable - aspects of social life such as 
storytelling to engage with colleagues. Now, having completed the project, I see 
colleagues in many other aspects of life beyond the sphere of the financial services 
use tactics such as storytelling as strategies for trust building. However, in the 
context in which I undertook the project it was surprising to see that such discussions 
– and attempts between the participants to build trust between their organisations – 
were reliant on such everyday practices such as storytelling. 
Second, I found the openness the participants had with regard to talking 
about the situations extremely surprising. Having heard stories from colleagues 
about the difficulty of gaining access and more specifically, when one was granted 
access, I heard stories about researchers only presented with the “party line”. This 
was not my experience and I expect this was in part because of my own role in the 
organisation (And I would make the case for more Ph.D. research taking place whilst 
the researcher is working within an organisation because of the experience I had in 
this respect). However, there was perhaps a little more to the situation. As the 
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project developed I came to realise that much of my own view of those operating in 
the strategic interests of the financial services sector had been shaped by second 
hand accounts that presented those who were in leadership roles as secretive – 
operating behind closed doors and somehow in cahoots with one another. My 
experience was that the individuals I engaged with were, in the most part seemingly 
quite normal individuals and rather open to discussions. Clearly this is simply my 
individual view as a researcher, but after almost two years researching and nearly 
seven years working alongside these individuals, I found them to be open to 
constructive questions and this led me to see another side to those operating in and 
alongside the sector, which contrasted rather starkly to the description that one 
might more likely see in the tabloid news.  
Third, I was particularly surprised that there was such hermogeny in many 
of the views given by participants – particularly with regard to the European 
regulations and American legislation. Clearly, there were differences of opinions, 
but the general trends of opinion were rather similar. I was particularly surprised that 
there was not more conflict between the politicians and the banking participants, 
which I had expected to be much more akin to the relationship between the 
regulators and the banking participants. Furthermore, I began to hear stock phrases 
– for example, the comment about London being a home for ‘finance, food, fashion 
and film’was something I heard repeated by different participants as the study 
progressed. This was an interesting discovery and I wonder that there might be 
further mileage in exploring how these phrases gained cadence amongst the 
participants, but failed to find a way to effectively examine this.  
Forth, I found the focus on the City of London rather surprising. This made 
sense to me on one level for the reasons outlined in chapter six, but the lack of 
acknowledgement of the importance of the City of London amongst the participants 
from the regulatory and parliamentary stakeholder groups was particularly surprising 
since this meant that it was – as I touched on earlier – something specific to the 
banking participants. Given the public position of the politicians (and of course the 
public interest of the success of the City of London) I found it surprising that this was 
not something that more of the participants from the regulatory and parliamentary 
participants discussed. Given further opportunity, I would have been interested to 
learn if this was simply because they believed other topics to be more important to 
discuss in the time we had, or if it was something they either did not recognise, or 
that they did not wish to discuss. 
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Limitations of the thesis 
 
  As with all research, this thesis has limitations and there are plenty of things 
it does not cover or explain. I will briefly outline those that I have come to think most 
significant. First, is the challenge of gathering reliable information, which is 
discussed briefly in chapter four. There is no reliable way to guarantee the 
responses given by the participants are accurate. Second, and related to the first, is 
that the data relied on a good deal of interpretation by me as the researcher. This 
meant that there was likely to be some degree of researcher bias that, like all 
ethnographies, must be considered as we weigh up the data that is presented. Third 
was the limitations of time, which meant that wider contexts such as the media or 
public opinion could not be considered. Given the research was a pursuit of holistic 
interpretations, the omission of information from these wider contexts is a potential 
source of weakness of the data. However, one might wonder where we would stop 
in the pursuit of holistic interpretations and therefore the project captured as much 
detail as efficiently as possible in order to attempt to explore holistic interpretations. 
Forth, the length of the study presented a challenge. Although providing an 
opportunity to reflect in more detail, gathering data in two tranches made the data 
analysis challenging. Understanding how best to interpret data from individuals 
potentially up to eighteen months apart during a period when there were further 
developments that were likely to have influenced the responses from the 
participants was a limitation to the research design, but one that I believed was 
offset by the advantage of returning to the field with a greater level of insight into the 
situations of the participants I was observing. 
 
Future areas for research 
 
There are four areas that one might consider for future research. First, we 
need to better understand the liminal states that actors play and find better ways to 
use this insight in bringing together micro and macro conceptualisations of trust. In 
particular, how over time liminal states might change and what influences an actors’ 
ability to exist in a liminal state as they interact with other actors over time. Second, 
there needs to be more research on practices that might serve to build trust. Here 
we have identified three, but given the complexity of the concept of trust there are 
likely to be many more practices we can identify as we shift our understanding of 
trust-building to a practice approach rather than based simply on reified concepts. 
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Third, there needs to be further work undertaken on how the concepts identified in 
chapter two interact with one another and can be used to explore trust at multiple 
levels coherently. This study has shown that the constructs are all relevant, but 
future research might begin to explore in more detail how they interact and relate as 
we consider actors in liminal states and trust-building in terms of practice. Finally, 
there needs to be more empirical work undertaken on interorganisational trust-
building. If we are to consider trust-building from a practice perspective it is vital we 
build up a more coherent picture of how trust-building takes place through further 
empirical studies beyond the scope of the financial services sector. I will briefly 
discuss each an outline some potential avenues for future research.  
  Liminal states. Perhaps one of the most interesting findings in the study 
was the liminal states that the individuals occupied - where they were able to act 
both as individuals and as agents of their organisation. There are similarities 
between this perspective and Sztompka’s theory of trust transference, insofar as the 
trust can be transmitted between individuals and organisations and vice versa. What 
is of particular interest here is that the individuals in this study did not necessarily fit 
into a homogeneous group. On the one hand there were actors that purposefully 
and – on quite deftly – shifted from the individual to the organisational role (and vice 
versa) in order to best handle a situation. On the other hand, some actors appeared 
more constrained by their organisational orientation. A better understanding of what 
it is specifically that either allows and/or provides individual actors with an 
awareness of the potentiality of using liminal states to facilitate trust building would 
be extremely useful as we continue to consider how we conceptualise trust across 
levels.  
  Exploring the practice approach. Second, a better understanding of the 
practices – and potentially identifying more practices that contribute to trust building 
– will help us as researchers to better identify a nexus of practices that relate to and 
inform trust-building. The purpose should not be to develop any grand theory or 
framework of practices here, but rather to recognise in the complexity that the milieu 
of social life presents, and that there will be numerous practices, often overlapping, 
interacting and contributing to trust building. In this sense, we can learn from the 
trajectory that strategy-as-practice has taken. The goal (Initially at least) of trust-as-
practice research should be that of synthesis and assimilation of a critical mass of 
studies before we commit too quickly to any narrowing of our thinking. However, at 
this stage I offer one observation that has arisen in my study of trust research and 
practice theory more broadly: that is that as trust researchers we should not too 
readily divorce our thinking from the considerable resource of trust process 
176 
 
research. There are many valuable insights that we should not lose sight of in our 
exploration of this new practice perspective on trust. There may very well - indeed, 
most likely - be substantial overlap between trust process and trust practice 
research. This is something where we might well learn from the development of 
strategy as practice as a perspective distinct from strategy process research (see 
Whittington, 2006 for example).   
  Understanding aspects of trust. Further research also needs to be 
undertaken on the aspects of trust outlined in chapter two. Pertinent questions that 
still remain include, importantly, that we as a trust research community gain a better 
understanding of the relationship of the different aspects of trust, given the practice 
perspective I discuss. Lewicki et al. (2006) have undertaken important work from a 
process perspective to understand the relationship between calculative, knowledge 
and identification-based trust. However, work still needs to be undertaken to 
understand how these (and other aspects of trust outlined in the chapter) relate from 
a practice perspective. Furthermore, it seems timely for another review of the 
literature, building on Lewicki et al. (2006), Fulmer and Gelfrand, (2012) and 
Bachmann et al., (2015) to give further thought to how the current themes in trust 
research might develop.  
  Trust research methods. Forth, building on the excellent work of The 
Handbook of Research Methods on Trust by Lyon, Möllering and Saunders, (2015), 
I suggest that future research into a practice perspective would usefully explore in 
further detail what the practice perspective might mean for trust research methods. 
Key to this agenda would be a deeper consideration of the role of the researcher in 
trust research. There also appears here to be an opportunity to explore ethnographic 
approaches to trust research – currently, there is very little empirical research that 
focuses on ethnography as an approach to studying trust. Given the socially 
embedded, conceptually complex, subjective nature of the trust, trust research 
might do well to use methods such as ethnography that allow thick description and 
that allow the researcher to engage with trust as a cultural and social phenomenon 
in a reflexive, holistic way.    
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Conclusion 
 
This study of interorganisational trust has shown that a practice approach to 
trust-building allows us to better understand trust building in a way that goes beyond 
the interpersonal or organisational level, but is enacted as individual and 
organisational actors share stories, manage and mediate knowledge flows and 
curate space. Actors in liminal states can better navigate the agency of individual 
and organisation. They can become organisational knowledge carriers or individuals 
separate from their organisation as the trust-building process develops. Individual 
and organisational actors are shaped by their space both by in the present and its 
representations of the past, and possible futures. Spaces surrounding the actor shift, 
at times controlling; or providing identity as actors engage in social life to build trust, 
reliant on ever-evolving networks of other organisational and individual actors, 
negotiating boundaries and identifying ways to make sense of how, when and whom 
to trust.  
We therefore have a new way to think about trust that does not concede to 
levels of analysis or constructs, nor does it disregard them. Indeed, the aspects of 
trust referred to in chapter two are important ways to consider trust-building as 
practice. Where we once might have seen trust as an actors’ ability in a specific 
domain for example, we now can think more broadly of how ability becomes a part 
of our understanding of the routines and practices that contribute to trust-building.  
Thinking about interorganisational trust in this way – and specifically about 
the financial crisis, does two things. First, it does not try to codify or search for 
concepts that explains how trust was (and is continuing to be built) and 
acknowledges the messiness and complexity of the interorganisational interactions 
that took place. However, it also offers us an opportunity to consider the human 
aspect of the individuals addressing the crisis as they exist both representing 
organisations that are in the process of trust building but also making sense of and 
trying to understand themselves as individuals how to trust. 
We see therefore, in a curious way, that considering the problem of trust-building 
as one confined to levels or to specific constructs does not help us understand the 
processes of trust-building in a case such the 2008 financial crisis – instead trust-
building becomes an ongoing series of practical accomplishments that over time 
bring about routines and ways of thinking that provide the milieu for actors’ ongoing 
trust-building attempts in the interorganisational environment.   
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Appendix III: first order coding 
 
    
FIRST ORDER CODES MEMO LINK SOURCES REFERENCES 
Trustee showing good 
judgement*  13 20 
Referring to contracts*  21 49 
Creating or referring to rules*   15 51 
Consideration of the future of the 
financial services  12 28 
Trustee or trustor depending on 
someone or something*   11 29 
Trustee showing predictable 
behaviour*  19 53 
Participants showing or 
acknowledging competence   33 47 
Routines being established  15 34 
Informal interactions and 
unplanned activities  10 15 
Nonverbal communication  16 33 
trying to control behaviour*  18 31 
Blaming others for the crisis   4 7 
References to regulation*  18 32 
European Legislation   22 28 
British legislation  14 44 
Remuneration   4 6 
Banking  27 62 
Competence or values*  20 33 
Loyalty to the organisation   3 5 
Acknowledgement of failures*  19 26 
Basing opinions on data  2 4 
Referring to other organisations 
or individuals   20 43 
Showing fairness to others*   3 3 
Appearing to be reliable*   12 18 
Showing goodwill towards other*  10 35 
Friendly behaviour*   33 45 
Working across the sector   12 37 
Personal ethics and showing 
Accountability   14 25 
References to previous TSC 
meetings  8 30 
Showing ability (under pressure)   15 32 
Network-building*   17 33 
     * = a priori codes from literature review  
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Appendix IV 
 
First order codes were categorised (See table 1). As the study progressed towards 
a second tranche of data gathering, I identified twelve of the thirty themes (See 
table 2). Second order coding was cross referenced to explore alignment across 
themes and three broad practices began to emerge (See tables 3 and 4)
 
Table 1: first order coding and categorisation after second tranche of data 
gathering 
 
FIRST ORDER CODES  CATEGORIES  
Trustee showing good judgement Judgement-based trust and storytelling 
Referring to contracts Calculative-based trust and regulations 
Creating or referring to rules Calculative-based trust and regulations 
Consideration of the future of the financial 
services storytelling  
Trustee or trustor depending on someone or 
something managing knowledge flows  
Trustee showing predictable behaviour control  
Participants showing or acknowledging 
competence  ability-based trust  
Routines being established 
knowledge-based trust and managing 
knowledge 
Informal interactions and unplanned activities curating space  
Nonverbal communication curating space  
Trying to control behaviour 
curating space, control and American 
regulation 
Blaming others for the crisis  storytelling  
Regulation control  
European Legislation  European legislation 
British legislation British legislation  
Remuneration    
Banking   
Values 
identification-based trust and meditating 
knowledge flows  
loyalty to the organisation    
Acknowledgement of failures storytelling  
Basing opinions on data   
Referring to other organisations or individuals  ability-based trust / knowledge-based trust  
Showing fairness to others control and benevolence  
Appearing to be reliable Ability-based trust  
Showing goodwill towards others Identification-based trust  
Friendly behaviour Identification-based trust  
Working across the sector  Knowledge-based trust  
Personal ethics and showing accountability  Alignment of values 
References to previous TSC meetings   
Showing ability  Ability-based trust  
Network-building identification between participants 
  City of London**  
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Table 2: Coding from second tranche of data gathering 
 
SECOND ORDER CODING  SOURCES REFERENCES 
Ability-based trust  22 28 
Knowledge-based trust 19 25 
Identification-based trust 17 31 
Calculative-based trust  14 26 
Control  14 18 
American legislation 17 28 
European regulation 22 26 
City of London 17 28 
storytelling 13 19 
managing flows of information 12 22 
mediating flows of information 12 16 
Curating space  15 24 
 
 
Table 3: Further cross referencing of codes  
   
SECOND ORDER CODING SOURCES REFERENCES 
Identification and storytelling 10 15 
Ability and storytelling 8 13 
Calculative and curating space 15 19 
Control and curating space  6 22 
Calculative and managing knowledge flows 15 18 
Storytelling and City of London 11 14 
Mediating knowledge and European legislation 13 18 
managing knowledge and curating space 9 12 
 
 
Table 3: Categories and practices   
 
   
SECOND ORDER CODES PRACTICE 
Identification and storytelling Storytelling 
Ability and storytelling Storytelling 
Calculative and curating space Curating space 
Control and curating space  Curating space 
Calculative and managing knowledge flows Managing knowledge flows 
Storytelling and City of London Storytelling 
Mediating knowledge and European legislation Mediating knowledge 
managing knowledge and curating space Managing knowledge flows 
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Appendix V 
 
Indexing of themes from Bachmann et al., (2015) and first order coding  
 
FIRST ORDER CODES SE
N
SE
-M
A
K
IN
G
 
R
EL
A
TI
O
N
A
L 
R
EG
U
LA
TI
O
N
S 
A
N
D
 
C
O
N
TR
O
LS
 
ET
H
IC
A
L 
C
U
LT
U
R
E 
TR
A
N
SP
A
R
EN
C
Y
 
Trustee showing good judgement   x   x x 
Referring to contracts     x     
Creating or referring to rules     x     
Consideration of the future of the financial services x x       
Trustee or trustor depending on someone or something    x       
Trustee showing predictable behaviour     x     
[Participants showing or acknowledging competence]           
Routines being established     x   x 
Informal interactions and unplanned activities x x x     
Nonverbal communication x x       
Trying to control behaviour     x     
Blaming others for the crisis        x   
Regulation     x     
European Legislation      x     
British legislation     x     
Remuneration        x x 
banking   x x x x 
Values   x   x   
loyalty to the organisation      x   x 
Acknowledgement of failures       x x 
Basing opinions on data     x     
Referring to other organisations or individuals    x       
Showing fairness to others       x   
Appearing to be reliable       x x 
Showing goodwill towards others   x   x   
Friendly behaviour   x       
Working across the sector      x     
Personal ethics and showing accountability        x x 
[References to previous TSC meetings]           
Showing ability      x     
Network-building x x        
 
